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Abstract 
Contemporary academic and professional discourses on local African pharmaceutical manufacture 
have concentrated on technology, technology transfer, economies of scale, human capital, and 
markets for drugs; neglecting the financing of working capital and capital investment, and the role 
played by banks. When finance is discussed, it is not discussed in depth and it is divorced from 
innovation and complexities surrounding financing of local African pharmaceutical manufacture. 
In this study, I investigated the financing of antiretroviral drugs (ARV) manufacture in Zimbabwe 
focusing on sources of finance for working capital requirements and capital investment to import 
technology. I also investigated technological capabilities surrounding access to finance and loan 
origination at pharmaceutical companies and banks respectively. Using a case study approach and 
multiple methods for data collection, I interviewed over 50 respondents from three Zimbabwean 
pharmaceutical companies, nine commercial banks, and one regional financial institution in 
addition to local and regional pharmaceutical manufacturers and policy makers in 2011. I used 
examination, tabulation, categorisation and testing of data using both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence for data analysis. In line with literature on Zimbabwean enterprise finance, banks 
provided working capital finance but not capital investment finance. Bank short-term finance in 
conformity with African finance literature was characterised by high interest rates, high interest 
spreads, and low lending. The politics of lending offered an additional explanation to adverse 
selection and moral hazard explanations for the low lending, high interest rates, and high interest 
spreads in Zimbabwe. Pharmaceutical companies financed capital investment and a portion of 
working capital with internal funds, compromising rapid technological capability upgrading and 
innovation. Dependence on internal resources to fund capital investment and technology imports 
was driven by lack of investment and project finance capability to access offshore loans; as local 
banks could not advance foreign currency long-term loans. The theoretical implications of this 
study point to the need to unravel an African context of the finance and innovation nexus 
surrounding technological capability upgrading and innovation in local African pharmaceutical 
manufacture. Q f DON.i TiON 
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Chapter 1: Financing Local Pharmaceutical Production in Africa: The 
elephant in the room! 
1.0 What is the Big Story? 
Many sub-Saharan African countries face a real and present global health crisis because of an un-
proportionally high disease burden, high prevalence of neglected diseases, lack of access to 
medicines, importation of more than 90% of medicines and a general continental unpreparedness 
for epidemics (Africa Health Strategy, 2007; AU, 2007; WHO, 2005). For example, when there 
was a global flu pandemic threat in 2009, there were no plans or provisions for manufacture of 
vaccines for the African population, and if the pandemic had materialised in Africa the results 
would have been disastrous (AND! delegate, 2011 1). Turning to the issue of HIV/AIDS, as at 
2010, Zimbabwe had a population of 1.3 million living with HIV of which, 640 000 needed to be 
on antiretroviral drug treatment (NAC, 2010). The number of children orphaned due to 
unnecessary HIV/AIDS related deaths stood at 1 million in 20082, emphasising the urgency of 
access to antiretroviral treatment in Zimbabwe. 
The African health crisis is further exacerbated by the general low footprint and impact of local 
pharmaceutical production and innovation on Africa's medicines supply challenges (Africa Health 
Strategy, 2007; AU, 2007; WHO, 2005). To date many initiatives addressing the African 
medicines supply challenge come from the north; from a technology, and innovation perspective, 
as well as institutional innovations (social technologies) which gave rise to brokers and facilitators 
such as product development partnerships that are addressing access to medicine and innovation of 
health technologies for neglected diseases (Chataway et al., 2010). Given this background, it is not 
surprising that African local pharmaceutical manufacture has experienced a resurgence in recent 
years spearheaded by pan-African organisations such as AU (African Union), NEPAD (New 
1 I interacted with this global health expert at the ANDI conference in Ethiopia in 2011. 
2 http://www.avert.org!africa-hiv-aids-statistics.htm accessed 28 August, 2010 
1 
Partnership for Africa's Development) as well as regional economic bodies such as SADC 
(Southern Africa Development Committee) and EAC (East African Community) (Africa Health 
Strategy, 2007; AU, 2007; EAC PMPOA, 2011). 
The sub-Saharan African pharmaceutical industry however, is predominantly at the low end of the 
value chain, importing all active pharmaceutical ingredients (APls) and involved mainly in 
formulation and packaging activities except for companies in Ghana and South Africa which 
locally manufacture APIs (Kaplan and Laing, 2005; Mohammed, 2009). Consequently, calls for 
local production of drugs in Africa has met with mixed reactions and heated arguments based on 
technological capability, feasibility and economies of scale (Kaplan and Laing, 2005; Mohammed, 
2009; Rovira, 2006; Seiter, 2005; Turshen, 2001; UNIDO, 2010a, 201Ob, 2011b, 2011b; Wilson et 
a/.,2012). One school of thought argues that local pharmaceutical manufacture is good for Africa 
and should be encouraged from a health systems strengthening position, self-sufficiency, 
preparedness for epidemics, industrial development, economic growth, stimulating technological 
capability upgrading and innovation (see for example Bates, 2008; Mohammed, 2009; UNIDO 
20 11 b). Another group argues that many African country contexts, except a few major economies, 
lack economies of scale, human capital and technological capabilities, while supply and demand 
dynamics do not support such a heavy investment in local manufacture. As such import of cheap 
medicines and supply are key issues that need to be addressed (see for example Kaplan and Laing, 
2005). 
Literature that advocates for promotion of local pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa has to date 
focused on technology, technology transfer, human capital, markets for drugs, and economies of 
scale (AU, 2007, Bates, 2008; EAC PMPOA, 2011; Kaplan and Laing, 2005; Mohammed, 2009; 
UNIDO, 201Oa, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b) ignoring an in-depth analysis of complexities surrounding 
the financing of local drug manufacture. When finance is mentioned it is in passing lacking a 
detailed analysis. Chataway et al., (2009) when discussing technological trends and opportunities 
to combat diseases for the poor argued that scientific and technological breakthroughs and useful 
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innovations do not automatically translate to accessibility to the public; but African governments, 
industry, the international community and civil society need to purposively resolve funding, 
regulation, production and delivery issues. The recognition that finance is important for translation 
of breakthroughs into accessible health technologies reflects the focus on the need to understand 
complexities surrounding fmancing local pharmaceutical manufacture and sources of fmance for 
industrial development and technological capability upgrading. These sources of finance may 
include government, foreign direct investors, banks, venture capitalists or development fmancial 
institutions (see chapter 3). 
Contemporary debates by policy makers, industry players and agencies promoting African local 
pharmaceutical manufacture have focused on innovation, technology, technology transfer, 
economies of scale, markets for drugs and human capital whilst ignoring the critical subject of 
fmancing local drug manufacture. This is what I refer to as the "elephant in the room". In-depth 
analysis of firm level technological capabilities required by African pharmaceutical companies to 
access finance for working capital requirements and acquiring plant, equipment and machinery is 
lacking in contemporary literature on African pharmaceutical manufacture. Further to this, an in-
depth analysis of capabilities required by African fmancial institutions to prospect for viable 
projects to fund, carry out credit risk assessment and management, and monitoring and control of 
disbursed loans is scarce in African literature on banking and fmance. This is in spite of the 
universal identification of access to fmance, especially long term loans, to import plant, equipment 
and machinery as one of the major hurdles to African pharmaceutical industry development and 
innovation take off (Africa Health Strategy, 2007; AU, 2007; EAC PMPOA, 2011; Kaplan and 
Laing, 2005; Mohammed, 2009; UNlDO, 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b). Contemporary 
discourses either ignore or pay cursory attention to; who will finance, how they will fmance and 
why they will fmance African local pharmaceutical manufacture in that particular way. This study 
seeks to contribute towards filling this gap in knowledge. 
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I argue that the "elephant in the room" on fmancing African local pharmaceutical production 
debates is that it is not as simple as going to the bank or fmancier and getting money for day to day 
operations and importing plant, equipment and machinery. Contemporary discourses also ignore 
the link between fmance and innovation. Some innovation thinkers, for example Mytelka (2003) 
and Christensen (1992) pointed out the link between fmance and innovation, but this was more in 
general discourse about dynamics for catch up and the role of fmance in national systems of 
innovation. What is glaringly apparent though is the lack of in-depth empirically backed 
discussions and analyses on the complexity surrounding fmancing local pharmaceutical production 
in Africa, and the link between finance and innovation. There are complexities surrounding access 
to fmance by pharmaceutical companies for importing technology that can result in technological 
capability upgrading. For pharmaceutical companies to access finance there are capabilities and 
technical competencies required such as investment and project fmance underpinned by knowledge 
and experience (see chapters 5, 6 and 7). The same argument stands for fmanciers where there are 
intricate capabilities and technical competencies required such as prospecting for viable projects, 
project fmance appraisal, managing lending technologies, credit risk analysis, credit risk 
management, loan documentation, loan advance, and loan monitoring and control (see chapters 3, 5 
and 6). I also argue that some of the ignored complexities surrounding fmancing local 
pharmaceutical manufacture are bank institutional factors. The bank institutional behaviours 
constituting the politics of lending drive preference for lending to multinational corporates and 
their subsidiaries over local companies. These institutional factors also push for a preference for 
transactional banking over traditional lending as a key source of revenue for the business. These 
bank institutional behavioural characteristics driven by bank ownership, credit policies, 
underwriting standards, revenue generation strategies have to date been ignored in contemporary 
discourses (see chapter 6). Finally, I argue that there are policy and practice gridlocks, emanating 
from national technological capability failure and policy conflict that cause finns to invest in 
alternative infrastructure as a compensatory strategy. 
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I set up the rest of the chapter as follows: in section 1.1, I discuss the gap in knowledge, followed 
by my decision to focus on Zimbabwe in section 1.2. I discuss the research questions in section 
1.3, and in section 1.4, I present briefly the theoretical framework. I discuss the objectives of the 
study in section 1.5 followed by what this study contributes to knowledge in section 1.6. I focus on 
the relevance of the study to African pharmaceutical manufacturing in section 1.7 and conclude 
with section 1.8. 
1.1 Where is the Gap in Knowledge? 
As discussed earlier contemporary innovation, industrial development and technological 
capabilities studies and literature on African pharmaceutical manufacturing focus on technology, 
technological capabilities, technology transfer, human skills and economies of scale (Anderson, 
2010; Bates, 2008; Kaplan and Laing, 2005, Rovira, 2006; UNCTAD, 2011; UNIDO 2010a, 
201Ob, 20lla, 20llb; Wilson et al., 2012). This body of literature ignores the critical cog of 
fmance and its link to innovation and ultimately industrial development in Mrica. African fmance 
literature addresses lending issues and the challenges faced in enterprise financing. In general it 
focuses on the prevalence of high interest rates, high interest spreads and high incidence of moral 
hazard and adverse selection (Andrianova et ai, 2010, 20lla, 20llb; Aryeetey et al., 1997; Beck 
and Hesse, 2009; Beck et al., 2009, 2011; Nissanke, 2001; Sacerdoti, 2005). This literature is 
useful in illuminating the enterprise fmancing terrain. However, it does not focus on the fmancing 
of the pharmaceutical sector, the link between fmance and technological capability upgrading and 
innovation. It also does not address the complexities surrounding seeking and giving finance as 
discussed earlier and thus does not delve into the politics of lending. Innovation literature on 
African pharmaceutical production covers the technological aspects of production and mentions 
finance as a major hurdle (Anderson, 2010; Bates, 2008; Kaplan and Laing, 2005, Rovira, 2006; 
UNCTAD, 2011; UNIDO 2010a, 201Ob, 2011a, 2011b; Wilson et al., 2012). However, and this is 
the major gap in knowledge; there is no literature that purposively addresses the link between 
fmance and technological capability upgrading and innovation in local pharmaceutical manufacture 
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in Africa, considering and analysing the politics behind lending and banking activities, and the 
interactions between firms and banks at fum level. 
I elaborate on the complexity of financing local pharmaceutical manufacture ignored in 
contemporary discourses in Fig 1 below. I developed the framework using ideas on technological 
capabilities (Lall, 1992), and the role of banks as key economic units adding value to borrowers as 
they deal with and manage risk (Berger and Black, 2011; Allen and Santomero, 1997, 2001; 
Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000, 2003) and my practice experience as a banker and data from 
the field. I discuss the theoretical framework in detail in chapter 3. In analyses of pharmaceutical 
companies' firm level technological capabilities, investment and project finance capabilities have 
been ignored. The top phase of Fig 1 illustrates this argument. The capability of the project 
fmance team, especially the fmance function to link with and leverage interactions and knowledge 
from enginecring, production, quality control, research and development and procurement 
functions to produce a robust project fmance proposal for the fmanciers (see Fig 1), I argue is 
lacking in discourses on fmancing local pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa. These technical 
competencies cannot be taken as a given. 
The same gap in knowledge exists with respect to fmancial institutions. There are technological 
capabilities required by relationship managers, credit risk managers, approvers, and regulators as 
they use lending technologies, investment capabilities and linkage capabilities in assessing credit 
proposals, advancing loans, and monitoring and controlling companies (see chapters 3, 6 and 8). 
The process of credit risk management, where the team assesses business risk, industry risk, 
management risk and country risk amongst other risks (as shown in Fig 1), is complex. There are 
technological capabilities embedded in interactions with institutional policies on credit, 
underwriting standards, revenue generation streams, client preference amongst other factors that 
drive the politics of lending. This is the gap in knowledge with respect to fmancial institutions and 
the complexities ignored in debates on local pharmaceutical manufacture, where only casual 
mention of fmance as a hurdle to local drug manufacture is made. 
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From an innovation perspective to unravel some of the complexities involved in financing local 
pharmaceutical manufacture, I follow Lall's (1992) definition of firm level technological 
capabilities. He proposed that technological capabilities were made up of investment capabilities, 
production capabilities and linkage capabilities. Investment capabilities were defined as "the skills 
needed to identify, prepare, obtain technology for, design, construct, equip, staff and commission a 
new facility (or expansion)" (Lall, 1992: 168). Production capabilities were defined as "range from 
basic skills such as quality control, operation, and maintenance to more advanced ones such as 
adaptation, improvement, or equipment stretching to the most demanding ones of research, design, 
and innovation" (LaB, 1992: 168). And he defined linkage capabilities as ''the skills needed to 
transmit information, skills and technology to, and receive them from, component or raw material 
suppliers, subcontractors, consultants, service firms, and technology institutions" (LaB, 1992: 168). 
In contributing to knowledge on the identified gap, I focus on finance and technological 
capabilities surrounding access to finance, because in the link between finance and innovation, 
finance can serve as both a lubricant and fuel determining the success of ventures in part and the 
velocity of technological capability upgrading, innovation and industrial development of the 
pharmaceutical sector. Whilst I acknowledge that finance is not the panacea, I argue that finance; 
project finance, attendant technological capabilities and the politics of lending are key components 
that need to be analysed in addition to technology, human capital, technology transfer and 
innovation in contemporary discourses on local pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa. 
Admittedly, finance is part of an integrated technological capability and innovation system, but its 
importance and neglect, and the complexity surrounding accessing finance to date warrants a 
separate in-depth analysis in this instance. The thrust of this thesis is therefore to understand the 
following: the sources and cost of finance for working capital and capital investment for 
Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies manufacturing antiretroviral drugs (ARVs); the 
technological capabilities at pharmaceutical companies and banks key to accessing finance; the 
politics of lending in financial institutions, and the implications for technological capability 
upgrading and innovation. 
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1.2 Focus of the Study 
Firstly, I look at sources of [mance; who provides [mance; how they provide the [mance and why 
they are the providers of the finance for local ARV drug manufacture in Zimbabwe. In this study, I 
split finance into working capital and capital investment [mance. Secondly, I focus on the 
complexities surrounding fmance at the pharmaceutical company and at the commercial bank. For 
the pharmaceutical company I focus on Lall's (1992) firm level technological capabilities matrix 
covering investment capability made up of pre-investment and project execution, and I add project 
finance capability (see chapter 3 and 5). For the commercial bank, I focus on technical 
competencies, skills and knowledge involved in prospecting, project appraisal, credit risk 
assessment and management, loan disbursement, and monitoring and control activities. I also focus 
on how commercial banks' strategies on revenue streams and how this affects lending. At national 
level, I follow Lall's (1992) national level technological capability framework to focus on business 
and environmental factors that affect operations of pharmaceutical companies and commercial 
banks. 
1.2.1 Why Zimbabwe and ARV manufacture? 
In this section I discuss why I chose Zimbabwe as the country of study and specifically ARV drug 
manufacture. 
Zimbabwe in 1990 was, after South Africa, touted as the African country with potential to become 
the next newly industrialising country because it had an established and vibrant manufacturing 
sector (Pangeti et al., 2000; Phimister, 2000; Riddell, 1990; Stoneman, 1990). Zimbabwe is a clear 
counterexample to the argument that African countries do not have the capability to locally 
manufacture drugs. Zimbabwe is capable of producing 50% of all drugs on the essential drugs list, 
9 
and if all formulation and development activities are taken into account then the capability rises to 
supplying 75% of all national medicines on the essential drugs list (NECF, 2011). In the case of 
local ARV manufacture, Zimbabwe was one of the first African countries to use the compulsory 
route to effect local production of ARVs for public use (Osewe et al., 2008; UNIDO, 2011b) to 
address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The country's use of the compulsory route accelerated local 
manufacture of ARVs (antiretroviral drugs) in 2003 demonstrating the political will, policy 
infrastructure and local pharmaceutical manufacturing capability (Osewe et al., 2008; UNIDO, 
2007; UNIDO, 2011b). Demonstrating a policy and practice willingness to support the local 
industry, the government promised to procure 75% of all ARV production for the public health 
system, with the balance of 25% exported to raise foreign currency for the company (Osewe et al., 
2008; UNIDO, 2007; UNIDO, 2011b). 
The Zimbabwean pharmaceutical industry was set up in 1953, (UN, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c; UNIDO, 
2007; UNIDO 2011b) giving almost 60 years to allow for technological capability upgrading, 
product and process iImovation and vertical integration. The reality though is that the 
pharmaceutical industry in the 60 years it has been in existence has not exhibited a remarkable 
technological capability upgrading effort or product and process innovation or vertical integration 
to venture into primary production of drugs or intermediates (Osewe et aI., 2008; UNIDO, 2007; 
UNIDO,2011b). The pharmaceutical activity has remained mainly in secondary manufacture and 
highly dependent on imports of key raw materials such as active pharmaceutical ingredients and 
excipients (Osewe et aI., 2008; UNIDO, 2007; UNIDO, 2011b). 
In spite of the early promises in the 1990s of being the next newly industrialising country, the 
dream however, did not materialise. Zimbabwe thus represents a country that has fallen back on 
the earlier industrial gains achieved as early as the 1960s to 1980s (Pangeti et al., 2000; Phimister, 
2000; Riddell, 1990; Stoneman, 1990). Zimbabwe; a country emerging from a hyperinflationary 
era as a case study presents an interesting but complex candidate to study the financing of local 
pharmaceutical manufacture, in this case ARVs. As a case study, Zimbabwe has the potential to 
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precipitate and surface many issues, all at once, about what can go wrong in an economy with a 
once vibrant pharmaceutical industry that gave the government confidence to issue a compulsory 
license for local manufacture of ARVs. Zimbabwe can be used as a microcosm with an accelerated 
window to study the myriad of challenges that African countries can face in financing local 
pharmaceutical manufacture. 
Building on the fact that Zimbabwe can surface many issues all at once pertaining to finanCing 
local manufacture of AR V s, Zimbabwe is also interesting to study because it went through three 
dramatic politico-economic eras (Mutenheri and Green, 2002; Phimister, 2000). First it went 
through the federation era followed by unilateral declaration of independence (1965-1979) and had 
sanctions imposed during that period (Mutenheri and Green, 2002; Phimister, 2000). Secondly, the 
first decade of independence (1980 -1990) was characterised by a closed economy followed by 
economic structural adjustment programmes of 1991 that led to liberalisation of financial markets 
and concomitant de-industrialisation (Mutenheri and Green, 2002; Phimister, 2000). Finally, the 
country went through the politico-economic challenges of 2000 to 2009 accompanied by 
hyperinflation, international isolation, fmancial dis-intennediation, and scarcity of foreign currency 
and long-tenn finance (Mutenheri and Green, 2002; Phimister, 2000). An analysis of the 
challenges faced by the Zimbabwean pharmaceutical industry in financing local manufacture 
considering this background brings out nuances peculiar to Zimbabwe. As such, some of the 
challenges to fmancing local manufacturing of ARVs may be particular to Zimbabwe with its 
idiosyncrasies. However, there are lessons that may have universal appeal that other African 
countries and indeed other developing countries can learn from Zimbabwe. 
1.3 Research Questions 
As argued earlier, fmance is one of the major requirements for any project to succeed. As such 
focusing on who provides capital, how they provide the capital (lending technologies and politics 
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of lending) and at what premium (price in the form of interest and other fees) helps in advancing an 
understanding of fmance as one important factor, often neglected that can drive technological 
capability upgrading and innovation. 
The main research question for the study was: How is local manufacture of ARVs in Zimbabwe 
financed and what are the complexities and technological capabilities surrounding its 
financing? 
By necessity I split the type of fmancing into working capital finance (financing day to day 
operations of an enterprise) and capital investment fmance, which covers core working capital 
requirements and acquisition of plant, machinery and equipment (capital investment/fixed 
investment). 
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1.3.1 Sub-research questions 
In order to unravel the complexity surrounding fmancing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe I then 
split up the main research question into five sub-research questions as follows: 
Research question 1: How are capital investment and working capital requirements for ARV 
research and development, and manufacture fmanced? 
Research question 2: As the most prevalent source of external finance for enterprises, what role 
do commercial banks play in financing AR V manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
Research question 3: At firm level, what technological capabilities are required for 
pharmaceutical companies to access finance and the expertise and 
capabilities at banks required for loan origination? 
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Research question 4: What institutional factors drive bank strategy on revenue streams, lending, 
who to lend to and at what price? 
Research question 5: What are the key business and operating environmental factors that 
influence financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
I am focusing on the link between fmance and innovation, specifically technological capability 
upgrading that can result in product and process innovation after acquisition and importation of 
capital equipment; the hardware component of technology. I used an eclectic synthesis of 
economic, social, and financial history linked to fmance, corporate finance theory, contemporary 
banking and fmancial intermediation theories as well as innovation literature on technological 
capability framework. In order to build the theoretical framework I looked at historical sources of 
fmance for enterprises, and used pecking order theory to understand how companies decide to use 
which form of fmance. Banks emerged as the most prevalent source of external fmance, thus I 
looked at contemporary banking and financial intermediation theory to understand what banks do 
and how they do it. The link with innovation came through Lall's (1992) technological capability 
framework as well as Ernst and Lundvall's (1997) knowing and learning aspect of innovation 
covering the know-who, know-how and know-why aspects of knowledge. 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
The objective of the study was to understand how local ARV manufacture was fmanced; the 
sources of fmance for capital investment for importing machinery and equipment; the hardware of 
technology and the sources of fmance for working capital finance (see chapters S, 6 and 8). 
Another objective of the study was to unravel the complexities and technological capabilities 
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surrounding ftnancing local manufacture of ARVs in Zimbabwe by looking at ftrm level 
technological capabilities at the phannaceutical company involved in accessing fmance, as well as 
the fum level technological capabilities at the bank involved in assessing projects and loan 
advances (see chapters 5, 6 and 8). The third objective was to understand the politics oflending, in 
the interaction between banks and pharmaceutical companies and understand how this affects 
access to finance for local pharmaceutical companies (see chapters 6 and 8). The fourth objective 
was to understand how failure of technological capability at national level could elicit a 
compensatory response at firm level with investment in alternative infrastructure and thus causing 
policy and practice gridlocks manifesting as business and operating environmental hurdles (see 
chapter 7). In order to achieve these objectives, I carried out a case study of the fmancing of ARV 
manufacture in Zimbabwe using a fmance lens, within an innovation and technological capability 
framework to tease out the relationship between finance and innovation and the role played by 
banks in technological capability upgrading and industrial development in the Zimbabwean 
" pharmaceutical industry. 
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge 
My contribution to knowledge is from both an empirical and theoretical basis. Empirically my 
contribution to knowledge comes from the novelty of the study, which links fmance and innovation 
by considering the technological capability complexities surrounding financing of local 
manufacture at the pharmaceutical company and the bank. The other empirical contribution comes 
from the study considering the role played by commercial banks in technological capability 
upgrading and innovation for local pharmaceutical manufacturing in an African context (see 
chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8). To the best of my knowledge, this is the ftrst study of this kind in 
Zimbabwe and in Africa. 
14 
From a theoretical basis, my contribution to knowledge lies firstly in the modification of Lall's 
(1992) firm level technological capability framework to include project finance capability (see 
chapter 3). Lall (1992) may broadly have classified this ability under investment but I argue that it 
is of importance and needs to stand-alone but linked to investment capability. My second 
theoretical contribution to knowledge is the politics of lending explanation on low lending in 
Africa, accompanied by high interest rates and high interest spreads. These to date have been 
explained using only moral hazard and adverse selection explanations (see chapter 6 and 8). 
1.7 Relevance of Study to Africa and African Pharmaceutical Manufacture 
The research informs broader policy and practice debates on financing of local pharmaceutical 
manufacture in African contexts. It also explores challenges to financing technological capability 
upgrading and innovation in the African pharmaceutical industry. The fmdings have broad practice 
and policy implications at two levels. 
1. First, relevance of the study comes from its surfacing of the implications of the 
technological capabilities surrounding finance and project fmance capability for industrial 
development and innovation. It focuses on the challenges, the politics of lending, and the 
dynamics of fmancing technological advance and what needs to be addressed to unlock 
latent potential. 
2. Second, focusing on policy and practice, the discussion on the politics of lending and 
policy and practice gridlocks unravels some· up to now unincorporated issues for 
consideration and discussion in local pharmaceutical manufacturing debates in Africa. The 
raising of the implications of the politics of lending and policy and practice gridlocks 
driven by national financial architectures is timely for national and continental debates. 
Especially so considering local pharmaceutical manufacture programmes being promoted 
by the African Union (AU), Southern Africa Development Corporation (SADC), African 
Network for Drugs and Diagnostics Innovation (ANDn, Southern Africa Generics 
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Manufacturers Association, East Africa Phannaceutical Manufacturing Plan of Action 
group, West Africa Phannaceutical Manufacturing Association and the Federation of 
African Manufacturers Association initiatives, to mention a few. 
Whilst I acknowledge that Zimbabwe may have peculiar economic, macroeconomic and political 
circumstances; the findings however, at strategic, policy and practice levels are relevant for 
strategy and policy formulation on financing technological capability upgrading and industrial 
development of the phannaceutical sector in Africa in general. As mentioned earlier, the 
Zimbabwean situation precipitates rapidly factors and actors needed to address financing of local 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals in a developing country context. The whole thrust is on financing 
technological capability upgrading and innovation and at a theoretical level there is relevance in the 
Zimbabwean experience for other African countries. 
As mentioned earlier, Zimbabwe's phannaceutical manufacturing industry was established as early 
as 1953 and the country's health system was historically less dependent on imported drugs 
(Turshen,200l). To date the industry is capable of supplying 50% of the country's essential drugs 
rising to 75% if formulations under development are taken into consideration (UNIDO, 2011 b). As 
such the Zimbabwean pharmaceutical industry presents an opportunity to study an industry that 
prior to the economic downturn of the 2000s was successfully supplying a huge portion of local 
health system drug requirements. The policy and support mechanisms that the country used to 
nurture and grow the pharmaceutical industry can provide other African countries with policy and 
practice lessons. Zimbabwe was also the first African country to use the compulsory licensing 
route to locally manufacture ARVs for the public health system and therefore stands to give lessons 
that other countries can learn from the ARV manufacturing trajectory. 
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1.8 Structure of Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is set up as follows: Chapter 1 gives the background to Zimbabwe's political 
economy, secondary manufacturing, the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector, financial systems 
and historically, how industrialisation was fmanced. This chapter gives context to the Zimbabwe 
situation. Chapter 2 also reviews literature on African financial systems and pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. Chapter 3 is the second portion of literature review that focuses on building the 
theoretical framework that I used in this study. In Chapter 4, I present the methodology and 
methods I used to carry out this study, discussing the case study approach and multiple-methods for 
data collection, as well as analysis of the data. In Chapter 5, I discuss, using a fmance lens within 
an innovation and technological capability framework, the business of ARV manufacture covering 
procurement, research and development, production, and marketing of ARVs. I look at the sources 
and cost offmance for working capital requirements (including trade credit) and capital investment. 
In Chapter 6 I analyse the role of banks in fmancing ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe, 
technological capabilities involved in lending, the politics of lending as embodied in credit policies, 
underwriting standards and institutional behaviour. I explore the determinants of allocation of 
credit to pharmaceutical companies and current sources of fmance for working capital and capital 
investment. In Chapter 7, I explore the business and operating environment within which the 
I fmancial institutions and the phannaceutical companies operate. Using the technological capability 
framework of Lall (1992) I discuss how national technological capabilities drive the business and 
operating environment, and how failure at national technological capability level drive a 
compensatory response at company level technological capability resulting in policy and practice 
gridlocks and how firm level investment results in alternative infrastructure further driving up the 
cost of doing business. In Chapter 8, I analyse the empirical fmdings from chapter 5, 6 and 7 
addressing the research questions. In chapter 9, I discuss the significance of the results in light of 
the argument advanced in chapter 1 about financing of local pharmaceutical manufacture being 
ignored in contemporary discourses. I discuss the fmdings of the study; what they contribute to 
knowledge and what the implications for African local pharmaceutical manufacture and 
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technological capability are. I conclude the chapter by pointing at further opportunities for 
research and some policy recommendations. 
, 
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Chapter 2: Background to Zimbabwe: Tracing Key Events 
2.0 Introduction 
In chapter 1, I discussed how academic and professional debates on local phannaceutical 
manufacturing in Africa neglect the complex issue of fmancing local pharmaceutical manufacture. 
I pointed out the complexity surrounding fmancing local pharmaceutical manufacture and argued 
that it is not just about money but there are technological capabilities, lending technologies, skills 
and expertise, politics of lending and policy and practice gridlocks involved. In this chapter, I 
discuss the political economy, manufacturing, banking and phannaceutical production context for 
Zimbabwe. I also discuss African financial systems and phannaceutical manufacturing. I set up 
the chapter as follows: in section 2.1, I discuss local pharmaceutical manufacture, and African 
phannaceutical manufacture in section 2.2. In section 2.3, I discuss African financial systems, 
which leads into a discussion on the background to Zimbabwe's political economy in section 2.4. I 
move on to the rise of manufacturing in section 2.5 and the country's fmancial architecture in 
section 2.6. In section 2.7, I discuss financing Zimbabwean enterprises and industrial development. 
Zimbabwe's pharmaceutical manufacturing landscape is the subject of discussion in section 2.8 and 
I present the story of local antiretroviral manufacturing in Zimbabwe in section 2.9. I conclude the 
I chapter with section 2.8. 
2.1 Local Pharmaceutical Manufacture 
In this section, I discuss some of the discourses about what local pharmaceutical manufacture is 
and nuances from economic, social, political, and policy arenas. African local pharmaceutical 
manufacture draws in issues of economic development, industrial development, industrial policy, 
trade policy, and global health to mention a few (UNIDO, 20 11 b). At the core of the African local 
pharmaceutical manufacturing argument is the issue of increasing local supplies of drugs for the . 
public health system and lowering cost of medicines. Other arguments encompass self-sufficiency, 
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disaster preparedness, economic growth and industrial development (Africa Health Strategy, 2007; 
Anderson, 2010; AU, 2007; Bates, 2008; Rovira, 2006; UNCTAD, 2011; Wilson et al., 2012). 
From the demand side, the rise in global health donor funding has increased markets for drugs, 
especially ARVs, antimalarials and TB (tuberculosis) drugs and has acted as a pull factor for local 
pharmaceutical manufacture in Africa (Rovira, 2006; UNIDO 20 lOa, 20l0b, 2011 a, 20 11 b). 
Supplying medicines to global health donor funded programmes however came with complications 
of expensive multiple regulatory approvals. For example WHO-prequalification is a key 
requirement for donor funded programmes and it comes with increased costs for local companies. 
Local drug manufacture in Africa is complex and can involve multiple actors at firm, national, 
regional and international policy, practice and strategic levels (UNIDO, 20 lOa, 20 lOb, 2011a, 
2011 b). As mentioned earlier local pharmaceutical manufacturing discourses span global health, 
access to meClicines, neglected diseases, industrial development, economic development and social 
development debates (Bates, 2008; Kaplan and Laing, 2005; Turshen, 2001, Nwaka et al., 2012). 
At national level, local drug manufacturing, reflective of general manufacturing issues pans out 
into policy and practice domains of incentives, capability, and institutions (Lall, 1992; UNIDO, 
2010a, 201Ob, 2011a, 2011b; Wade, 2009). Local pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa is about 
policy and practice paradigms of institutional innovation, national systems of innovation, 
technological capabilities, drug regulation and harmonisation translating into health technologies 
and innovations that benefit the poor (Chataway et al., 2009; LaIl, 1992; UNIDO, 2010a, 201Ob, 
2011 a, 20 11 b). Local pharmaceutical manufacture is also about developing countries' industrial 
catch up, government's role in protecting nascent industry and technological effort (Christensen, 
1992; Mytelka, 2003; Wade, 2009). Advocates of local drug production argue that local 
manufacture is about Africa determining its health technologies innovation strategies and 
medicines supply (Africa Health Strategy, 2007; Anderson, 2010; AU, 2007; Nwaka et al., 2012; 
UNCTAD,2011). Local pharmaceutical manufacture in Africa is also about leveraging efforts by 
African governments and pan African institutions such as the African Network for Drugs and 
Diagnostics Innovation (ANOn to coordinate drugs, diagnostics and vaccine innovation 
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capabilities on the continent to solve the disproportionately high disease burden on the continent 
(Nwaka et al., 2012). 
2.2 African Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 
In the preceding section, I discussed local phannaceutical manufacture. In this section, I discuss 
sub-Saharan African phannaceutical manufacturing to build a more comprehensive picture. 
The global pharmaceutical industry is complex, and highly dynamic, characterized by high research 
and development (R&D) expenditures and extensive regulation of products compared to other 
manufacturing industries (Berger et al; 2009; Kaplan and Laing, 2005; Rovira, 2006). However, 
African pharmaceutical companies are mostly involved in generics manufacture and limited to 
formulation activities only except for Ghana and South Africa to some extent (Berger et al., 2009; 
Kaplan and Laing, 2005; UNIDO 2011 b). Data on pharmaceutical manufacturing on the continent 
is scarce and fragmented (Berger et al., 2009; Kaplan and Laing, 2005; UNIDO 2011b). However, 
UNIDO, GIZ and NEP AD have made efforts to build knowledge of the manufacturing capabilities 
on the continent; and this study benefitted immensely from these studies (Berger et al., 2009; EAC 
I PMPOA, 2011; UNIDO, 2010a, 20 lOb, 2011 a, 2011b). To date, UNIDO has published 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities scans for Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwean 
(UNIDO, 2007, 201Oa, 20tOb, 20 11 a, 2011b). In East Africa, GIZ, the Germany development 
agency in conjunction with the East African Community mapped out the manufacturing capabilities 
of Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda (EACPMPOA, 2011; GIZ, 2007a, 2007b). Of 
these five countries, the major manufacturing companies are in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
(EACPMPOA, 2011; GIZ, 2007a, 2007b). 
Thirty seven of the fifty six African countries possess some pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capability with as mentioned earlier, South Africa and Ghana the only countries in sub-Saharan 
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Mrica with limited production of active pharmaceutical ingredient (APO and intennediates (Berger 
et aI, 2009; GTZ, 2007a, 2007b; IFC, 2008; Kaplan and Laing, 2005; UNCTAD, 2011; UNIDO, 
20 lOa, 20l0b, 20lIa, 2011b). Production of pharmaceuticals in Africa is heavily reliant on 
imported active pharmaceutical ingredients (APls) and excipients from India and China (UNIDO, 
20l0a, 20l0b, 20lla, 20llb). The local pharmaceutical manufacturing companies serve a small 
proportion of their population and hence the arguments on unattainability of economies of scale 
(Berger et aI, 2009; Kaplan and Laing, 2005; UNCTAD, 2011; WHO, 2005, 2011). 
Africa's share of medicines production has continued to decline and current efforts to increase local 
manufacture are a response to this decline (WHO, 2005). The African Union (AU, 2007 and 
Berger et ai, 2009) argue that there is a business case for local drug manufacture, but recognised 
that some countries might have neither the capacity nor capability to go it alone. NEP AD also 
recognised tbis limitation in devising the Strengthening Pharmaceutical Innovation in Africa 
strategy (Berger et al., 2009). NEP AD acknowledged that countries are at different levels of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capability and proposed a phased approach to localisation of drug 
production (ibid). Countries at advanced stages would be encouraged to go for local production 
while the resource poor countries would be encouraged to aim for access strategies (ibid). 
UNCTAD (2011) also gave policy guidelines to policy makers and investment promotion agencies 
for local pharmaceutical manufacturing. However, what is missing from these strategies and policy 
recommendations is who will flnance local pharmaceutical manufacture, and how they manage the 
complexities involved in fmancing technological capability upgrading and innovation. 
In the next section, I discuss African fmancial systems to give context to the flnancial architecture 
in sub·Saharan Africa. 
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2.3 African Financial Systems 
In section 2.2, I briefly discussed pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa. The industry is 
dispersed and spread throughout the continent but, data is scant and the majority of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing plants are privately owned, and involved in secondary and tertiary drug 
manufacturing activities. Of the strategies advanced by African regional bodies3, none addressed 
who will finance, and how they will fmance local pharmaceutical manufacture. In this section, I 
briefly discuss fmancial systems in sub-Saharan Africa in order to situate in the African context, 
Zimbabwe's fmancial systems (see section 2.6). The brief overview covers the financial 
architecture and key fmdings on financial systems and fmancing enterprises in Africa. 
Allen et a/., (2011) give a comprehensive review of African financial systems. They acknowledge 
the huge economic and cultural diversity on the continent and different economic blocs and hence 
difficulties in generalising (ibid). Allen et a/., (2011) split the continent on geographical basis into; 
North Africa, West Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. Using these geographical groupings, 
they discussed banking systems, the insurance sector, the stock markets, bond markets, the 
derivatives market, private equity, pension funds and other non-bank financial institutions and 
microfmance institutions (ibid). Beck et al., (2009) also looked at fmance in Africa focusing on the 
challenges, achievements, and the role of government in expanding financial sectors and the role 
played by foreign banks. 
The picture that emerges of sub-Saharan African fmancial systems is that in most countries, the 
dominant fmancial institution is the commercial bank and secondly in many countries the major 
banks are foreign owned (Allen et a/., 2011, Beck and Hesse, 2009; Beck et a/., 2009, 2011, 2009). 
Foreign banks are thought to have brought more benefits than risks to countries of operation, 
however as I will argue in chapters 6 and 7, they have also driven the politics of lending that causes 
3 These strategies pertain to a phased approach to local production covering Issues such as technology 
transfer, markets and economies of scale. 
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credit rationing. The nature of the foreign banks has changed over time from international 
subsidiaries of European banks to regional banks based on the African continent (Allen et al., 2011, 
Beck and Hesse, 2009; Beck et al., 2009, 2011, 2009). The major African regional banks are 
Ecobank (Ecobank website4), Standard Bank of South Africa trading as Stanbic outside South 
Africa (Standard Bank website'). 
African banks charge high interests for debt finance, and have high interest spreads (Andrianova et 
al., 2010; 20lla; 2011b; Beck and Hesse, 2009; Beck et al., 2009, 2011; Demetriades and Gregory, 
2011; Mugizi et al., 2009; Nissanke, 2001). The banks characteristically have high liquidity and 
exhibit low lending ratios to avoid high loan defaults (Andrianova et al., 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 
Mugizi et al., 2009; Nissanke, 200). Moral hazard and adverse selection (see section 3.5.1) are 
reported to be high and are used to explain why African banks lend so little compared to other 
developing countries (Andrianova et al., 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Aryeetey et al., 1997; Nissanke, 
2001). The general belief that high moral hazard frequency and adverse selection lead to low 
lending has been used by banks to argue that there are few fundable projects, whereas the 
entrepreneurs on the other hand argue that the banks do not know their businesses (asymmetric 
infonnation barriers), are risk averse and would rather lend "safely" to government (Andrianova et 
al., 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Aryeetey et al., 1997; Nissanke, 2001). 
Africa's financial systems are characterised by foreign ownership of financial institutions, 
commercial bank domination, and minimal fmancial development (Allen et ai, 2011; Beck and 
Hesse, 2009; Beck et al., 2009, 2011). The low fmanciaI systems depth, breadth and efficiencies 
result in an inability to fmance Iong-tenn projects from African savings as risk, liquidity, and 
maturity transfonnation activities are subdued (Beck and Hesse, 2009; Beck et aI., 2009, 2011) (see 
also section 3.5.2 and chapters 6 and 8). The commercial bank dominated financial system exhibits 
low product and process innovation, as well as low domestic savings of a long-tenn nature hence 
.. http://www.ecobank.comlgroup/aboutus.aspx.accessed 12 April, 2012 
S http://www.standardbank.comlOverview.aspx.Accessed 12 April, 2012 
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the inability to finance long term loans (Beck and Hesse, 2009; Beck et al., 2009, 2011). Given 
this background it is not surprising that enterprise fmancing is expensive and confmed mainly to 
short term fmance characterised by high interest rates and high interest rate spreads (Allen et al .• 
2011; Andrianova et aI, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Beck and Hesse, 2009; Beck et al., 2009, 2011; 
Fowowe, 2011; Nissanke, 2001). 
For equity fmance, African capital markets are not developed except for South Africa and to a 
lesser extent Nigeria (Beck and Hesse, 2009; Beck et al., 2009, 2011). The capital markets 
therefore do not playa significant role in African financial systems and fmancing of enterprises. 
The major African developmental fmancial institutions are the African Development Bank 
(AfDB6) and the Development Bank of Southern African (DBSA\ whilst Afreximbank8 is the key 
player in fmancing trade business on the continent. The African Finance Corporation (AFC9) a 
private corporation has emerged to fmance long-term projects in Africa. The PTA bank10 (Eastern 
and Southern African Trade and Development Bank) domiciled in Kenya is another pan African 
financial institution that has been active in medium to long term fmance as well as financing trade 
business. The developmental fmancial institutions are characterised by ownership by governments 
and board positions held by Ministers of Finance or Central bank Governors. The regional 
development fmancial institutions' perception of the Africa risk appears somewhat different from 
foreign owned financial institutions, and domestic banks resulting in them fmancing enterprises 
where others have since stopped. Zimbabwe is a case in point (see chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
The picture that emerges is that even though it is diffIcult to generalise for Africa as a whole, its 
financial systems are broadly underdeveloped, major financial institutions are foreign owned, and 
many financial systems are commercial bank dominated (Andrianova et aI, 2010, 20lla, 2011b; 
Beck and Hesse, 2009; Beck et al., 2009, 2011; Dailami and Walton, 1989; Fowowe, 2011; 
6 http://www.afdb.orglenlabout-usl, accessed 12 April, 2012 
7 http://www.dbsa.orgJPages/default.aspx, accessed 12 April, 2012 
8 http://afreximbank.comlafreximleniAboutUs.aspx, accessed 12 April, 2012 
9 http://www.africafc.orgl?page_id=499£ accessed 12 April, 2012 
10 http://www.ptabank.org/index.php?page=Mission-Vision, accessed 12 April, 2012 
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Fafchamps et al., 1995; Nissanke, 2001). The banks charge high interest rates, have high interest 
spreads and operate mostly in the short-term fmancing spectrum (Andrianova et aI, 2010, 2011a, 
2011 b; Nissanke, 2001). The most viable, stable, liquid and profitable fmancial institutions tend to 
be foreign owned (Allen et aI, 2011). Equity fmance is scarce because capital markets are 
underdeveloped except for South Africa and maybe Nigeria (Beck et al., 2009). As a result capital 
markets do not play a key role in raising long-term fmance critical for investment in plant, 
equipment and machinery critical for technological capability upgrading and fostering product and 
process innovation. Paradoxically, of all the literature surveyed on African financial systems, none 
addresses the expertise and skills involved in loan origination in African financing contexts; neither 
does the literature address lending technologies and innovation in African fmancial systems. The 
surveyed literature does not discuss the link between fmance, especially long term fmance and its 
relevance to technological capability upgrading and innovation from acquisition of the hardware 
aspect of technology (plant, equipment and machinery). The African banking and fmance literature 
, 
relies on moral hazard and adverse selection explanations for low lending by African banks, high 
interest rates and high interest spreads, neglecting the politics oflending (see chapters 6 and 8). As 
I argued in chapter 1, it is as simple as going to the bank and getting money but there are skills and 
technological capabilities at the pharmaceutical company and skills and lending technologies at the 
bank surrounding fmancing of enterprises. The surveyed literature on African fmancial systems 
and fmancing African enterprises neglects this key aspect of fmancing technological capability 
upgrading and innovation. 
Now that I have given the context to African pharmaceutical manufacturing and African financial 
systems, I turn to Zimbabwe's political economy in the ensuing section. 
26 
2.4 Background to Zimbabwe's Political Economy 
In this section, I discuss the political economy of Zimbabwe from a historic perspective. The year 
1890, when the British South Africa Company arrived is the starting point. r discuss 
chronologically the key economic, political and historical events that influenced industrial 
development, financial systems and pharmaceutical manufacturing in Zimbabwe (Fig 2). 
Evolution of Political/Economic Systems, Industry and Financial Services in Zimbabwe 
Timelines Political/Economic Events 
BSAC establishes colony 
Self Governance in 1923 
Federation made up of Malawi, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe 
UDI from Britain 
High Controls/UN Sanctions 
Import Substitutions Policies 
Independence: Treasury Empty 
Obsolete Equipment & 
Machinery 
Import Substitution 
Structural Adj ustment 
Growth did not match revenues 
Company closure 
Farm Invasions 
Targeted Sanctions 
Foreign Lines of Credit Reduced 
Hyperinflation and Price Controls 
Industry Structure 
Mining: 2nd Rand Failed 
Shift to Commercial Agriculture 
M ining and Agriculture Key 
Sectors 
"CAPS Established in 1953 
Mining, Manufacturing and 
Agriculture Industry Dominate 
Military Hardware 
" Pharmanova Established in 
Mining, Manufacturing, 
Agriculture, Textile and Food 
Industries. 
" Varlchem Established in 1987 
Textile companu Closures 
Unemployment Rises 
" Plus 5 Pharmaceuticals 
De-Industrialisation 
Mothballing of Companies 
Obsolete Machinery and 
Equipment 
Financial Services 
Stock Exchange Established 1892 
Standard Bank Established 1892 
Banks of Africa Established 1895 
RHOBANK Established 1951 
Grindlays Established 1953 
Key Banks: Standard Bank, 
Barclays Bank Formerly Bank of 
Africa, Rhobank and Grindlays 
Key Financial Institutions: 
CommerCial Banks, M erchant 
Banks, Finance Houses and 
Building Societies 
The Rise of Local Banks as 
Merchant Banks, challenging the 
dominance of International 
2003 Bank Collapse 
Exchange Control Tighten ing 
Quasi Fiscal Operations by RBZ 
The Fall ofthe Zimbabwe Dollar 
Source: Developed by Author from Karekwaivanani, 2003; Riddell, 1988; UN, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c; 
UNIDO 20 II b; and various RBZ reports. 
Figure 2: Political economy, and evolution of industry and financial services in Zimbabwe. 
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2.4.1 The early years to 1979 
Zimbabwe is a Southern African landlocked country bordered by Mozambique to the east, 
Botswana to the west, Zambia to the north and South Africa to the south (Wild, 1992). Rhodesia 
the predecessor of Zimbabwe, traces its roots to 1890, when the British South Africa Company in 
1889 obtained a Royal Charter with wide ranging powers over the territory to the north of the river 
Limpopo (ibid). The primary purpose was gold mining however, in 1923 the focus shifted from 
extraction of mineral resources to settlement and establishment of commercially viable agriculture 
in the colony, because mining had not been successful (ibid). The shift in focus to agriculture was 
the genesis of land inequities and inequalities, when the most fertile land was allocated to settlers 
and indigenous populations were forcefully displaced onto infertile lands (Wild, 1992; Helmsing, 
1990). These land disputes sparked the liberation struggles and later on the land reform of the 
2000s. From 1890 to about 1953, mining and agriculture were the mainstay of the economy and in 
,-
parallel financial services evolved (see section 2.6) to support the enclave economy 
(Karekwaivanani, 2003; Riddell, 1988; Wild, 1992). The banking sector was dominated by four 
banks; Standard Bank. Grindlays. Rhobank and Barclays as shown in Fig 2 (UN, 1980a, 1980b, 
1980c). 
Faced with the prospects of involving the black community in the governance of the country, 
Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence (VDI) from Britain in 1965 and the period 1965-1979 
was characterised by sanctions and import substitution industrialisation strategies accredited with 
the rapid development of industry in Zimbabwe (Riddell, 1988 and Kanyenze, 2006). Phimister 
(1988) posits that the Second World War and the close trade relations with South Africa spurred 
industrial development through import substitution. Importation of plant and machinery post VDI 
however slowed down due to sanctions and foreign currency restrictions (Bond, 1998; Phimister, 
1988). Consequently, local industry was forced to utilise excess capacity originally invested for the 
federal market (Bond, 1998; Phimister, 1988). Since the country had depended on foreign direct 
investment and foreign loans for technology imports and industrial development the sanctions and 
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foreign currency shortages resulted in reduced capital investment and led to obsolescence of plant, 
equipment and machinery by 1979 (Bond, 1998; Phimister, 1988). At the same time, the economic 
attrition caused by the 14-year national war of liberation consumed huge economic resources 
(Bhebhe and Ranger, 1995). 
2.4.2 The independence era 
On attainment of independence in 1980, the economy had been weakened by 15 years of political 
unrest, the liberation war and comprehensive trade and social sanctions imposed by the United 
Nations (AfDB, 1998). As mentioned earlier industrial machinery had become obsolete due to run 
down and scarcity of foreign exchange (Bond, 1998; Phimister, 1988). At independence, the 
government maintained the UDI era economic controls and restrictions, and companies continued 
to experience foreign-exchange shortages (Chifamba, 2003). In response, the government partially 
eased foreign-exchange restrictions for meeting verified export orders first through an Export 
Revolving Fund (ERF) in 1983, and later through an Export Retention Scheme (ERS) in 1989, and 
later an Open General Import Licence (OGIL) in mid-1990 (ibid). 
I 
High growth from 1980 to 1982 was described as a once off event that utilised existing idle 
capacity and stockpile of stock that could not be sold during the sanctions era (Seidman, 1982; 
Stoneman, 1990). Seidman (1982) and Bond (1998), argue that the Zimbabwean growth model 
was the classical case of "growth without development" as a handful of commercial farms owned 
more than 50% of the national land area, and transnational mines contributed less than 2% of 
income tax. The manufacturing sector produced luxury and semi luxury goods for high-income 
earners, whilst over 75% of the population lived crowded on rocky or sandy, infertile and 
overgrazed soils (Seidman, 1982). Ndlela (2007) describes this phenomenon as a disarticulated 
economy resulting from grafted capitalism which characterises many former colonial economies. 
Ndlela (2007) argues that the economies are composed of the formal, informal and peasant sectors, 
with the bulk of economic activity occurring in the informal and peasant sectors. The formal sector 
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based in urban centres caters for 25% to 40% of the population and efforts to industrialise are 
encumbered by these hurdles because of this peculiar economic architecture (ibid). 
The incoming government tried to narrow the inherited racial gap in living standards through 
budgetary transfers using education and health as the key elements of social transformation. As a 
result, education and health expenditure expanded through introduction of free health and 
education for all for the formerly disadvantaged population (Davies and Ratso, 2000). This high 
growth in education, health and public administration, constituted the areas Zimbabwe became 
renowned for in terms of development and social equity strides (Helmsing, 1990). Expansion of 
social services without a corresponding increase in revenue inflows however, led to budget deficits, 
forcing the government to abandon initial resistance to economic structural adjustment programmes 
(AIDB, 1998). On the advice of the International Monetary Fund (lMF) and technocrats in the 
Ministry of Finance, the country embarked on the economic structural adjustment programme in 
1991, with disastrous consequences of de-industrialisation unemployment and deterioration of the 
health system (AIDB, 1997; Brett, 2005; Richardson, 2005). 
2.4.3 The economic meltdown of the 20005 
After the economic structural adjustment programme and on the back of political instability, an 
unstable macroeconomic environment, and loss of confidence by investors in the long-term 
prospects of Zimbabwe, hyperinflation set in post 2000. This period saw Zimbabwe isolated 
internationally, scarcity of foreign currency became acute, FDI dwindled and emigration of skilled 
resources accelerated (AIDB. 1997; Brett, 2005). From 2003, bank closures and placement under 
curatorship by the central bank became prevalent (RBZ reports 2003 to 2008). Incidentally it was 
during these economic turbulent times that one company Varichem Pharmaceuticals (Pvt) Ltd 
started locally manufacturing ARVs in 2004 (see section 2.9) after being issued a compulsory 
license by the government. The economic situation continued to deteriorate culminating in 
hyperinflation that caused businesses to stop trading. 
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On 15 September 2008, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was signed between the political 
parties Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU (PF» and the two Movement For 
Democratic Change (MDC) factions; and this brought the three political parties into a coalition 
government and saw the beginning of some stability (STERP, 2009). Subsequently the 
Government of National Unity was formed, and the Minister of Finance in March 2009 launched 
the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP): Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again 
(ibid). Amongst the various initiatives of resuscitating and rehabilitating the Zimbabwean 
economy, the strategy covered social protection which included; food and humanitarian assistance, 
and education and for health delivery the focus was on human resources, drugs, medical equipment 
and preventable diseases (ibid). The specific details on health delivery as stated in STERP 2009, 
included addressing drug shortages (average drug stocks in 2008 were 36% with prevalent stock 
outs of essential drugs, vaccines and medical supplies). The strategy also included capacitating 
Natpharm (national drug procurement agency) to supply all government health intuitions with 
drugs and pharmaceutical products. However, allocated funds for public health were inadequate 
and the health system depended on donor funding (see chapters 5 and 7). Lack of funding for the 
public health sector is a key issue, as it debilitated public health drug procurement as an industrial 
policy tool to support local manufacture (see chapter 5, 8 and 9). 
In the short and medium term development plans, manufacturing was placed at the epi-entre of the 
stabilisation programme as policy makers targeted critical industry sub-sectors of food processing, 
beverages, textiles and ginning, clothing, footwear, fertiliser, pharmaceuticals, motor industries, 
packaging, paper printing and publishing, chemical and petroleum products and non-metallic 
products (STERP, 2009; MTDP, 2010). Initial estimates of financing industry resuscitation were 
pegged at USD 5 billion; however, it was acknowledged that funds were limited, (STERP, 2009; 
MTDP,2010). The African Development Bank concurred that the private sector needed to be re-
invigorated to kick start the economy (AIDB, 2009), and the main priority was providing a quick 
disbursing and self-liquidating line of credit in conjunction with South Africa, whilst Afreximbank 
provided support to the private sector through commercial banks. Only Afreximbank in 
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conjunction with The Ministry of Finance has availed USD 70 million for recapitalisation of 
industry through the ZETRAF fund which is likely to increase to USD 100 million with 
Afreximbank contributing USD70 million and the Ministry of Finance contributing usn 30 
million (see chapter 6). 
2.5 The Rise of Manufacturing in Zimbabwe 
In this section, I discuss the rise of manufacturing in Zimbabwe and present a brief overview to 
give context to the pharmaceutical manufacturing discussion on in section 2.9 and chapter 5. 
The Zimbabwean manufacturing sector was one of the most advanced and diversified in Africa 
(AIDB, N~94F. Contributing 30% to GDP, and 35% of gross export earnings, manufacturing was 
the most important sector for the economy (ibid). Of critical value were the extensive linkages 
between manufacturing and key economic sectors such as mining and agriculture; an evolution 
linked to the political economy of Zimbabwe, as discussed earlier (phimister, 1988). The 
manufacturing sector evolved to supply mining and agriculture leveraging an extensive 
infrastructure (AIDB, 1994; Mlambo 2000; Phimister, 1988, 2000; Stoneman, 1990). The biggest 
industrial sector was food processing followed by packaging (Ndlela, 2002). Other significant 
sectors included metals and metal products (17% industrial output) earning the most foreign 
currency for the country; chemical and petroleum products (16% industrial output); textiles and 
ginning (11% industrial output); and drink and tobacco (10% industrial output) (ibid). The 
manufacturing industry innovation legacy as mentioned earlier comes from the Second World War 
era and shortages that occurred, as well as the unilaterally declaration of independence (UD!) from 
Britain, trade with South Africa and sanctions (Pangeti et aI, 2000; Phimister, 2000; Riddell, 1990). 
Prior to the Second World War (WWII), Zimbabwe was a destination of manufactures from Britain 
and South Africa. The onset of WWII however saw the blockade of trade routes and shortages of 
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manufactures which prompted the local economy to diversify and start local manufacturing 
(pangeti et aI, 2000; Phimister, 2000; Riddell, 1990). 
The average annual industrial growth from 1944 to 1948 was 24.4%, as wartime interruptions to 
trade accelerated industrial development (pangeti et ai, 2000; Phimister, 2000; Riddell, 1990). 
After wwn, trade blockades were removed and imports from overseas started coming in, 
incre~sing competition. To counter this competition and to enable expansion of local markets and 
cater for overcapacity in the local industry the federation, comprising of Zambia, Malawi and 
Zimbabwe was set up in 1953 (pangeti et aI, 2000). However, most of the resources for 
development were channelled to Zimbabwe which spurred industrialisation in Zimbabwe with the 
enhanced market of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Helrnsing, 1990). During this era, 
foreign direct investment by South African and British companies flowed into Zimbabwe and 
contributed to set up of manufacturing industry (Phimister, 2000). Industrial policy moved from 
preference to protectionism in the period 1940 to 1965 (ibid). During this expansionary phase of 
manufacturing in Zimbabwe, three of the five major pharmaceutical companies were established; 
CAPS Pharmaceuticals in 1953, Datlabs in 1954 and Pharmanova the only one established much 
later in 1970 (UN, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c; UNIDO, 2007, 2011b). Phimister (2000) argues that the 
rise of manufacturing in Zimbabwe cannot be explained without considering trade agreements with 
South Africa, which were instrumental in industrial development. 
The Central African Federation and UD! were key events that shaped the evolution of the 
manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe (AfDB, 1994; Bond, 1993 and 2007; Phimister, 2000). During 
UD!, manufacturing contributed 25% of GDP and enforced protection acted as an accelerant to 
import substitution (Stoneman, 1990). However, the sector was geared to producing military 
hardware for the civil war, luxury and semi luxury goods for the high-income minority (ibid). The 
major centres of industrialisation were Harare (47%) and Bulawayo (22%) (Seidman, 1982). Ten 
years after declaring UD!, the economy flagged as plant and machinery became obsolete, and as a 
result, exports dropped, balance of payment worsened and the civil war placed an onerous burden 
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on the economy (Wild, 1992). The Rhodesian government introduced exchange and import 
controls, tariff controls and state involvement in industry with the sole purpose. of making 
successful import substitution industrialisation (Seidman, 1982). Wages and taxes were kept very 
low ensuring high profits, and the stringent controls restricted outflow of capital to less than 5% of 
gross operating profits in 1975 (ibid). These controls remained in place until independence in 
1980. 
The first decade of independence (1980 -1990), was characterised by import substitution industrial 
policies, foreign exchange controls, limited import of machinery and a predominantly agro based 
economy (Phimister, 2000). The Government's formal role in industrialisation was enunciated in 
the Growth with Equity proposal in 1981 via the establishment of the Zimbabwe Development 
Corporation (Stoneman, 1990). Subsequent development strategies included the Transitional 
National Development Plan 1982/3-1984/5 and the First Five Year National Development Plan 
1986-1990 (ibid). There was no explicit industrial policy in Zimbabwe and influences on industry 
were driven by other policies that covered macroeconomics and trade from 1980 up to 1998 (ibid). 
The Government came up with the Framework for Industrial Development, Trade and Investment 
in Zimbabwe which gave an outline of the intentions for industrial policy, and a white paper with 
the detailed industrial policy was presented later (UNDPIUNCTAD Country Assessment Report, 
2000). From 1980 to 2000, limited sources of long-term fmance and a general lack of foreign 
currency triggered a shift in industrial development policy towards export led growth strategies and 
export processing zones (Kanyenze, 2006). 
Stoneman (1990) argues that state policy towards industry post-independence was conservative, 
and industrialisation policies were largely correct although inadequately theorised and pursued with 
insufficient priority as there was short run balance of payment constraints, which resulted in 
outcomes that could have been avoided. Stoneman (1990) further asserted that the industrialisation 
of Zimbabwe brought into the open the need for an intelligent state role in industrialisation as well 
as the fact that both import substitution and export orientation are necessary (ibid). 
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The decade plus commencing around 1997 to 2008 saw de-industrialisation as manufacturing 
declined at a grand scale caused by hyperinflation (Fig 3) (MTDP, 2010). As Fig 3, shows 
manufacturing real growth rates were negative from 1997 to 1998 except for 2005, signifying a 
gradual reduction in manufacturing capacity, loss of skills and technological capabilities. There 
was a declining contribution of manufacturing to GOP from a high of 20% in 1997 to 11 % in 2008 
(see Fig 3). Manufactured exports fell from 20% to slightly over 10%, although there was a period 
of increase from 2000 to 2003; however, this is a ratio where the GOP was shrinking annually. 
From 2008 onwards, the private sector declined to the extent of operating at 10% capacity, in an 
environment characterised by shortage of capital, foreign currency, and interrupted electricity 
supplies (ibid). Physical infrastructure crumbled, human capital emigrated and incentives and 
institutions were severely debilitated (AIDB, 2009). 
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Figure 3: Manufacturing growths (percentage) for the period 1997 to 2008. 
This picture of the state of manufacturing post 2000s helps put into context the state of 
manufacturing, and the economic challenges faced in locally manufacturing antiretroviral drugs 
since 2004. It also puts into perspective challenges faced in accessing long-term funds within and 
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outside Zimbabwe, in view of political, economic and macroeconomic instability. It is within this 
context that I approach financing of local ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. 
2.6 Zimbabwean Financial Architecture 
In section 2.5 I built up a picture of the manufacturing sector for Zimbabwe, in this section, I tum 
to the financial systems context for the country. 
Dailami and Walton (1989) reported that Zimbabwe had an unusually deep, British-influenced 
financial sector with a wide range of financial institutions. The financial institutions showed an 
elevated proportion of long-term assets and liabilities (ibid). The bond markets financed the public 
.. 
sector rather than the corporate sector (ibid). By 1994, after economic structural adjustment and 
financial liberalisation, Zimbabwe still had one of the most advanced financial systems in Africa, 
second only to South Africa (Carmody, 1998; Fafchamps el al., 1995). The financial institutions 
consisted of commercial banks, merchant banks, finance houses, discount houses, building 
societies, the stock exchange. institutional investors, development financial institutions, venture 
capital companies, credit guarantee companies and credit reference companies (Carmody, 1998; 
Fafchamps et al., 1995). Reflective of the African financial system discussed earlier (section 2.3), 
Zimbabwe's financial system is predominantly bank-based with a low-key capital market. The 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange; established in 1893, was capitalised at US$ 3.4 billion as at December 
2011, falling from US$ 4.1 billion the previous yearll. 
The Zimbabwean bank financial architecture is composed of 18 commercial banks, 2 merchant 
banks, 4 building societies, 1 savings bank no finance houses and no discount houses, giving 25 
bank-financial institutions (RBZ Monetary Policy, July 2012). The non-bank financial institutions 
include 16 asset management companies and 172 microfinance institutions numerous insurance 
11 http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/companies-a-markets/ 13 921-zse-tumover-Ieaps-despite-poor-
sentiment.html, accessed 2S August, 2012 
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companies and pension houses and the Deposit Protection Board set up in 2003 to administer the 
deposit protection fund (ibid). 
The minimum capital requirements set by The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe used to be US$ 12.5 
million for Commercial Banks, US$ 10 million for Merchant Banks, US$ 10 million for building 
societies, US$ 7.5 million for Finance Houses and Discount Houses and US$ 2.5 million for Asset 
Management Companies (RBZ Monetary Policy, January, 2009). Table 1 shows the minimum 
capital requirement, and capitalisation levels for banking financial institutions in Zimbabwe as at 
31 December 2011. These requirements have since been increased with new minimum capital 
requirements for commercial and merchant banks now USD 100 million, building societies USD 
80 million, and finance and discount houses USD 60 million (RBZ Monetary Policy, July 2012). 
Microfinance institutions requirements rise to USD 5 million (see Table 2). The monetary 
authorities argue that this will bring stability to the banking sector (RBZ Monetary Policy, July 
2012). Opponents however argue this will cause a collapse of local banks or cause the rise of a 
monopolistic banking structure. The increase in minimum capital requirements could be a push by 
policy makers for banks to lend more. In section 3.5.1 I discuss that financial institutions are the 
most highly leveraged form when one considers their equity and obligations to their depositors 
(their liabilities). Increasing the minimum capital requirements forces them to increase their equity 
,and ultimately to lend more as they avoid having capital sitting idle. If they let the capital sit idle, 
by not lending it would reduce their return on equity. Secondly the opportunity cost for the bank to 
have USD 100 million sitting idle on their balance sheet would be untenable and the banks may 
thus be nudged to lend to earn a return on this additional capital. 
In the next section, I discuss the evolution of Zimbabwe's financial architecture. 
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Table 1: Banks declared capital and prescribed capital as at December 2011. 
I ~ pl' til' I inanl'ial h.,lillllitln In,lillllion Dl'l'Ian'd ( orl' ( apilal \, OIl 1" 'l"lTihl'1I \lillillllllll Capilal 31 Dl'l'l'lllhl'r lUll 
CBZ Bank US$ 65.2 million 
Standard Chartered US$ 53 .2 million 
Barc1ays Bank US$ 33.4 million 
BancABC US$ 32.1 million 
Stanbic Bank US$ 32.0 million 
ZB Bank US$ 20.7 million 
NMB Bank US$ 19.8 mill ion 
MBCA Bank US$ 19.5 million 
C ommercial Banks Metropolitan Bank US$ 18.0 million US$ 12.5 million 
FBC Bank US$ 16.8 million 
Interfin Bank US$ 16.3 million 
Agribank US$ 14.1 million 
TN Bank US$ 13.4 million 
Trust Bank US$ 12.8 million 
Kingdom Bank US$ 4.2 million 
Royal Bank US$ 43.4 million 
ZABG Bank US$ - 15.3 million 
Tetrad Investment US$ 12.7 million 
Ecobank US$ 10.9 million 
Merchant Banks Genesis Investment US$ -3.2 million USD$ 10 million 
Renaissance Under Curatorship 
CBZ Building Society US$ 22.7 million 
CABS US$ 14.4 mill ion 
Building Societies FBC Building Society US$ 13.5 million US$ 10 million 
ZB Build ing Society US$ 13.4 mill ion 
Savings Ba nk POSB US$ 10.8 million 
Source: RBZ Monetary Policy Statement, January 20 12 
Table 2: The new minimum capital requirements for financial institutions in Zimbabwe. 
('urn'nl 'linil1lul1l :\l' \\ 'Iinil1lul1l Capilal 
Finalll' ial In,lillllilln ( 'apilal: l iS!) :\jillilln Ih'quirl'd: l 'S!) 'liIIilln 
Commercial Banks 12.5 100 
Merchant Banks 10 100 
Building Societies 10 80 
Finance Houses 7.5 60 
Discount Houses 7,5 60 
Microfinance Institutions I 5 
Source: RBZ Monetary Pol icy Statement, July 20 12, 
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2.6.1 Evolution of the financial architecture 
Zimbabwean financial institutions have been around for almost 120 years and one can argue that 
they should have developed to such an extent that their lending technologies and institutional 
architecture could facilitate industrial development financing that fosters technological capability 
upgrading and innovation take-off for Zimbabwean enterprises. In the ensuing sections I discuss 
the emergence of the financial architecture in Zimbabwe. 
The Stock Exchange was set up in the early 1890s (Karekwavainani, 2003), and the first bank 
Standard Chartered, then The Standard Bank of South Africa, was set up in 1892 (UN, 1980a, 
1980b, 1980c). In 1895, Barclays Bank International Limited (wholly owned UK subsidiary) 
which later became Barclays Zimbabwe Limited was the second bank to be set up (UN, 1980a, 
1980b, 1980c). The third bank to be set up was Rhodesia Banking Corporation (RHOBANK) in 
1951 (ibid). It later became Zimbank and then ZB Bank (UN, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c). Shareholders 
for RHOBANK were Nedbank of South Africa (70%), and 30% minorities following public issue 
of shares in 1967 (UN, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c). The fourth bank, a wholly owned UK subsidiary 
was Grindlays Bank International set up in 1953 (UN, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c). Grindlays later sold 
I its African businesses in eight African countries to Standard Bank of South Africa, which operate 
outside South Africa as Stanbic Bank Limited (Stanbic Zimbabwe website, 201212). These were 
the dominant banks in Zimbabwe up to 1980 including BCCZ, and afterwards continued to 
dominate deposits and loans market (see Tables 3, 4 and 5) (UN, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c). 
Commercial banks had sister companies in merchant banking (see Table 5). Standard Chartered 
had Standard Merchant Bank, ZB Bank had Syfrets Merchant Bank and Barclays Bank had 
Barclays Merchant Bank (UN, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c). Merchant Bank of Central Africa (MBCA) 
owned by Phillip Hill Acceptances Corporation of South Africa, N.M. Rothschild of London and 
Rhodesia Selection Trust among others, later became a commercial bank (UN, 1980a, 1980b, 
12 http://www.standardbank.comlOverview.aspx. accessed 12 April, 2012. 
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1980c). The financial architecture morphed over time to a commercial bank dominated financial 
system, with a low-key footprint and influence of merchant banks, finance houses and discount 
houses. Lending technologies used by merchant banks, and other financial institutions, such as 
leasing or asset backed lending technologies, equipment based lending technologies and fixed asset 
lending technologies were de-emphasised due to the changes in the financial architecture instigated 
by the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme of 1991 (Group Chief Executive, Domestic 
Bank F, 2011). I will discuss the lending technologies in section 2.6.3. 
By 1991, the financial architecture was composed of 4 commercial banks; 2 discount houses; 3 
merchant banks; 3 building societies; 3 finance companies; 1 post office savings bank, the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, 3 development financial institutions, 2 brokerage houses, and a large 
number of insurance and pension companies (AIDB, 1997). After financialliberalisation in 1991, 
, 
there were huge increases in interest rates and devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, which 
negatively affected capital investment for the local manufacturing industry, as companies put off 
capital investment (Sachikonye, 1999). Four years later in 1995, 2 national discount houses 
entered the sector. Bureaux de Changes had been introduced in 1994, leading to an increase in the 
range of financial services offered in the country (AIDB, 1997). Historically commercial banks 
mobilised more domestic resources; averaging about 46% for each of the years 1987 to 1990, 
whereas merchant banks mobilised around 6% for the same period. Building societies mobilised 
about 7% and the Post Office Savings Bank, used mostly to fund government projects, mobilised 
about 20% for the same period (ibid). This reinforces the earlier argument that African financial 
systems are dominated by commercial banks. 
In the next section I turn to the dominance of commercial banks in Zimbabwe's financial system. 
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Table 3: Zimbabwe's banking financial institutions architecture in 1979. 
f~t"nrl"rrl Bank of South Africa 1892 
ItiarCiaVS Bank International Limited 1895 
rindlays Bank International 1953 
IRndh""i::. Banking Corporation (RHOBANK) 1951 
pourceW~I 1980a, 1980b, 1980c 
Nedbank 70% (RSA): 30% 
shareholding in the hands of 
minority following public issue 
1967. 
in Bank of Africa's operation 
fnrminnlihm,,, of The National Bank of South 
1911). dominance of sector: In 1963, 
accounted for 90% 
I· loepo:S1l liabilities of the five 
in the federal zone, and advancedl 
85% of funds in the form of 
with local operations 
part of total world business 
of branch network and liabilities 
National and Grindlays 
being followed by Ottoman 
absorbed in 1969 as a 
and bills of exchange. 
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Table 4: Zimbabwe's banking financial institutions architecture as of July 2012. 
'iii 1912 UK 183 43 -1 
c: 
. 2 
0; 
Bane ABC: The heritage dates back to 1956 . 1956 Botswana 217 104 3.4 
E MBCA Bank Ltd: Established as Merchant Bank of Central Africa . 1956 South Africa Geographic 1.6 Q) 135 82 c: Converted Licence to Commercial Bank in 2004 . and Functional 
"0 Stanbie Bank Zimbabwe ltd: Standard Bank Group South Africa 1992 South Africa Geographic 8 c: 302 97 cu in 1992 bought Grindlays Bank established in 1953 and Functional 
'iii 
c: 
.2 
Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Ltd 1892 UK Geographic OJ 223 109 8 Q) and Functional a:: 
Agrlbank: History can be traced to 1924 with establishment of the 
land and Agriculture Bank. AFC (Agriculture Finance Corporation) 1924 Zimbabwe Geographic established in 1971 through amalgamation of land and Agricultural 
Bank and the Agricultural Assistance Board. The Bank wa 
CBZ Bank: Formerly 1980. Became CBZ in 
1991 after the Government took total shareholding and saved it 1980 Zimbabwe Geographic 578 425 21 
Merchant Banks 
BuildingSocieties 
Source: RBZ monetary policy statement, July 2012 . 
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TableS: Zimbabwe's financial institu tions financing indus try prior to 1980. 
Merchant Bank Of Central Africa 
(MBCA) 
Rhodesian Acceptances Limited (RAL) 
Syfrets Merchant Bank 
Standard Merchant Bank 
British and Rhodesian Discount House 
(BARD) 
Discount Company of Rhodesia 
Source: UN, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c 
1956 
1956 
1971 
1971 
1959 
1959 
Phillip Hill Acceptance Corporation 
(SA) and N.M. Rotschild of London 
and Rhodesia Selection Trust and 
others. 
Closely tied to Anglo American 
Corporation, although promoted by 
Lazard Bros. It had ties to Barclays 
by direct implication . Anglo American 
Corporation was main shareholder. 
Rhobank as at 1979: Commenced 
business as Nefricho Acceptances 
Ltd , but later merged and became 
part of Rhobank. 
Standard Bank Group: Originally 
Accepting Bank of Rhodesia 
(Portuguese·owned company), but 
later fell into Standard Bank group. 
Gillet Bros (20%) and the balance 
was held by various Insurance 
Companies. 
Private Company with greatest 
shareholding (30%) held by MC. 
Shareholders later became Barclays 
Bank, Grindlays Bank, Standard 
Bank, Rhobank, MC and SA based 
Insurance Companies (as at 1979). 
Bills of Exchange, Hire Purchase 
Financing, Medium Term Loan Finance, 
Foreign Market Transactions, Equity 
Issues, Stock Exchange Transactions, 
Portfolio Management, Company 
Broking and Corporate Reconstruction. 
Attracted deposits on a call basis, and 
funds were used to purchase a portfolio 
of securities in State/Municipal stock, 
Treasury Bills, Acceptances, Agricultural 
Marketing Authority (AMA) Bills, and 
Negotiable Certificate of Deposits 
(NCD). Portfolio hoi 
Closely geared to corporate needs 
(wholesale banking) and large account 
holders. Played a critical role in the size 
and composition of the private sector's 
medium term investment in the 
development process. 
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2.6.2 Dominance of commercial banks 
The commercial bank dominated financial system was further reinforced after financial 
liberalisation in 1991 (see Table 4), with a gradual reduction in the role played by merchant banks, 
finance houses and discount houses compared to three decades earlier (see Table 5). Players in the 
industry blame the changes in the financial architecture on the IMF and World Bank instigated 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme of 1991 (see chapter 6 and 7). As cost of funds on the 
interbank market increased due to interest rate increases after financial liberalisation, there was a 
stampede to convert merchant banking licenses and other banking institution licenses to 
commercial banking licenses to access cheap deposits (current and savings accounts) and reduce 
cost of funds (Group Chief Executive, Local Bank F, 2011). This move played a significant role in 
shrinking a critical financial space for industrial development as specialised financial institutions 
were replaced by commercial banks with a concomitant loss of skills and knowledge (know-how, 
, 
know-whom and know-why) as certain lending technologies were either lost or de-emphasised. 
Experienced managers left merchant banks or were de-skilled as they converted into commercial 
banks specialising in financing trade and commerce only. 
After liberalisation in 1991, local commercial banks came on the scene with the establishment of 
FBC Bank in 1997 as a commercial bank and other financial institutions such as Kingdom Bank 
which began life as a Discount House, whilst NMB and Trust Bank began as Merchant Banks 
(Group Chief Executive, Local Bank F, 2011). At the same time, international banks collapsed 
their merchant banking units into corporate banking division or units. Standard Chartered 
Merchant Bank was incorporated into the corporate banking division13. Barclays Bank Zimbabwe 
still has Barclays Merchant Bank Limited (100% ownership) and Fincor Finance Corporation 
Limited (100% ownership) on its books, although they are now dormant companies (Barclays 
Financial Statements for Half year ended 30 June 2011 14). As mentioned earlier, conversion of 
merchant banks into commercial banks was driven by the need to access cheap current and savings 
13 Practice knowledge of the researcher of having worked in the industry for 7 years. 
14 http://www.barclays.comlafrica/pdfs/2011_halCyearJesults.pdf. accessed 10 October, 2011 
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accounts resources. It precipitated generalisation of specialist skills geared to function in the 
medium term to long-term loan finance for industrial financing. Focus shifted more to financing 
trade and commerce by commercial banks (see chapter 6 and 8). This development resulted in loss 
of these specialist skills for the country as merchant bankers emigrated or left banking. With the 
loss of the "old timers" (see section 3.6), there was inherent loss of institutional memory and tacit 
knowledge, critical for knowing and learning; the know-why, know-who, know-what aspects of 
learning and knowledge (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Ernst and Lundvall, 1997; Polanyi, 1966). 
This complexity is ignored in contemporary discourses on financing local pharmaceutical 
manufacturing in Africa. Commercial banks in Zimbabwe specialise in short-term lending on the 
back of short-term hot deposits. 
In the next section I discuss the lending technologies in Zimbabwe, which were affected by the 
demise of the merchant banks and the dominance of commercial banks. 
2.6.3 Prevalent lending technologics in Zimbabwe 
Berger and Udell (2006) defined lending technology as "a unique combination of primary 
information source, screening and underwriting policies/procedures, loan contract structure, and 
monitoring strategies/mechanisms". Paraphrasing; lending technologies are tools that financial 
institutions use to gather and screen information about a borrower to assess risks, the venture's 
viability, profitability and ensuring likelihood of the borrower repaying debt (see section 3.5.2). 
Lending technologies therefore operationalise products used to finance an enterprise and covers 
issues such as title of an asset financed by the bank (ibid). Table 6 shows lending technologies 
prevalent in Zimbabwe in 1980, 2000 and 2010. The trend shows a gradual reduction in key 
lending technologies critical for financing industrial development; leasing/asset based lending, 
equipment based lending, and motor vehicle and fixed asset lending as the country went through 
different economic phases as discussed in section 2.4. Financial statement lending is the dominant 
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lending technology used in Zimbabwe. The relationship management model is used to augment the 
financial statement lending approach (Berger and Black, 2011; Berger et al., 2008; Berger and 
Udell, 2006). 
Table 6: Lending technologies in use in financial institutions in 1980,2000 and post 2010. 
Leasing/Asset Based Lending 
Equipment Based 
Small Business Credit Scoring 
Commercial Real Estate 
Fixed Asset Based Lending Residential Real Estate 
Motor Vehicle 
Leasing Companies. Finance Houses 
Commercial Banks . 
Finance Houses. Merchant Banks 
Commercial Banks. Merchant Banks 
Finance Houses . 
Building Societies 
Building Societies 
Leasing Companies. Finance Houses 
Commercial Banks 
Active Limited Activity 
Active Limited Activity 
Active Active 
Active Limited Activity 
Active Limited Activity 
Active Limited Activity 
Source: Developed by author from Berger et al., 2008; Berger and Udell, 2006; Bartoli et aI., 2010; 
Hirofumi et aI., 2006, Fieldwork, 2011 and practice. 
The mechanics of lending technologies are some of the complexities surrounding financing of local 
pharmaceutical manufacture that have been ignored in contemporary discourses (see chapters 3, 5 
and 6). 
2.7 Financing Zimbabwean Enterprises and Industrial Development 
In this section I discuss how enterprises and industrial development in Zimbabwe were financed, 
bringing out the importance of transnational corporates and foreign direct investment in the set up 
and expansion of industry (Bond, 1993 , 2007; Stoneman, 1978). Reliance on FDI implies that 
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Active 
banks did not playa key role in industrial set up (ibid). They may thus lack institutional memory, 
tacit knowledge and expertise key to fmance technological capability upgrading. However, there is 
evidence that merchant banks were active in the local currency long term fmance market and 
competed with development financial institutions (AfDB, 1998). 
As mentioned earlier, Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector set up was fmanced by FDI as subsidiaries 
of British and South African companies established operations in the country (Bond, 1993, 2007; 
Stoneman, 1978). Foreign capital; FDI and loans, were thus instrumental in the evolution of the 
manufacturing sector (Phimister, 1988; Riddell, 1990). The economy attracted such high amounts 
of foreign capital to the extent that in 1965 even though the South African economy was ten times 
bigger, the stock for Zimbabwe was one third that of South Africa (Stoneman, 1978). What is key 
as will be discussed in chapter 6 is the importance ofFDI and foreign loans (foreign currency) for 
acquisition of plant, equipment and machinery (Dailami and Walton, 1989). 
During the sanctions era when exchange controls imposed, capital was locked up in Zimbabwe due 
to non-repatriation of profits or dividends to offshore shareholders (Bond, 1993, 2007; Stoneman, 
1978). The blocked funds, made up of un-remitted profits and dividends were re-invested into 
local businesses, leading to the overcapacity pointed out by Bond (1993, 2000). International 
isolation due to sanctions, and the shortages of foreign currency slowed down replacement of 
machinery and equipment leading to obsolescence of industrial machinery (ibid). At independence, 
international companies shied away from capital investment, whilst they capitalised on relaxed 
foreign exchange regulations to remit locked up profits and dividends until the Finance Minister 
stopped the tide in 1984 (Burdette and Davies, 1987). Thus, instead of recapitalisation when 
exchange controls were relaxed, there was capital flight, and the industry remained with 
obsolescent equipment save for a. few companies borrowed offshore or leveraged foreign 
ownership to import plant and equipment (Jenkins, 1998; Pangeti et a/., 2000). 
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Domestic savings were not a constraint to lending as there was excess liquidity in the banking 
sector (Jenkins, 1998). Jenkins argued that in the period 1969 - 1974, savings were more than 
sufficient to finance high demands for the expansion and improvement of capital stock (ibid). 
Reflecting slowdown in capital investment, between 1980 and 1989, fixed investment declined 
from 25% to 16% of GDP, inadequate for maintaining even current capital stock (AfDB, 1998). 
Dailami and Walton (1989) also reinforced the assertion that business fixed investment was low 
after independence especially amongst the mostly foreign owned large companies, which had been 
traditionally the sources of capital for industrial development. Foreign owned companies were 
reluctant to take a long-term perspective and invest in the country, as they were uncertain of 
government's policies on remittance of profits and dividends locked up in the country (Burdette 
and Davies, 1987). Another reason for low capital investment was foreign currency shortages, 
which deterred them from importing capital goods in addition to excessive administrative 
interventions.· Some of the administrative hurdles included foreign currency certificates, import 
controls, and price controls (ibid). Other factors cited for lack of investment were socio-political 
issues (Stoneman, 1978; Bond, 1993; Chigumira and Masiyandima, 2003). 
Zimbabwe recognised that it needed to modernise and retool industry (AfDB. 1994). 
Consequently, the African Development Bank (AfDB) channelled long-term fmance (foreign 
currency loans) through the Zimbabwe Development Bank (ZDB) (ibid). Two of the 32 long-term 
loans went to pharmaceutical companies for replacement of equipment (ibid). CAPS 
Pharmaceuticals used the loan to modernise its tablet and capsule machinery and Pfizer to improve 
quality control (ibid). The AfDB (1994) reported the vibrancy of the merchant and commercial 
banks in Zimbabwe post financialliberalisation, explaining that ZDB faced stiff competition in its 
preserve of term lending especially from merchant banks. This indicates an active role by 
merchant banks in the long-term fmancing arena, and as I will argue in chapter 6, their demise led 
to loss of this local capability in long-term fmance. 
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The AIDB strategy, an institutional arrangement innovation, was a shift from traditional FDI and 
foreign loans to capitalise industry,. What is relevant to this study is the fact that funds for 
industrial recapitalisation came from outside Zimbabwe (AIDB sourced funds), reinforcing 
Jenkins's (1998) and Dailami and Walton's (1989) argument that what was critical for industrial 
finance was foreign currency and not domestic savings. Banks are key to financing industrial 
development as they are not only involved in intermediating domestic savings but can structure 
foreign currency loans for industry with their correspondent foreign banks or their parent offshore, 
an activity highly linked to macroeconomic policy, fiscal policy and political stability and 
predictability (see chapters 8 and 9). 
In spite of the sophistication of the Zimbabwean financial system, the depth of domestic savings, 
pension and insurance funds showing a remarkable potential to finance long-term loans; the 
financial system was more inclined to financing the public sector than the private sector (Dailami 
and Walton, 1989). Savings from commercial banks, post office savings bank as well as pension 
and insurance funds were used to finance the public sector as short-term loans with automatic 
rollovers (ibid). The long-term domestic savings went into Agricultural Marketing Authority 
(AMA) bonds and bills utilising mandatory prescribed asset ratios (ibid). This reflected the agro-
based nature of the economy and the tendency of government policy to support agriculture (ibid). 
I 
Paradoxically there was little evidence of public sector debt crowding out the private sector, as the 
private sector preferred to use internal funds for financing (Dailami and Walton, 1989; Fafchamps 
et aI, 1995). The demand for credit from the private sector was thus subdued; an insight reinforced 
by Bond (1993; 2007), who argued on overcapacity and over accumulation in the industrial sector. 
In as much as this argument is solid for local currency long-term loans, it is flawed when 
considering financing importation of technology for technological capability upgrading. The local 
manufacturing industry does not produce capital equipment. Accessing a local currency long-term 
loan without access to foreign currency as was the case in Zimbabwe where shortages of foreign 
currency were rampant means the company could not import capital equipment. Zimbabwe may 
have had high domestic savings, but local savings could only work if local fabricators and 
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toolmakers could manufacture the required capital equipment. Thus, because all plant, machine 
and equipment are imported, the local companies depend entirely on foreign currency to import 
capital goods. 
2.8 The Zimbabwean Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Landscape 
In this section, I discuss pharmaceutical manufacturing in Zimbabwe. The intention is to give 
context to the sector's architecture and its capabilities, and finally the story of antiretroviral (ARV) 
drug manufacture in Zimbabwe in section 2.9. 
There are nine pharmaceutical manufacturing companies registered with the Medicines Control 
Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ), and of these, five are the major generic manufacturers 
accounting for 90% of the formulation businesses (Table 7) (UNIDO, 2011b). Using Seiter's 
(2005) classification, Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies fall into generics companies with 
predominantly national operations and small-scale local manufacturers limited to formulation and 
packaging activities. Subsidiaries of large multinational companies and generics manufacturers 
operating globally do not currently operate manufacturing plants in Zimbabwe (UNIDO, 2007, 
20 11 b). The companies operate in a competition i!ltensive, low margin commodity-type business, 
where profitability and long-term viability depend on economies of scale, assured demand and 
large markets (Berger et ai., 2009; Kaplan and Laing, 2005). Although the pharmaceutical industry 
dates back to 1953, little vertical integration has occurred and no drug discovery or production of 
APIs takes place (UNIDO, 2007, 2011b), pointing to lack of or a slow rate of technological 
capability upgrading and innovation. The pioneer company, CAPS Pharmaceuticals then Central 
African Pharmaceuticals (Private) Limited, was founded in 1952 operating in the formulation and 
wholesaling business (CAPS website, 2012; UNIDO, 2007, 2011b). In 1958, CAPS stopped 
general wholesaling and focused on manufacturing and marketing of pharmaceuticals (CAPS 
website, 2012). 
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Facility Manufacturing 
Licensing 
Capacity Utilisation 
Facility Design and Layout 
Additional equipment needed 
for additional 
Research and Development 
ARV Portfolio 
Markets: All Products 
Source: UNIDO, 2007, 2011b 
MCAZ (Zimbabwe), MCC (South 
Africa) , NMRC (Namibia) , DRU 
(Botswana) 
over 
products registered in 16 sub-
Saharan countries. 
(2009) 
Recently refurbished but requires 
HVAC (heating, ventilation, air 
Not known 
mUialions, seeking expansion 
of products through products gone 
off patent as well as technology 
transfer in collaboration with Indian 
manufacturers of ARVs 
Nevirapine, Lamuvidine 
Africa, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Namibia, and Mauritius 
MCAZ (Zimbabwe), NMRC 
(Namibia) 
Requires upgrade. Requires HVAC 
(heating, ventilation, air 
US$1 .5 mill ion 
done in South Africa. Only 
undertakes reformulation, ARV 
bioequivalence studies done in 
South Africa . 
None Manufactured 
Wholesalers 79%, Pharmacies 
15%, Public Sector 5% and NGOs 
<1 %. Exports: Zambia, Botswana,1 
Mala'Ni, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda 
& Burundi. Potential: Uganda, 
Angola , RSA, 
Not known 
Not known 
No formal 
were reviewing its establishment. 
None Manufactured 
Wholesalers = 95%, Pharmacies, 
Public Sector % NGOs = 5%. 
Used to export to South Africa, 
Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and 
Namibia. 
MCAZ (Zimbabwe) 
28 
shutdown for 
US$ 1.5 million 
Department: 
Formulation R&D. Collaboration 
with external research organisation 
(Contract Research Organisations 
in India or RSA) on bio-
equivalence and studies for ARVs 
None Manufactured 
Wholesalers = 80%, Public Health 
= 10%, Pharmacies = 8%, NGOs = 
2%. In the past exported to 
Malawi, Swaziland and The West 
Indies. 
103 (as at end 2007) 
30-60% 
GMP Compliant, recently 
refurbhised. HVAC operational 
US$ 1.0 million 
Formulation R&D, Operational 
Research, Clinical Research Trials, 
Herbal Medicine. Collaborating 
with School of Pharmacy in 
analysis of raw materials. Working 
with CROs in India and QC labs in 
South Africa. 
list 
past exported to South Africa , 
Botswana, Namibia, Angola, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, 
Yemen, Malawi 
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Datlabs (Pvt) Ltd was established in 1954 as a subsidiary of Ingrams, a South African company and 
Pharmanova (Pvt) Ltd was established in 1970 (UNIDO, 2007, 2011b). Zimbabwean 
entrepreneurs established Varichem Pharmaceuticals (Pvt) Ltd in 1985 (ibid). An interesting case 
involves Plus 5 Pharmaceuticals, which was established in 1996 using venture capital funding 
(UNIDO, 2007, 2011b). Plus 5 Pharmaceuticals presents an interesting take on Zimbabwe's 
financial system capability because venture capital was used to establish a successful 
pharmaceutical company at a time the country was just emerging from the economic structural 
adjustment programme. The directors eventually bought out the venture capitalists (UNIDO, 
20 11 b). Another insight gleaned from the venture capital deal is reinforcement of earlier 
discussions about the early development, sophistication, and depth of Zimbabwe's financial 
systems. This development of financial systems was however not sustained because of the 
economic challenges the country faced in the last decade. 
Historically, the target market for Zimbabwean manufactured pharmaceuticals was the larger 
Central African Federation consisting of Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Marketing Director, 
2011). The industry used to supply 122 products out of the 260 essential drugs; 46% of the 
country's essential drugs (UNIDO, 2011b and NECF, 2011). When new product development 
initiatives underway are factored in, local drug provision can rise to 75% of essential drugs and 
contribute 5% to GDP (NECF, 2011). Zimbabwe was historically less dependent on imported 
drugs (Turshen, 2001). Government policy supported local manufacturing capability by 
purchasing as much as 75% of all production (Consultant, Pharmaceutical Industry, 2011) For 
example, on issuance of the compulsory license to Varichem in 2004, government promised to 
purchase 75% of locally manufactured ARVs, with the balance reserved for export to generate 
foreign currency for the company (Osewe et al.,2008). Economic challenges after the economic 
structural adjustment programmes and high inflation constrained government's financing ability for 
the public health system. This culminated in the collapse of the public health system (2003 to 
2009) and high donor-dependence for financing public health systems and drug procurement 
(Managing Director 2, 2011). The greatest challenge for the local pharmaceutical industry capacity 
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utilisation was lack of procurement by government. This incapacitated the potency of public health 
drug procurement as an industrial development policy tool (NECF, 2010). Reliance on donor 
financing for the public health system and drug procurement poses a demand side constraint on 
local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities and capabilities; I discuss this in chapters 5 and 8. 
2.9 Zimbabwe's Local ARV Manufacturing Story 
During the economic challenges of the late 1980s and 1990s, Zimbabwe faced a huge social and 
health challenge from the HNIAIDS pandemic. The outbreak of HNIAIDS placed a huge strain 
on an already overburdened health system and in response, the government set up the National 
Aids Council and the National Aids Trust, which collects and administers the AIDS levy set at 3% 
of salaries to finance the HNIAIDS programmes IS. Fifty per cent of the AIDS levy is reserved for 
procurement of ARVs, with the balance financing prevention and awareness programmes as well as 
administrative costs (ibid). On the back of these funds, the government pushed for local production 
of ARVs by issuing a compulsory license promising to purchase 75% of ARVs produced locally 
(Osewe et aI, 2008). 
The government approached local pharmaceutical companies to produce ARVs in 2002, whilst in 
the interim it imported ARVs (Marketing Director, 2011). Datlabs won the tender to import ARVs 
from Ranbaxy of India. Initially local companies pursued licensing negotiations with an Indian and 
European pharmaceutical company that had ARV technology (ibid). However, the negotiations 
were not successful and consequently they were forced to go the compulsory route (ibid). Osewe 
et al., 2008 and the UNIDO (2011b) explore in detail the story of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe 
and the policy steps taken (see Table 8). To summarise the process, in 2002, the government 
amended the Patents Act of 1996 to conform to provisions of TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights) and section 34 of the Patents Act 26.03 which provided for compulsory licensing 
IS httpWLLwww.nac.org.zwLaboutlfundin~ accessed 20 April, 2012 
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for government use (Osewe et at., 2008; UNIDO, 20 11 b). A state of emergency was declared from 
January 2003 to December 2005, and the compulsory license was used to improve access to ARVs 
(Osewe et aI., 2008). On the 8th of April 2003, the Minister of Justice authorised Varichem to 
produce ARVs and HNIAIDS related drugs under a compulsory license and sell 75% of their 
production to State-owned health institutions (ibid). Varichem started manufacturing the 
combination ARV Varivar (Lamuvidine and Zidovudine) in July 2003 followed by Stalanev 
(combination of Stavudine, Lamuvidine and Nevirapine) in October 2003 and other ARVs as 
shown in Table 8 (Osewe et at., 2008; UNIDO, 2011b). In a separate arrangement, Ranbaxy 
entered talks with Ingram in South Africa to form a joint venture and through technology transfer 
manufacture ARVs at Datlabs in Bulawayo (Marketing Director, 2011). The agreement between 
Ranbaxy and Ingram in South Africa fell through and Datlabs has not manufactured ARVs locally 
to date (ibid). 
, 
Four Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies registered twenty generic ARVs with the Medicines 
Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ); Varichem (13), CAPS (4), Datlabs (1) and Plus 5 
pharmaceuticals (2) (UNIDO, 2011b). Registration of ARVs does not mean the drugs are under 
production, but that companies have approved documentation to produce the drugs in Zimbabwe. 
Only Varichem is currently manufacturing ARVs and it is the sole supplier of locally manufactured 
ARVs (UNIDO, 2007, 2011b). CAPS used to manufacture Lamuvidine and Nevirapine but 
indications on the market are they have since stopped (Procurement Manager, 2011). The greater 
proportion of ARVs for the antiretroviral treatment (ART) programme in Zimbabwe, are imported 
from Indian companies such as Matrix, Ranbaxy, Cipla, Aurobindo and Hetero (Procurement 
Manager, 2011; AIDS Conference, September, 2011 16). 
16 I attended the AIDS conference held at Celebration Centre in Borrowdale, Harare organised by the 
National AIDS Council (NAC) and observed the ARVs that the major Global Health partners were 
displaying, which incidentally were all supplied by Indian Manufacturers such as Hetero, Aurobindo and 
Cipla. 
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2002 
General Notice 240 of 2002. 
Official gazette published on 
January 17,2003. 
08-Apr-03 
Jul -03 
Oct-03 
Jun-04 
Jun-04 
Jun-04 
Sep-04 
Mar-OS 
Sep-05 
Source: Osewe et ai. , 2008 
Patents Act of 1996 ammended to bring it into conformity with the provisions of 
TRIPS agreement. Section 34 of Patents Act, Cap. 26.03, provides for 
compulsory licensing and Government use. Minister may authorise use of 
patented invention by any Government department or 3rd party for services of 
state. Section 35 : Any authorisation by Minister under section 34 during a state 
of emergence shall include power to make, use, exercise and vend the invpntion l 
for any purpose which appears to the Minister necessary or expedient. 
State of Emergence on HIV/AIDS from January 1 2003, to December 31, 2005. 
Intent of using Govt - use option to improve access to ARVs 
letter signed by Minister of Justice to Varichem to produce ARV or HIV/AIDS 
re lated drugs, and supply 75% of its production to State owned Health 
Institutions. 
Varivar (Iamuvidine 150mg + Zidovudine 300mg) 
Stalanev (Stavudine 30/40mg + Nevirapine 200mg + lamuvidine 150mg) 
Stavudine 30mg 
Stavudine 40mg 
lamuvidine 150mg 
Nevirapine 200mg 
Zidovudine 300mg 
Indinavir 400mg 
Public Health: Incorporate ·TRIPS flexibilities into Zimbabwe's 
domestic legislation, promote beneficial utilisation, including 
local production. legal basis for Zimbabwe's strategy of moving 
towards reliance on local production of ARVs to solve affordable 
access challenges. 
Permitted State to ma ke or use a ny patented drug, i ncl ARVs to 
treat HIV/AIDS related conds . 
Govt roll out of the drugs (Purchasing power) would be funded by 
budgetary allocations and AIDS levy (3% of gross salary). Pvt 
sector however relied on out of pocket payments, Private Health 
Insurance, assistance from NGOs (MSF) and international 
HIV/AID5 initiatives (Global Fund). local production was meant 
to complement the import of generic ARVs (RSA and India) . 
Target markets: regional countries; Malawi, RSA and Zambia . 
Capacity as at 2008 was 1.15 billion tablets and capsules . 
Benefitted from government procurement through special 
dispensations of supplying Govt without going to tender. 
Government showed commitment by obtaining the greater 
portion of ARV supplies from Varichem. Prior to local 
manufacture costs per month were USD 30 to SO, Varivar 
however sold at just USD15 per month. 
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The portfolio of ARVs manufactured by Varichem pharmaceuticals is shown in Table 9. Table 10 
shows locally manufactured ARVs in comparison to the recommended treatment regimens 
(MOHCW, 20 10). What is apparent on scrutiny of Table lOis that ARVs manufactured in 
Zimbabwe are predominantly first line treatment drugs falling under the broad classification of 
nucleoside reverse transcription inhibitors; Zidovudine (AZT, ZDV), Lamuvidine (3TC) and 
Stavudine (d4T). The other nucleoside reverse transcription inhibitors such as Emtricitabine 
(FTC), Abacavir (ABC) and Didanosine (ddI) are currently not being manufactured in Zimbabwe, 
neither are they under formulation development. The only nucleoside reverse transcription 
inhibitor that is under development activity is Tenofovir (TDF), and these are both adult and 
paediatric formulations (see chapter 5). 
Table 9: Portfolio of ARVs manufactured by Varichem as at January 2012. 
Product Description Pack Size 
Varivar Tablets (Lamivudine150mg I Zidovudine 300mg) 60s 
Lamivudine150mg Tablets 60s 
Nevaripine 200mg Tablets 60s 
Stavudine 30mg Capsules 60s 
Zidovudine 300mg Tablets 60s 
Indinavir 400mg Capsules 28s 
Varicomb Tablets (Lamivudine 150mg I Zidovudine 300mgl 60s Nevirapine200mg) 
Stalanev 30 Tablets (Stavudine 30mg/Lamivudine 60s 150mg/Nevirapine 200mg) 
Source: Varichem website http://www.varichem.co.zw/products-anti-retrov irals.cfm accessed 15 February 
201 2. 
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Table 10: Recommended treatment regimens and ARV product profile manufactured, 
under development, and imported into Zimbabwe. 
Portfolio Of ARVs Manufactured and Not Manufactured In Zimbabwe as at December 2011 
Fusion Inhibitor 
Enfurvltlde 
Key To Colours In Table: 
Non Nucleoside Reverse Transcription Inhibitors 
Efawenz (EFZ) 
Etravlrlne 
Intergrase Inhibitor 
Raltegavlr 
ARV Manufactured In Zimbabwe ARV Under Development In Zimbabwe 
Protease Inhibitors 
Atazanaw/R,tonaw (A TV/r) 
Indlnaw (IDV) 
Saqumaw 
Rltonaw (RTV) 
Darunavlr 
CCR5 Inhibitor 
Maravlroc 
Source: Guidelines for ART in Zimbabwe, NDTPAC & Aids and TB Unit MOHCW, May 2010; Field 
work, 2011). 
For the non-nucleoside reverse transcription inhibitors, only Nevirapine (NVP) is manufactured in 
Zimbabwe, whilst Efavirenz (EFZ) is under formulation development. Etravine is not 
manufactured locally and is not under development. In the protease inhibitors class Indinavir 
(I0V) is the only ARV manufactured locally, whilst Lopinavir/Ritonavir (LPV/r), 
Atazanavir/Ritonavir (ATV/r), Saquinavir, ritonavir (RTV) and Oarunavir are neither under 
development activity nor manufactured locally. The fusion inhibitor (enfurvitide), the integrase 
inhibitor (Raltegavir) and CCR5 inhibitor (Maraviroc) are all neither under development nor being 
manufactured locally (ibid). The significance of this is that the local pharmaceutical manufacturing 
company is debilitated when competing for tenders that include ARVs they currently do not 
produce. As a result foreign companies do not face any competition from local companies when it 
comes to the second line treatment. 
Over the last decade, research and development activities in Zimbabwe were affected by the 
economic meltdown causing the portfolio of ARVs manufactured in Zimbabwe being 
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predominantly old first line treatment regimens such as Stavudine, which is being phased out 
(Consultant Pharmaceutical Industry, 2011). The hyperinflationary environment and collapse of 
the Zimbabwe Dollar meant severe erosion of the purchasing power of public health institutions, 
hence a loss of the demand for ARV s (ibid). As a result of lack of access to foreign lines of credit 
and technology transfer slow down, research and development activities ground to a halt, as did 
manufacture of second line ARV treatment regimens (Research and Development Director, 2011). 
I discuss this further in chapters 5 and 8. 
Table 11: Early challenges to increased local ARV production. 
Challenges to Initial Local Production Plans 
WHO Prequalification: First obstacle. Global 
fund dis-appointments . 
Cost of conducting in-vivo bio equivalence tests 
with a company that is Internationally accredited. 
Cost of APls 
Funding for H IV/AI DS programmes 
Source: Osewe et at. , (2008) 
GMP needed and quotation was USD 2.5million 
made available by UNDP. 
Costs rose from US$ 10000, to 15 000 and 20 
000 as at 2008. This adds to the cost of local 
production. 
Exports of ARVs were supposed to be a source of 
foreign currency as per government 
arrangements for importation of APls . However 
due to lack of a viable external market (WHO pre-
qualification albatross), the government was 
compelled to provide foreign currency for import 
of APls, and then the economic challenges of 
2004 onwards made it even more complex. 
The roll out of HIV programmes has suffered from 
lack of international funding. Malawi and Zambia 
which have slightly lower rates of HIV/AIDS 
revalence than Zim have received more HIV/AIDS 
funding from the Global Fund. 
According to Osewe et al., (2008), some of the early challenges to increased local ARV 
manufactu re were lack of WHO pre-quali fication and resultantly an inability to participate in 
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Global Fund or PEPFAR funded tenders which required this qualification (see Table 11). 
Secondly, the costs of in-vivo bio-equivalence tests were steep as were the prices of APIs and 
excipients, imported from India and China. These imports require foreign currency, which was in 
short supply (ibid). The third hurdle was lack of funding for HIV/AIDS programmes as alluded to 
earlier (ibid). I return to discuss these in chapters 5, 7 and 8. 
It is with this background in mind that I set to understand the financing of technological capability 
upgrading and innovation. I used the OECD (2005) definition of innovation which states that "An 
innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or 
process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace 
organisation or external relations". The Oslo Manual classifies innovation into four broad 
categories of; product innovations, process innovations, marketing innovations and organisational 
innovations (ibid). My focus on technological capability upgrading is within this framework of 
innovation. 
2.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed African financial systems and African pharmaceutical manufacturing to 
give context to the study. I also discussed Zimbabwe's political economy, the rise of 
manufacturing, the financial architecture, financing of enterprises, pharmaceutical manufacturing 
and the story of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. In summary, the rise of manufacturing in 
Zimbabwe was linked to the agricultural and mining sectors as well as production of food 
production. The supply of repairs and substitution of imported equipment formed the basis for the 
development of manufacturing in Zimbabwe propelled by blockades of WWII and sanctions 
imposed after UDI. The financial sector developed to support trade and commerce modelled on the 
British financial system. Industrialisation was financed by FDI and foreign loans as subsidiaries of 
South African and British transnational corporates set up plants in Zimbabwe. Historically 
commercial banks have not played a critical role in financing industrial growth and development, 
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except for merchant banks, which competed with the Zimbabwe Development Bank in the long-
term financing terrain. However, local bank-availed long-term foreign currency loans have 
historically been scarce. The pharmaceutical sector emerged around 1953 and has existed for six 
decades, ample time, all things being equal, for technological capability upgrading and innovation 
to take off, which has not occurred. There was scarcity of foreign currency to import state of the 
art technology (plant, equipment, and machinery). ARV manufacture started in 2003 through the 
compulsory licensing route, operating through a harsh economic environment as Zimbabwe went 
into hyperinflation. Consequently, the portfolio of ARVs under manufacture is predominantly the 
first line treatment regimen. The demand side for ARVs has been decimated by lack of finances 
for public health drug procurement, and the promised 75% of production uptake has not been 
forthcoming as the public health system became more reliant on the donor funding. Resultantly 
public health drug procurement could not be used as an industrial policy tool. 
, 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review: Building the Theoretical Framework 
"When a banker starts to study the theory of financial intermediation in order to ' 
better understand what he has done during his professional life, he enters a world 
unknown to him. That world is full of concepts, which he did not, or hardly knew 
before and full of expressions he never used himself: asymmetric information, 
adverse selection, monitoring, costly state verification, moral hazard .... He gets the 
uneasy feeling that a growing divergence has emerged between the micro economic 
theory of banking, as it took shape in the last three decades, and the everyday 
behaviour of bankers according to their business motives, expressed in the language 
they use" (Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2003) 
3.0 Introduction 
The quote above captures my dilemma as a former banking practitioner getting to grips with the 
theoretical underpinnings of my career and trying to synthesise a theoretical framework to study the 
complexities surrounding the fInancing of AR V manufacture in Zimbabwe. The theory of fmancial 
intermediation alone could not fully explain the practical and behavioural aspects of my banking 
experience. It could not unravel aspects of knowing, which product to use for which customer, 
interpersonal and interdepartmental linkages, reliance on old timers to give historical and unwritten 
explanations on certain institutional viewpoints and tacit aspects of knowledge involved in 
fmancing enterprises. As I argued in chapters 1 and 2" fmancing local African pharmaceutical 
manufacturing is not just about giving loans to borrowers, but at the fmancial institutions there are 
skills, expertise and lending technologies surrounding loan origination, credit risk management, 
monitoring and control and loan repayment. At the pharmaceutical company there are 
technological capabilities of investment and project fInance involved in accessing fInance. 
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In building the theoretical framework for this study, fmancial intermediation only could not explain 
the whole story; neither could innovation focusing on technological capabilities, nor, economic, 
social, and fmancial history literature on its own. However, a synthesis of these diverse fields, 
including trade credit theory, and pecking order theory could build a rich theoretical framework to 
understand the complex story of fmancing technological capability upgrading and innovation in the 
manufacturing of ARVs in Zimbabwe. The advantage of the eclectic approach is the ability to 
cover the intersection of fmance and innovation. However, with an eclectic theoretical framework 
there is always a risk that I am drawing from too large a spread of different literature. I tried to 
avoid this by giving emphasis to the literature that is pertinent to this study. 
Calorimis (1995) argued that financing industrialisation in the second industrial revolution has 
contemporary applicability on the basis of two factors; first, during the second industrial revolution 
large amoUnts of fmance were required to finance large scale production and distribution. 
Secondly, the new production methods in the second industrial revolution embodied new products 
and new technologies, which reflect the contemporary situation of pharmaceutical companies in 
developing countries (ibid). The novelty of the new products and technologies gives rise to 
informational opacity for non-technical people such as bankers. However, Calorimis' (1995) 
analysis adopts the same approach of just making it about getting money and in larger quantities for 
catch-up industrialisation. The requisite technological capabilities at firm level for the borrower 
and the financial institutional behaviours are not analysed. It is with this understanding, and with 
acknowledgement of the complexity surrounding local pharmaceutical manufacture that I built an 
eclectic theoretical framework to conceptualise and study the financing of ARV manufacture in 
Zimbabwe. 
In this chapter, I discuss how I built the theoretical framework drawing from various bodies of 
literature including economic. social and financial history. financial intermediation theory. trade 
credit theory, pecking order theory, and technological capability framework. 
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I structure the rest of the chapter as follows: in section 3.1, I introduce the construction of the 
theoretical framework, whilst in section 3.2; I discuss sources of finance for companies from a 
historical perspective using economic, social and economic history. I highlight the fact that banks 
were a key source of external fmance for enterprises. I also discuss trade credit theory as trade 
credit is a source of in-kind external finance for working capital requirements. In section 3.3, I 
discuss the critical role played by banks in industrial development, reinforcing the idea that banks 
were a critical source of external finance. Section 3.4 covers the pecking order theory, explaining 
how companies when they need external finance prefer bank debt first, then hybrid bonds and 
finally equity to preserve management control. I discuss fmancial intermediation theory in section 
3.5 to explain what banks do, and how they do it and lending technologies. Up to this point all the 
literature I discuss concerns finance, but omits technological capabilities at pharmaceutical 
companies key to accessing finance. I therefore discuss in sections 3.6 the technological 
capabilities required by an enterprise to access fmance and conclude the chapter with section 3.7. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework Construction 
As I mentioned earlier, using intermediation theory only would not give a rich picture of the 
complexities involved in fmancing local pharmaceutical manufacture. Taking a technological 
I 
capability framework perspective only would not provide a rich picture either. I therefore 
combined economic, financial and social history literature, trade credit theory, fmancial 
intermediation theory, pecking order theory and Lall's technological capability framework to build 
the theoretical framework for this study. Fig 4 graphically presents the process of building the 
theoretical framework, showing a linear process but in reality, the process was iterative and 
involved preliminary desk research, and interrogating data in the field as the complexity of the 
study unravelled. Economic, social, and fmancial history, pointed to banks as the most prevalent 
source of external fmance (see section 3.2) which led to financial intermediation theory to explain 
what banks do and how they do it. I also included trade credit theory to cover short-term in-kind 
fmance provided by suppliers critical to fmancing working capital requirements. To understand 
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how companies choose external fmance when internal fmance is limited, I used the pecking order 
theory advanced by Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
As I discuss later in section 3.4 when companies need external fmance their order of preference 
puts bank debt at the apex, followed by hybrid bonds and lastly equity as managers prefer to retain 
management control and reduce external control and accountability that comes with equity fmance 
(Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). This reinforces the importance of banks as a primary 
source of external fmance for fIrm growth. I use fmancial intermediation theory (see section 3.5) to 
explain what banks do and how they do it; covering issues of risk, risk transformation, liquidity 
transformation, maturity transformation, asymmetric information, and transaction costs (Allen and 
Santomero, 1997, 2001; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000, 
2003). However, the literature above cannot explain the complexity of fInancing enterprises and 
industrial 'development such as technical skills in project fInance for both pharmaceutical 
companies and banks. I used the technological capability framework developed by Lall (1992) 
which looks at fIrm level technological capability of investment (pre-investment and project 
execution), product engineering, process engineering, industrial engineering, and linkages with the 
economy (see section 3.7). The fIrm level technological capabilities interact with national level 
capabilities; incentives, and institutions (ibid). 
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Developed by author with ideas from: Lazonick and O'Sullivan (1997a; 1997b) Myers (1984), Santomero 
(2000) Bhattacharya {I 993), Lall (1992). 
Figure 4: Building the theoretical framework. 
I now turn to an in depth discussion of the literature I used to build the theoretical framework. 
3.2 Explaining Sources of Finance for Industry 
Economic, social, and financial history literature reveals the sources of finance for setting up 
enterprises globally as internal or own finance made up of savings, wealth, and loans from family 
and friends (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1996; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1997a, 1997b; Trew, 2010). 
For growth, enterprises depended on retained earnings and banks were the most prevalent source of 
external finance (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1996; Lazonick and O' Sullivan, I 997a, 1997b). 
Exploring other possible sources of external finance for enterprises, Bhattacharya and Thakor 
(1993) listed venture capitalists, banks and capital markets with the key determining factor of type 
of financier being enterprises' management experience, skills and credit reputation (see Table 12). 
As Table 12 shows, in developed markets for start-up or emerging companies with un-established 
management and credit reputation and unknown future prospects, venture capital is the most 
appropriate source of capital (ibid). Growing companies with experienced management, poor to 
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good prospects for future prospects, medium to high risk and established credit reputations are 
likely to use banks as the source of external finance (ibid). Diamond (1991) posited that relatively 
new companies lacking a well-established reputation stand to gain the most from the monitoring 
activities of banks. Hence, they choose bank loans; whereas more experienced borrowers with a 
better reputation prefer to borrow from the capital market (ibid). 
Table 12: Sources of capital for companies determined by age, management skill and 
credit reputation. 
Sources of Capital for Companies At Different Stages Of Growth 
Attribute Venture Capitalists Bank Capital Market 
Type of Company Start-Up or Emergi ng Company Grow ing Company Establi shed Company 
Management Skills Unestablis hed Management Experi enced Ma nagement Experienced Management 
Prospects For the Future Profit s Unkown Poor t o good pros pects for fut ure Good pros pects for future profits profits 
, 
Usually cl assified as high 
because of the unes tabl is hed Medium to High credit ri sk, as Deemed low credit ri sk, because 
Cred it Risk manage ment, lack of operational the compa ny has some of establ is hed operational track 
track record and relat ively operat ional track record. record a nd pros pect f or future 
unkown fut ure profits pros peet s. profits. 
Un-determi ned as the compa ny is In t he process of es tabl is hi ng Credit Reputation 
at t he genesis stage . credit reputation. Establis hed re putati on. 
Source: Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) 
For established companies, with established credi t records, low credit risk and run by experienced 
management, capital markets become the most probable source of capital (Bhattacharya and 
Thakor, 1993). Capita l markets, though as argued by Lazonick and O' Sullivan (1997a, 1997b) did 
not playa major ro le in raising capital for industrialisation, except to a certain extent in the USA 
where bond finance was used in certain instances. Capi ta l markets were mostly used to transfer 
ownership of corporates from family run or close knit ownership structures to public ownership 
rather than raise finance for industrialisation (ibid). 
66 
The main sources of finance for industry can thus be split into internal and external sources (see Table 
13). Internal sources of finance as mentioned earlier, include own funds, loans from family and friends 
as well as retained earnings (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1997a, 1997b). External sources include bank 
finance (debt finance), securities (bonds, shares, and equity), trade credit and capital transfers (ibid). 
Another source of external finance critical especially for African industrialisation is foreign direct 
investment (see sections 2.7 and 3.2.3). The ultimate source of funds for industry are national savings 
composed of household and corporate savings, linked to the capital accumulation process (ibid). The 
other'sources of external finance include the state and development financial institutions (see Table 
13). 
The challenge that many African countries face is the limitation of sources of external finance. 
Venture capital and capital markets in general are either absent or limited in their operations, limiting 
the major source of external finance to bank debt as financial systems are bank dominated (see chapter 
2). 
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Table 13: Sources of financing for industry in developed economies. 
Sources of industrial finance 
Ultimate source of funds 
The State as a source of finance 
Financial and other institutions involved 
Internal finance (depreciation and retained profits), Bank I What were the sources of capital (finance) for start ups, 
Finance (Debt Finance). Bonds, Shares and New Equity 
(Securities), Trade Credit, Capital Transfers .. 
National Savings : Corporate Savings and Investment as 
well as Household Savings and Investments : 
State can leverage the fiscal process and long term 
borrowing to fi nance infrastructure and industry. 
Bank-Based Financia l System Architecture: Commercial 
Banks, Merchant Banks/Investment Banks, Finance 
Houses, Discount Houses, International Financial 
Institutions. and Rel! ional Banks . 
Market-Based Financial System Architecture: Stock 
Exchange, Merchant Banks, Brokers, Law Firms, C 
Finance Firms. and FDI. 
growing companies and companies that were taking off 
hitorically. What were the organisational dyanamics 
The capital accumulation process is therefore critical to 
financing industrialisation and determines whether a 
locally driven or external financing strategy will be 
employed in financing the industrialisation process. 
The entrepreneural state or the interventionist state 
Germany and Japan 
Anglo-Saxon financial system: UK and USA 
See for example foxwell (1917); Cohen (1967); 
Griffith-Jones and Rodriguez (1984); Calorimis 
(1995); Corbett and Jenkinson (1996); Lazonick 
and O'Sullivan (1997); Da Rin and Hellman 
(2001); Trew (201O) 
GS 
In the next section, I tum to internal sources of finance in brief. 
3.2.1 Own and Internal sources of finance for industrial development 
Sources of finance for early and late industrialisers can be glimpsed from Allen et ai., (2010) who 
listed them for the UK, USA, Germany and Japan as banks, securities markets, internal finance, trade 
credit, families and friends, and governments (see Table 13). As mentioned earlier the prevalent 
Source of finance for start-up enterprises was own finance, with internal finance the most common 
source for enterprise growth (ibid). This undergirds the British first industrial revolution financing 
model where wealthy merchants funded the genesis of companies, turnpikes, and canals (Corbett and 
Jenkinson, 1996, Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1997a and 1997b, Trew, 2010). Gowland (1998) classifies 
this as an informal capital market where entrepreneurs approach rich citizens to finance a project. On 
the other hand, internal finance accounted for the following proportion of finance to enterprises: Japan 
(57.9%), Italy (51.9%), France (61.4%), US (85.9%), UK (102.4%), Germany (70.9%), Finland 
(64.4%) and Canada (76.4%) (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1996; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1997a, 1997b). 
Companies therefore grew through reinvestment of earnings (retained profits). Corbett and Jenkinson 
(1996) in their international comparison of financing industrialisation between 1970 and 1989 reported 
that most countries internally financed their enterprises with contributions from the capital markets 
being either negative or small. However, Japan had larger contributions from all external sources 
(ibid). 
This presents a challenge for most African countries, which cannot internally finance industrial 
development, because of what Ndlela (2007) terms the prevalence of dis-articulated economies in 
Africa. Ndlela (2007) argues that because of colonisation, African countries experienced grafted 
capitalism and their societies did not go through social changes that developed countries experienced. 
ResuItantly commodification did not occur at the same magnitude in Africa as was the case in 
developed countries. The bulk of the population is poor, subsisting on peasantry and the informal and 
sectors which are not integrated into the formal economy (ibid). The formal economy is mostly based 
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in urban centres where 30% and at most 50% of the population resides (ibid). The accumulation 
process is slow and many African countries find it difficult to accumulate capital to finance 
industrialisation, hence the reliance on FDI and foreign loans (ibid). These stylized facts imply that 
until such a time that African economies cease to be dis-articulated, and can integrate the peasant, 
informal and formal economies, then accumulating capital to finance technological capability 
upgrading, and innovation will remain a challenge. This emanates from the critical role played by 
national savings and household wealth (accumulation process) in financing industrialisation from local 
resources. Data on financing manufacturing industry in seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
indicates that FDI and external/offshore finance were the main sources of capital, reinforcing Ndlela's 
(2007) argument (Riddell, 1990). Dailami and Walton (1989) however, put a caveat to this assertion 
that national savings are key to internal financing of industrialisation. They argued that the problem 
that African countries face is shortage of foreign currency to import technology for industrialisation 
(ibid). I return to this discussion in chapter 8, when I analyse Zimbabwe's sources of capital 
investment and the role played by banks. 
3.2.2 External sources of finance 
Bank credit was the most prominent source of external finance, except for USA where capital markets 
played some role (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1996; Trew, 2010). However, Lazonick and O'Sullivan 
(l997a) argue that in the USA, capital markets were used mostly to transfer ownership for going 
concerns established by own resources and grown using internal resources. Reinforcing the 
importance of bank finance, Corbett and Jenkinson (1996) reported that from 1970 to 1989, bank 
finance was the second most significant source of finance in most countries, particularly in bank-based 
economies such as Japan and France. Bank finance was also more significant than capital markets in 
Germany where joint-stock credit banks played an influential role in capital formation (Burhop, 2006). 
Gorton and Winton (2002) also support the idea that banks were the most prominent source of external 
finance in many countries. For example, between 1970 and 1985 bank finance, as a proportion of 
sources of finance in a number of countries was as follows: Japan (50.4%), Italy (27.7%), France 
(37.3%), US (24.4%), UK (7.6%), Germany (12.1%), Finland (28.1%) and Canada (15.2%) (ibid). 
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These results concur with African enterprise financing studies by Fafchamps et al., (1995) where they 
found out that of all external financing sources, bank finance was the most prevalent. Lazonick and 
O'Sullivan (1997a) reported that merchant banks in the UK (the equivalent of US Investment banks), 
did not fmance domestic industry but fmanced international trade and commerce. In Japan however, 
the Industrial Bank of Japan financed critical national policy companies and acted as a lead bank in 
syndications (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1997b). This may be the cue that countries like Zimbabwe are 
taking by proposing the establishment of an Industrial Development Bank to fmance industrial 
development (ZIDP, 2011). 
Capital markets (bonds and stocks) were not a significant source of funds for enterprises globally 
(Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1997a, 1997b). As argued earlier (see section 2.3) capital markets are of 
little significance to African contexts because of their small-scale nature and low capitalisation 
(Fafchamps et aI, 1995). Considering the general African context, (see section 2.3) venture capital and 
capital markets are more the exception than the norm, ruling them out as common sources of capital for 
industrial development. One of the key sources of external fmance at national level as discussed in 
section 2.7 is FDI, which can embody technology flows (Portelli and Narula, 2004). FDI as discussed 
earlier was critical in the set-up of the manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe (see section 2.7). Portelli 
land Narula (2004) pointed out that FDI is important for technological upgrading prospects for 
developing countries through technological spill overs. They defined FDI as a "combination of capital, 
stock, know-how and technology" and posited that for developing countries it represented a critical 
means of acquiring modem technology (ibid). Reflective of the role of multinationals in industrial 
development in Zimbabwe, Narula (1997) asserted that foreign investment embodied in multinational 
companies played a key role in the Nigerian economy, as between 1963 and 1972, of the total national 
capital, 65% was held by foreign companies. The major sources of FDI in Nigeria in 1975 were United 
Kingdom (38%), USA (22%), and other Western European countries (26%) (ibid). FDI therefore 
serves as the easiest mode of killing two birds with one stone; the developing country does not finance 
the importation of technology, and the investor brings in the knowledge and skills required to operate 
the technology. However, the challenges to this approach are assertions that FDI does not transfer 
technology as effectively through learning by doing, as multinational corporates tend not to reveal the 
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innovation process but are more interested in application of technology thereby limiting technological 
knowledge overflows. 
Another source of in-kind external flnance is trade credit advanced by suppliers of goods. I discuss 
this in the next section. 
3.2.4 Trade credit as a source of in-kind short-term external fmance 
Trade credit is a source of short-term., external in-kind fmance to companies availed not as money but 
as goods on credit (Berlin, 2003; Gianetti et al., 2011; Peterson and Rajan, 1997). Trade credit is 
therefore a peculiar form of short-term loan advanced by suppliers rather than banks (Nilsen, 2002). 
The buyer's ability to manage payment flows through a formalised delayed payment mechanism (trade 
credit) from the supplier causes the buyer to reduce cautionary holding of cash for goods payment 
alleviating cashflow problems and the need to borrow from banks (ibid). Suppliers unlike banks have 
an advantage because they advance goods and not money, averting diversion of funds risk faced by 
banks, which lend money (Berlin, 2003). 
Smith (1987) defined trade credit as "a contractual device for dealing with informational asymmetry in 
intermediate goods". Smith puts traditional explanations of trade credit into two groups; the fmancing 
motivation explanation and the pricing motivation explanation (ibid). Suppliers with market power 
and reputation access formal credit from banks and extend trade credit (in-kind fmance loan) to buyers 
allowing suppliers to price discriminate using credit (discounts systems) (petersen and Rajan, 1997, 
Nilsen, 2002, and Gianetti et aI, 2004). Suppliers thus provide capital to buyers unable to raise funds 
from flnancial intermediaries (Nilsen, 2002, and Gianetti et aI, 2004). Trade credit is also a screening 
and monitoring device in suppliers' relationships with buyers (Berlin, 2003; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
The fact that there are more suppliers better at evaluating credit than there are fmancial intermediaries 
makes trade credit an important source of flnance (Berlin, 2003; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Suppliers 
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by extending credit to buyers reduce transactional costs making business transactions cheaper and 
easier (peterson and Rajan, 1997; Berlin, 2003; and Gianetti et al., 2011). 
Superior information theory of trade credit ascribes a superior ability to sellers' information gathering 
ability over financial institutions (Gianetti et a1., 2011). Sellers can monitor the default risk of the 
buyer through frequency of order placement, and have more up to date information on company 
performance through order placement (ibid). If buyers fail to take advantage of early payment 
incentives this acts as an early indicator of deteriorating company performance (ibid). Gianetti et al 
(2004) however argue that the source of the supplier's informational advantage emanates from an input 
completion thesis, where the supplier unlike other lenders automatically becomes aware when the 
transaction has been completed and thus averts moral hazard, which arises due to interim information 
asymmetries unlike the fmancial institutions which do not possess the ability to do the same 
expeditiously. Other theories of trade credit include control theory, which emphasises the ability of the 
supplier compared to fmancial institutions to exercise control over the buyer through threat of 
withdrawal of supplies provided the buyer does not constitute a huge portion of the seller's sales 
(Peterson and Rajan, 1997). This argument, however has shortcomings when one considers a short-
term facility such as an overdraft or a revolving loan where the financial institution can also threaten 
either early repayment or lower the limits set on the facility as a tool for reinforcement thus exhibiting 
I 
some form of control. Another theory for trade credit is the salvage capability theory, which gives an 
advantage to the sellers' ability to get back their supplies in the event of non-payment and selling them 
off to another buyer (Smith, 1987; Peterson and Rajan, 1997, and Gianetti et ai, 2004). However, in 
the event of bankruptcy this is not easy unless the goods were sold on consignment, as other creditors 
would have claim to the assets of the company including inventory (Smith, 1987; Peterson and Rajan, 
1997, and Gianetti et aI, 2004). 
For companies in poorly developed markets, Fisman and Love (2003) assert that trade credit provides 
an alternative to traditional sources of funds such as banks. They showed that industries that exhibited 
elevated dependence on trade credit were in countries with poorly developed financial markets (ibid). 
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These findings concur with Fafchamps et ai's., (1995) enterprise financing fmdings in Zimbabwe, 
which revealed trade credit was a key source of external fmance for enterprises. Fafchamps et ai's 
work shows trade credit use in African enterprises, and especially important for this study that trade 
credit was active in Zimbabwe. Trade credit is a source of in-kind fmance that companies in 
developing countries can leverage to reduce expensive bank fmance. If pharmaceutical companies in 
Zimbabwe can access trade credit, they could control fmancing and manufacturing costs by reducing 
cost of bank finance and consequently boost price competitiveness. 
3.3 Critical Role Played by Banks in Financing Industry 
In the previous sections, banks have emerged as the most prevalent source of external fmance for 
industry globally and even in African contexts. In this section, I briefly discuss the critical role that 
, 
banks played in fmancing industry globally. 
The question of fmance influencing and modernising industry has been topical for centuries including 
the most appropriate model for financing industrialisation and economic growth (Cameron 1967; 
Cohen, 1967). The works of Patrick (1966); King and Levine (1993) demonstrated a close link 
between a country's financial system and economic growth. The role of fmancial systems in economic 
development, has been extensively investigated, with commonly cited examples being Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (Da Rin and Hellman, 2002; Allen and Carletti, 
2008). The debate is, which should come first, financial deepening or economic development? Levine 
(2002), argues that particularly in the early stages of development, bank based financial systems 
encourage economic growth and industrial development at a higher rate compared to market based 
systems. Da Rin and Hellman (2002) presented a theory of banks as catalysts for industrialisation, by 
formalising the Gerschenkron and Schumpeter argument that banks promoted creation of new 
industries. The banks however needed to be of sufficient large size, enjoying sufficient market power, 
able to mobilise resources and make profits from coordination processes (ibid). Governments and 
corporations were two alternative catalysts to banks for industrialisation (ibid). Gerschenkron (1962) 
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earlier on had given importance to the pivotal role played by banks in development of new markets, 
industries and economic growth (Da Rin and Hellman, 2002). Industrial development was accelerated 
as financial intermediaries mobilised savings, evaluated projects, managed risk, monitored managers, 
and allocated resources to investors (see section 3.5) (ibid). 
King and Levine (1993) showed that financial systems deepening can promote economic growth 
(supply leading concept) and conversely economic development could accelerate financial 
development (demand following concept). The supply-leading phenomenon, they asserted was most 
prevalent in less developed countries (Gershchenkron, 1962; Patrick, 1966). Calderon and Liu (2002) 
investigated the direction of causality between fmancial development and economic development 
(termed 'Patrick's problem'), and their investigation revealed the following five observations: 
a. Financial development leads to economic development, 
b. Dual nature of causality co-exists, 
c. Financial deepening contributes more to the causal relationships in developing countries than 
in industrial countries, 
d. The longer the sampling period, the larger the effect of financial development on economic 
development. 
They argued that financial deepening accelerates economic growth because of rapid capital 
accumulation and productivity growth, with productivity being the strongest (ibid). As discussed 
in the preceding sections, banks are key sources of external finance for industrial development and 
they are also the dominant financial institution in African financial systems. If in developing 
countries, the supply-leading phenomenon is more important for economic development (King and 
Levine, 1993), this further reinforces the importance of banks as potential financiers of industrial 
development in Africa. Reinforcing this argument, Bertocco (2003) asserted that banks and credit 
are fundamental elements of an economic system and critical to industrial development and 
economic growth. Bertocco (2003) further argued that banks and entrepreneurial innovators 
shoulder the responsibility of choosing which investments materialise and thus their actions 
influence industrial and economic development. 
75 
What this discussion brings to the fore is the critical role played by banks (fmancial intermediaries) 
in mobilising resources, evaluating projects, allocating resources to investors and the concomitant 
monitoring of managers and risk management (see section 3.5). From this perspective, fmancial 
institutions in developing countries can playa critical role in financing industrial development and 
economic growth, hence the focus of this study on the role played by banks in fmancing ARV drug 
manufacture in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean fmancial system was reputed to be highly developed 
(see section 2.6) and as such in the absence of the traditional FDI, banks are the most likely source 
of finance for industry (Dailami and Walton, 1989). 
3.4 Pecking Order Theory 
Prasad, Green, and Murinde (2001) argued that at firm level, fmancing policy dictates that 
, 
management identify avenues of fmancing investment, and the choices available to managers 
include internal and external sources of funds. Internal funds come from retained earnings, 
depreciation, or fresh equity injection from existing shareholders (ibid). External funds include 
bank debt, hybrid bonds, or issuing of new equity to new shareholders (ibid). When internal funds 
are limited, management sources external fmance, and the pecking order theory explains using 
management control the basis for external finance choice ranking (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 
1984). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf(1984) posit that companies choose the most optimal 
financing structure that minimises information costs and this leads to the pecking order theory 
whose conclusions are that in the presence of asymmetric information: 
(i) Firms' first choice of finance are own resources such as retained earnings or profits 
(ii) If self-fmancing is inefficient to fund investment, then firms' second choice of finance is 
acquisition of external debt instruments, frrstly, bank debt, then hybrid bonds, and the last 
option is new equity. 
Companies, for fear of management control dilution, prefer to use internal sources of fmance 
(retained earnings and profits) for expansion, as this enables them to maintain management control 
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(ibid). In the event that internal sources of funds are limiting, they prefer to obtain bank debt flrst, 
then hybrid securities such as convertible bonds as these have less management control dilution or 
external accountability (discipline and reporting) issues compared to accessing funds from the 
stock exchange, which is the final resort for external financing (ibid). Equity is taken as a last 
resort because of the onerous reporting standards and controls imposed on management and the 
attendant agency issues that arise when dealing with broad shareholding structures and professional 
managers as agents of shareholders (Bertocco, 2003; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
The pecking order theory in my theoretical framework links firm level technological capability of 
investment with banks as the preferred first source of external finance and maybe the only source 
of external finance in certain African contexts (see section 3.6). As discussed earlier capital 
markets are low key in many African countries, effectively ruling out hybrid securities and equity. 
In the next section (3.5), I tum to financial intermediation theory and discuss what banks do, how 
they do it by discussing contemporary banking and fmancial intermediation theories. 
3.5 Financial Intermediation 
As demonstrated in previous sections, banks were the most prevalent source of external fmance for 
enterprises and are thus critical for industry and economic development (Corbett and Jenkinson, 
1996; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1997a, 1997b). Companies in need of external fmance prefer bank 
debt to external equity to avoid dilution of management control and onerous reporting and 
accountability issues (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). In this section I discuss what banks 
do and how they do it by looking at contemporary banking and financial intermediation theories. 
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Thakor (1996) from a brokerage services perspective defined a financial intermediary as an 
institution that provides brokerage services when it intermediates in financial transactions without 
changing the nature of the transacted claim. From a qualitative asset transformation services 
perspective, the fmancial intermediary intermediates processes but qualitatively changes the nature 
of the claim (ibid). Financial intermediaries can be classified as depository or non-depository 
institutions involved in payments, information collection, loan origination and loan advances, 
underwriting and risk sharing amongst other functionalities (Allen and Gale, 2004). Depository 
fmancial intermediaries accept deposits, invest them in loans and securities, whilst non-depository 
financial intermediaries are involved in financial transactions and services, but do not raise deposits 
(ibid). Depository financial intermediaries include commercial banks and savings banks, whereas 
fmancial institutions such as insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, rating agencies 
and financial advisors exemplify non-depository institutions (ibid). Fama (1980) defmed banks as 
"financial intermediaries that issue deposits and use the proceeds to purchase securities", a 
"", 
defmition echoing Pyle's (1971) description of essential characteristics of a financial intermediary 
as an institution that issues claims on itself and uses the proceeds to purchase other fmancial assets. 
Wray (2010) augments this definition by listing five essential activities played by fmancial 
institution in an economy as follows: 
a) A safe payments and settlements system. which in many economies, is managed by 
commercial banks. 
b) Provision of short-term loans to households, companies, and governments. 
c) A system for availing mortgage finance for housing. 
d) Complementary fmancial services to the ones mentioned above such as pensions, 
brokerage and insurance schemes. 
e) Funding of capital assets through long-term fmance from respective fmancial institutions. 
There has been a gradual broadening of the theory of financial intermediation to cover not only the 
facets mentioned above but to explain asymmetric information, maturity transformation, risk 
78 
transfonnation and risk management roles of fmancial intennediaries (Allen and Santomero, 1997, 
2001; Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000, 2003). 
I discuss this in the next section by looking at theories that shift the focus from information 
asymmetry and transaction services to amelioration of risk, risk transformation, and risk 
management. 
3.5.1 Contemporary banking and fmancial intermediation theory 
Haubrich (1987) posited that banks enter long-tenn relationships with borrowers but not with 
depositors, and in the long-tenn relationships, which he likened to marriage, banks acquire 
proprietary information which is difficult to pass on or transfer to other lenders. The major 
functionalities of fmancial intennediaries hence revolve around dealing with asymmetric 
information, risk transformation, maturity transfonnation, and risk management as they ameliorate 
moral hazard and adverse selection (Allen and Santomero, 1997,2001; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 
1993; Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000, 2003). Financial intennediaries thus playa critical role 
in the economy; not only of mobilising savings and re-allocation to investors but transforming and 
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managing risk leading to them being viewed as economic units that add value to their clients 
through the activities of risk transformation and risk management (Allen and Santomero, 1997, 
2001; Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000, 2003). 
The financial instruments that financial intennediaries deal with in an economy include; bonds, 
notes and bills issued by governments; deposits and acceptances issued by banks; equity, bonds, 
convertibles, preferred stock, commercial paper, and warrants issued by companies and finally 
commodity futures issued by exchanges (Allen and Santomero, 1997). Allen and Santomero 
(2001) divided financial assets into three classes; those held by depository institutions (banks), 
those held by non-bank intennediaries (for example pension funds and insurance funds and mutual 
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funds) and thirdly, assets directly held by households (stocks and bonds). Financial intermediaries 
mediate the transactions of the aforementioned assets between savers and investors (ibid). 
Reinforcing this, Gorton and Winton (2002) posited that in capitalist economies, the process of 
savings and investment is managed by and through fInancial intermediaries using debt contracts 
when dealing with both savers and borrowers. This is different to capital markets where investors 
contract directly with companies resulting in marketable securities (ibid). Allen and Santomero 
(2001) pointed out that in certain economies such as UK and USA; households no longer deal 
directly with investors but indirectly with the market through pension fund, mutual fund and 
insurance fund management agents. 
Major reviews of contemporary banking and fInancial intermediation theories have been done by 
Santomero (1984), Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Allen and Santomero (1997 and 2001), 
Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000 and 2003), and Gorton and Winton (2002) amongst others. 
Gorton and Winton's (2002) treatise is extensive and goes into great detail on fmancial 
intermediation explaining why banks exist, what they do and how they do it at the micro-level. 
The discussion on the theory of intermediation in this thesis will revolve around theoretical thrusts 
by the aforementioned authors. Some authors built their arguments on imperfect markets, and 
informational frictions emanating from asymmetric information, transactional costs, maturity 
transformation, liquidity transformation, risk transformation and risk management activities (Allen 
and Santomero, 1997, 2001; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Gorton and Winton, 2002; 
Santomero, 1984; Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000 and 2003; Wray, 2010). 
Different approaches to factors mentioned above resulted in different theories of fInancial 
intermediation. The dichotomy comes from the approach to markets and the role of intermediaries 
as agents in a static system where they owe their existence to imperfect markets and the need to 
have an intermediary (agent) with advantages in information collection and management as well as 
advantages in transactional costs emanating from informational frictions (Allen and Santomero, 
1997, 2001; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Gorton and Winton, 2002; Santomero, 1984). The 
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second perspective is of intermediaries as active economic units that add value to their borrowers 
and lenders in a dynamic system through systematic risk transformation and risk management 
(Allen and Santomero, 1997, 2001; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Gorton and Winton, 2002; 
Santomero, 1984). The early paradigm of understanding financial intermediaries was built on 
asymmetric information and transactions costs theories (Diamond, 1984; Diamond and Dybvig, 
1986; Leland a,nd Pyle, 1977). Leland and Pyle (1977) posited that borrowers (entrepreneurs) have 
an advantage because they possess better knowledge about their projects than do financiers or 
outsiders hence the existence of information asymmetries. Entrepreneurs as specialists in their 
business possess better quality information on their collateral, business acumen, moral conduct and 
risks they face compared to lenders or outsiders (ibid). In as much as lenders may want to know 
information possessed by borrowers, moral hazard acts as a barrier retarding full information 
exchange between market participants (ibid). Information asymmetries are more pronounced in 
financial markets than in other markets, and external verification of the true business status may be 
costly leading to the transaction costs theory on financial intermediation (ibid). 
Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000, 2003) characterised the types of information asymmetries as 
either ex-post or e- ante. Ex-post information is information gathered after the event, based on 
,knowledge of the past, whereas ex-ante information is information before the event, or based on 
prior assumptions (ibid). Consequently, ex-ante informational asymmetry leads to adverse 
selection, interim information asymmetry leads. to moral hazard, whilst ex-post information 
asymmetry results in costly exercises of audit, state verification and enforcement (ibid). Interim 
information asymmetry emerges through on-going monitoring of revolving loans. These 
information asymmetries and transaction costs result in the need for a financial intermediary, which 
can leverage economies of scale to reduce information monitoring costs by accumulating 
proprietary information and reduce transaction costs compared to each individual investor trying to 
do the same (Diamond, 1984). Diamond's (1984) theory of financial intermediation was premised 
on minimising informational costs to resolve incentive problems (cost advantage). A financial 
intermediary, for example a bank was delegated the task of monitoring loan contracts, avoiding 
duplication if each individual investor was to do it or the free rider issue where no investors 
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monitored the lender (ibid). Monitoring the loan contract; an exercise that includes tracking loan 
covenants, surfaces the delegated monitoring function of the intermediary through collection and 
analysis of proprietary information (see Fig 5) (ibid). 
Source: Leland and Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984) 
Figure 5: Asymmetric information and agency explanation of financial intermediation 
Diamond and Dybvig (1986) argued for a synthesis of banking theory built on asset services, 
liability services and transformation services. The asset services made available to the borrowers 
included; evaluation, granting of loans and subsequent monitoring and control of loans, whilst 
liability services provided to depositors encompass; holding deposits, clearing transactions, holding 
an inventory of currency, and services flows (ibid). Transformation services described maturity 
and liquidity transformation services where short term liquid deposits are used to fund long term 
illiquid loans, described as the most subtle and important exclusive functionality of banks; as it is 
one of the key triggers on a run on the bank (ibid). Thakor (1996) and Allen and Santomero (1997) 
avoided this synthesis as they thought it was an artificial classification which became blurred 
considering the sophistication in financial intermediation. 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) in their review of financial intermediation theory came up with six 
key issues to explain the existence of financial intermediaries; credit allocation, liquidity 
transformation, maturity transformation, bank regulation, and borrower's choice of finance (see Fig 
6). 
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Financial Intermediary 
Brokerage Services 
Qualitative Asset 
Transformation 
... 
... 
Transaction Services: 
Financial Advice : 
Cheques, Trading SeCUrities, and 
Sa fe Custody. 
Portfolio M anagement and 
Investment Advi ce. 
Screening and Certification: Bond and SeC Urit ies ratings . 
Origination Services: 
Issuance Services: 
Miscellaneous Services: 
Loan initiati on activiti es. 
Bringing a sec urity offering to 
market. 
Trust activiti es. 
Maturity Transformation: Financing long term assets with 
short term liabiliti es . 
Divisibility: 
Liquidity Transformation: 
Credit Risk: 
Holding assets w ith larger SIZe 
than Indivi dual li abiliti es. 
Funding illiqUid loa ns (assets) 
with liqUid li abilities (depOSits). 
M onitoring and control activiti es 
to reduce default rISk by limiting 
m oral hazard and adverse 
se lec tion . 
Source: Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) 
Figure 6: Brokerage services and qualitative asset transformation model of financial 
intermediation. 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) reviewed literature spanning 15 years on contemporary banking 
and financial intermediation theory, and argued that informational asymmetries were the most basic 
form of transactional costs, and consequently informational-based theories of financial 
intermediation gave a more fundamental explanation. They organised the literature in six 
categories namely; why financial intermediaries exist, credit allocation activities, liquidity 
transformation, maturity transformation, bank regulation and borrowers choice of financing and 
market microstructure (ibid). On why financial institutions exist, Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) 
argued that financial intermediaries provide qualitative asset transformation and brokerage services 
(see Fig 6). The brokerage function involves bringing together savers and investors and does not 
change the nature of the transacted claim, whereas in qualitative asset transformation the claim 
being transacted involves risk (ibid). Financial intermediaries accept short-term liquid deposits on 
the back of which they issue long-term illiquid loans, a process involving maturity and liquidity 
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transfonnation hence the emergence of risk (ibid). In maturity transfonnation a bank funds loans 
(bank assets) of a longer maturity with bank liabilities (deposits) of a shorter maturity, and the 
bank's reward emanates from charging for bearing interest rate risk and creating liquidity for the 
borrower (Thakor, 1996). Liquidity transfonnation is the process where short tenn liquid deposits 
are converted into long tenn illiquid loans by the financial institution; the depositors through a debt 
contract give short tenn liquid resources to the bank, and the bank in advancing liquidity to the 
entrepreneur or investor converts liquid deposit into an illiquid asset (bank loan) (Bhattacharya and 
Thakor, 1993). Banks as depository financial institutions tend to provide both brokerage and 
qualitative asset transfonnation services whereas non-depository financial institutions operate in a 
narrow range (ibid). The process of intennediation in the Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) model 
of financial intennediation arises because of infonnational frictions in the market and hence the 
need for an agent to intennediate. 
, 
Allen and Santomero (1997) argued that traditional intennediation theories based on transaction 
costs and asymmetric infonnation, were designed to explain financial institutions that accepted 
deposits or insurance policies and advanced the collected funds to companies. However, this 
explanation fell short in explaining developments in the financial services sector where although 
transaction costs and asymmetric infonnation had declined, intennediation had increased (ibid). If 
intennediation owed its existence to transaction costs and asymmetric infonnation, there was no 
rational basis for intennediation to increase since transactional costs and infonnation asymmetries 
were declining they argued (ibid). In addition, innovations in the financial industry were building 
new markets of financial futures and options, which were the preserve or domain for exchanges 
purely between financial intennediaries themselves, which did not involve individuals or 
companies (ibid). Therefore, there was a need to discuss the role of intennediaries using risk 
trading and participation costs rather than traditional transactions costs and asymmetric infonnation 
(ibid). To reinforce this argument Allen and Santomero (1997) pointed at the rising share of assets 
held by Mutual Funds and Pension Funds compared to share of assets held by banks and insurance 
companies which had fallen. They argued that there had been a shift in activities to risk transfer 
and participation costs instead of traditional asymmetric infonnation and transactional costs (ibid). 
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They cited the emergence of securitisation of loans where one intermediary originated a loan, 
packaged it and sold it off to another intermediary, which traded the securitised loan on the 
secondary market (ibid). Another institution was contracted as a broker to collect the repayment of 
principal and interest on a commission basis, without holding the loan on its balance sheet (ibid). 
These fmancial innovations could not be explained by traditional transaction cost and asymmetric 
information theories. 
Allen and Santomero's (1997, 2001) approach brings out the dichotomy of functional versus 
institutional activity as a basis for theory building. It explains the different approaches of 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) of asymmetric information and transactions costs, the distribution 
of risks amongst participants and even the Allen and Santomero (1997, 2001) risk transfer, 
emphasising risk management and participation costs. Allen and Santomero (1997, 2001) argue 
that a functional theory building approach is better than an institutional theory building approach, 
as functions are more stable than institutions. Institutions come and go but functions in spite of 
innovation are more long lasting (ibid). For example, they argue a functional approach would look 
at financial intermediation from the aspect of loan origination, distribution, servicing and funding 
which have remained stable than the institutions administering these services (ibid). Allen 
'Santomero (1997, 2000) further argued that using a functional approach; literature on transactional 
costs could be rationalised through viewing the role of the institutions in distribution, and the 
asymmetric information role as activities around origination and servicing of loans. Hence the 
proposal that financial intermediaries act as facilitators of risk transfer and deal with complex 
fmancial instruments and markets, and risk management as the central issue in intermediation 
(ibid). 
Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000,2003) critiqued Allen and Santomero's (1997, 2001) theory of 
fmancial intermediation built on risk trading, risk management and participations costs arguing that 
risk management was not a recent development or phenomenon to the financial sector and also 
against the concept of participation costs assuming a pivotal role in intermediation. They agreed 
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with Allen and Santomero's (1997, 2001) functional approach rather than institutional approach to 
theory building (ibid). However, they argued that Allen and Santomero's (1997, 2001) assertion 
that risk management was a recent occurrence in the fmancial sector and making participation costs 
central to a contemporary theory of fmancial intermediation was not a complete analysis (Scholtens 
and van Wensveen 2000, 2003). They argued that the paradigm of complete markets giving 
fmancial intermediaries a role because markets are imperfect, or existing by ''the grace of market 
imperfections" was flawed (ibid). This logic implies that as soon as markets become perfect 
financial intermediaries become redundant; because savers and investors would have perfect 
information to identify each other and transact without the need for an agent or intermediary but in 
reality this is not so (ibid). The situation in practice is anything but the above; in fact, financial 
intermediaries broadly, instead of a tendency towards redundancy are re-inventing themselves, 
innovating to stay relevant, and taking a prominent role in modem economies argued Scholtens and 
van Wensveen (2000 and 2003). They asserted that it was erroneous to interpret the relative 
declining role of banks in the US context as a sign of general disintermediation when one considers 
the fact that financial innovation resulted in certain assets being off-balance sheet amongst other 
factors (ibid). The use of an institutional lens could be the reason for this erroneous analysis, as the 
functional analytical framework shows that fmancial intermediaries are of increased importance to 
the modem economy (ibid). They also asserted that the argument on participation costs is weak, as 
participation costs cannot explain the dramatic rise in mutual funds and the widespread use of 
derivatives (ibid). Banks were active in initiating or originating loans (deals), arrangement of 
deals, underwriting instruments, maintenance of a secondary market, innovation and production of 
a variety of both on and off-balance sheet products derived from securities, clearing deals, 
settlement and payment, offering custodian services, and providing stock lending (Scholtens and 
van Wensveen 2000,2003; Burhop, 2006). 
Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000, 2003) agreed with Allen and Santomero' s (1997) intimation 
that risk assumes a pivotal role in financial intermediation and the focus on risk management 
research, as risk is the reason d'etre of financial intermediation. Risk thus becomes the foundation 
of functions such as insurance and hence the genesis of banking lies in the risk transformation and 
risk management activities as evidenced by the merchant bankers of the Italian renaissance and the 
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insurance of goods shipped overseas (ibid). The essence of savings and loan associations, they 
argued, is steeped in risk management, encompassing interest rate risk, credit risk as well as 
liquidity risk, thus making risk the main business (ibid). They advocated that risk takes the central 
place in the theory of fInancial intermediation and a change from the static perfect markets as 
discussed earlier to a dynamic concept where new markets are developed for new products (ibid). 
Financial intermediaries are therefore economic units that add value to their clients through spatial, 
temporal, geographic and liquidity risk transformation and risk management (ibid). 
The Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000 and 2003) theory of financial intermediation therefore 
involves a paradigm shift to a dynamic concept of defIning financial intermediaries as 
entrepreneurial providers of fInancial services that are value creating economic units operating in a 
dynamic market. The market is characterised by market differentiation, new products, product 
innovation, with a focused customer orientation towards both borrowers and savers, and majoring 
in risk transformation and risk management (ibid). The financial intermediary still deals with 
agency problems manifesting through adverse selection and moral hazard as part of the risk 
function in the value addition process (ibid). This approach divorces the fmancial intermediary 
from the passivity ascribed to it by the traditional static information asymmetry and transactional 
I costs model and gives fmancial intermediaries an active, entrepreneurial value-adding role in the 
economy as a risk transformer and risk manager (ibid). The Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000 
and 2003) model puts risk and risk management at the core of intermediation with some of the risks 
dealt with including but not limited to maturity risk, counterparty risk, market risk (interest and 
stock prices),life expectancy risk and income expectancy risk. Financial institutions thus use their 
reputation, balance sheet and off balance sheet items rather than their very limited funds to act as 
counterparts. In fact of all forms of private enterprises, fInancial institutions are some of the most 
highly leveraged fIrms considering their equity to obligations to their depositors (ibid). 
The emphasis on viewing financial intermediaries as value-creating economic units that deal with 
risk management is critical to this study. Banks are the most probable source of fInance for 
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enterprises in Zimbabwe, even if they may not have local and foreign currency savings to lend. 
They theoretically are able to leverage international correspondent bank relationships (in the case 
of local banks) and affiliates or parent banks (in the case of foreign owned banks) to negotiate for 
foreign lines, as they carry out their fundamental activity of risk transformation and risk 
management. They are supposed to know the Zimbabwe risk and the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing risk better than the offshore providers of capital and can therefore intermediate not 
only in the local economy but can be integrated with global fInancial systems to channel capital to 
technological capability upgrading and innovation in the local pharmaceutical industry. This in-
depth analysis of the theory of contemporary banking and fmancial intermediation is important as it 
forms the keystone on the role Zimbabwean banks can theoretically play in fmancing ARV drug 
manufacture, by acting as value-adding economic agents that manage risks and leverage their local 
knowledge of risk to intermediate foreign capital and local projects. The second reason for the 
detailed treatment of contemporary banking and fInancial intermediation was to surface the 
complexities involved in fInancial intermediation and the highly specialist skills required to 
advance loans, balancing the liquidity of a bank as it does maturity, liquidity and risk 
transformations whilst managing regulatory requirements. As argued in chapter 1, it is not just 
about getting money but there are technological capabilities at play involved in the fmancing of 
African local pharmaceutical manufacture. 
3.6 Technological Capabilities Framework 
In the previous section, I discussed contemporary banking and fInancial intermediation theory that 
explains what banks do and how they do it. Risk is at the core of the business of fmancial 
intermediaries, as economic units that add value to borrowers (Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000, 
2003). Contemporary banking and fInancial intermediation theory though is silent on the technical 
capabilities involved in fmancial intermediation, specifIcally for this study, the complexities, 
expertise and lending technologies surrounding lending. In as much as fInancial institutions do not 
deal with physical products because they are in the services industry, they still deal with products 
(intangible though they may be) and processes and therefore are subject to product and process 
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innovation. There is a dearth of literature on product and process innovation in African fmancial 
services, and I used Lall's technological capability framework to map out some similarities with 
the productive firm. For the pharmaceutical company as a productive firm I used LaU's (1992) 
firm level technological capability framework with a minor modification of adding proj ect fmance. 
Lall ,(1992) explored the nature and determinants of micro level technological development and 
proposed a framework for national technological capabilities built on incentives, capabilities, and 
institutions. He suggested that firm level technological capabilities were made up of investment 
capabilities, production capabilities and linkage capabilities (ibid). He defined investment 
capabilities as "the skills needed to identify, prepare, obtain technology for, design, construct, 
equip, staff and commission a new facility (or expansion)" (Lall, 1992:168). Production 
capabilities are "range from basic skills such as quality control, operation, and maintenance to more 
advanced ones such as adaptation, improvement or equipment stretching to the most demanding 
ones of research, design and innovation" (Lall, 1992: 168). Lastly, linkage capabilities are ''the 
skills needed to transmit information, skills and technology to, and receive them from, component 
or raw material suppliers, subcontractors, consultants, service finns, and technology institutions" 
(LaU, 1992: 168). 
Kim (1997) defined technological capability as "the ability to utilise technological knowledge in 
the absorption, adaptation and remodelling of contemporary technologies". It is important to point 
out that technology can be the hardware as embodied in capital equipment for production and 
processing (Kumar et al., 1999). Or technology can have a software aspect as in tacit knowledge 
and the recipes for making or processing a product or service (ibid). Kumar et al., (1999) describe 
the two components of technology as "(a) the physical component which comprises products, 
tooling, equipment, blueprints, techniques and processes and (b) the informational component 
made up of know-how encompassing management, production, quality control, skilled labour and 
functional areas". My discussion oftechnological capability refers to both the hard and soft aspects 
of technology. 
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Technological capability can be viewed as the process of technical knowledge absorption, 
adaptation and modification through learning (Kumar et at., 1999). The various vehicles of 
transfer are foreign direct investment, joint ventures, acquisition of capital goods, and franchising 
(ibid). Kumar et aI., (1999) built the core of their conceptual model of technological capability on 
Lall's (1992) firm level technological capability framework. In developing country contexts where 
foreign direct investment and joint ventures are limited, two feasible options for technological 
capability upgrading are long term loans to acquire capital equipment and secondly franchising for 
the transfer of both hard and soft technological capability. This brings to the fore the importance of 
knowledge and learning by doing involving both codified and tacit (body contact) knowledge 
(Lundvall, 2007) particularly that relating to the fmance sector. 
Lall (1992) argued for state intervention in bolstering technological and industrial development at a 
time when the tide was against industrial policy or any state intervention but in favour of non-
interventionism in development circles. He argued that discourses then assumed that developing 
countries obtained all technological improvements from developed countries and transfer of 
technology was seamless with no need for adaptation in developing countries (ibid). Based on this 
he argued for selective interventions other than the functional governmental support which was in 
vogue (ibid). I discuss this in detail in the next section. 
3.6.1 Firm level technological capabilities 
Lall (1992) splits technological capabilities into national level technological capabilities (NTC) and 
firm level technological capabilities (FTC). Firm level technological capabilities include 
investment (pre-investment and project execution), process engineering, product engineering, 
industrial engineering, and linkages within the economy (see Fig 7; the blue section). His firm 
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level technological capability matrix was based on earlier work on micro level technological 
trajectory analysis by other authors (ibid). 
The stylised facts presented by Lall (1992) are that firms do not possess equal capabilities and 
aptitudes for technological knowledge, and consequently technological imitation and/or transfer 
bem:een firms is unequal. He argued that the process of technology transfer inevitably involved 
knowledge and learning as aspects of technologies that are tacit, reflecting Polanyi's (1966) we 
know more than we can tell thesis (ibid). As a result, attaining expertise in a certain technology is 
not a passive process but involves effort and investment by the firm. Lall (1992) asserted that 
technological change is a continuous process driven by inputs external to the firm as well as past 
knowledge (institutional memory). 
In categorising his firm level technological capabilities, he drew upon the work of Dahlman, Ross-
Larson and Westphal (1987), his work; Lall (1987) and Kats (1984, 1987) to synthesise what he 
called an indicative technological capability framework (see abridged version in Fig 7 the blue 
coloured portion). The key finn level technological capabilities were; investment split into pre-
I investment and project execution; production capabilities of process engineering, product 
engineering, industrial engineering, and finally linkages within the economy (Lall, 1992). At each 
level he described the degree of complexity ranging from basic (experience based) to intermediate 
(search based) to innovative or risky activities (research based). 
Investment capabilities covered skills relevant in searching for, identifying, making preparations, 
and acquisition of technology. This may involve construction, equipping, staffing, and 
commissioning a green field operation or growth of an existing plant. Factors under consideration 
at this stage include capital investment, technology, product range, mix and appropriateness of hard 
and soft technologies (ibid). 
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Under production capabilities, he included the usual production functions of qualit)' assurance, 
operations, machinery stretching, and adaptation which involve product and process engineering 
(ibid). These skills are critical to technological effort depending on in-house aptitude for adoption, 
adaptation, and modification of technology (ibid). Lastly he discussed linkages within the 
economy, which depended on skills critical for effective communication of skills and technology 
between, amongst to and from suppliers, sub-contractors, other firms, technology institutions, and 
other service firms (ibid). These extra market linkages are key to increasing productive capacity 
and efficiency, however he pointed out that all these factors were subject to macroeconomic 
environmental factors, competition and trade policy regimes (ibid). 
This discussion reveals that the framework was built more for the manufacturing sector than the 
financial ~ervices sector. However, when consideration is made to the fact that financial 
institutions sell products, intangible though they may be; it implies that product and process 
engineering goes on in financial institutions. The nature of the product being dealt with is 
intangible and knowledge intensive, and the technology used is both hard and soft. On that basis, I 
argue that it may be possible to use the technological capability framework to understand some 
processes in banks. 
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Degree of 
Complexity 
Matrix Of Firm Level Technological Capabilities: Lall {1992} 
Source: Modification of Lall ' s (1992) matrix of technological capability and Ernst and Lundvall's (1997) styles of innovation. Green section is author's modification. 
Figure 7: Modification of Lall's (1992) matrix of technological capability to include project finance capability 
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Lall's (1992) spoke of the need for the ability to gamer financial resources and physical investments as 
being critical to technological capability upgrading. However, he did not pursue the issue of efficient 
financial systems and ability to gamer financial resources and physical investment further for 
developing country contexts (ibid). This is the gap that I identify in his paper, because African 
financial systems are anything but efficient and the ability to gamer both financial resources and 
physical investment for technological capability are the greatest challenge faced by many African 
countries (see sections 2.3, 2.6 and 2.7). Consequently on the basis of African countries' inefficient 
financial systems and inability to gamer financial resources and physical investment for technological 
capability upgrading, I argue that Lall (1992) in his indicative framework omitted project finance as a 
key capability to access financial resources to import capital goods (the physical embodiment of 
technology). As discussed in chapter 2, many African countries do not have the capital to finance 
acquisition of plant, equipment and machinery and have to rely on regions with the capital through 
regional banks. Accessing these foreign long term loans from the regional or international banks calls 
for skills and expertise in synthesising a robust project finance document hence the importance of 
project finance for garnering the resources critical for importing technology (hardware). 
3.6.2 Modifying Lall's (1992) firm level technological capabilities. 
Based on the observation above, I argue that there is another set of finn level technological capability 
of project finance relevant for developing country contexts that Lall omitted (see Fig 7; green portion) 
which incidentally pervades all the other capabilities that he proposed from investment to production 
and linkage capabilities in both the manufacturing firm but also the financial services finn that is the 
bank. Project finance capability entails the ability to understand a project life cycle, the phase 
financed, and the ability to structure the right type of finance, lending technology, price, and tenor. 
This also includes knowing where to get the most appropriate project finance, from whom and when to 
use it based on Ernst and Lundvall's (1997) styles of innovation that argue that for innovation to 
occur, there is a need for a system integration that leverages know-what, know-how, know-why and 
know-who. Lall (1992) may have implicitly included project finance in investment as well as the 
national technological capability of efficient financial systems (banks). However, I argue that project 
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fInance is so important for developing country contexts that it warrants a separate classifIcation where 
fInancial systems are not efficient and growth of capital-intensive enterprises depends on capital 
investment fInancing (long term foreign loans) in most cases from offshore sources (see sections 6.2.3, 
8.2). Secondly, project fInance crosses over fIrm level and national level actors. It is therefore a key 
technological capability linking fIrm level and national level capabilities with respect to fInancing 
technological capability upgrading. 
I therefore modify Lall's (1992) firm level technological capabilities matrix and add project fInance 
based on Ernst and Lundvall's (1997) style of innovation (see Fig 7). The pivotal issue then becomes 
national systems of innovation (NSn and technological capability in a learning national economy 
(Adeoti, 2002). Freeman (1987) broadly defmes NSI as a network of institutions; be they private or 
private that interact, and in their interaction stimulate, cause the adoption, adaptation, and diffusion of 
technologies. Project fInance becomes an issue in NSI because by its very nature it involves a network 
of fIrm and national level private and public institutions such as technology institutions, training 
institutions, fmancial institutions, universities, firm level training. 
3.6.3 National Technological capabilities 
Under national technological capabilities Lall (1992) discussed three key factors; capabilities, 
incentives and institutions. Under capabilities, he discussed physical investment, human capital and 
technological effort (ibid). Lall (1992) touched on issues of government support through industrial 
policy favouring selective support instead of functional support that called for getting prices right, 
reduction, or elimination of protection and assumed free flows of capital and technology 
internationally. Wade (2009) also supported a state-led development approach, where governments of 
low-income countries pay greater attention to industrial policy than aid donors and prior governments 
driven by neo-liberalism had done in the last 25 years. Wade (2009) defined Industrial Policy as "any 
sectorally or activity targeted interventions", and argued that the perception of industrial policy as 
picking winners must be discarded, as "industrial policy can be done 'big' or 'small' and by leading 
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the market or following the market", This is done by taking advantage of endowments and constantly 
directing industry to upgrade or diversify and in some cases encouraging linkages (ibid), An extension 
of the industrial policy argument as argued by Wade (2009) involves a coordinated nationally driven 
effort to inculcate technological capability upgrading (see also Lall, 1992). 
Under incentives, Lal1 (1992) covered macroeconomic incentives, incentives from competition and 
incentives from factor markets. Interest rates, exchange rates, credit availability and foreign exchange 
availability are key drivers of macroeconomic incentives (Lall, 1992) and incidental1y all these factors 
fall under exchange and monetary policy which are linked to fiscal policies. He also alluded to 
political stability as a key macroeconomic incentive constituent, however for Zimbabwe these 
incentives have turned more into disincentives for industry (see chapter 5, 6 and 7). Lall (1992) 
however did not give a comprehensive discussion of institutions save to mention that institutions key 
for technological capability include the legal framework, property rights, and industrial institutions 
that promote firm inter-linkages, technology and training institutions and support for smaller 
enterprises. 
I used Lall's (1992) national level technological capability framework to I look at the business and 
environmental factors that made doing business in Zimbabwe a difficult task emanating from policy 
and practice gridlocks (see chapter 7). 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to build the theoretical framework to understand the complexities surrounding 
financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. I pointed out that looking at any of these theories; trade 
credit theory, pecking order theory, fmancial intermediation theory or economic, social, and fmancial 
history literature in isolation could not adequately explain the complexities surrounding fmancing 
ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. Since this study is at the interface of finance and innovation, I added 
Lall's (1992) technological capability framework to the above literature to come up with an eclectic 
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theoretical framework to understand the financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. Economic, 
social, and fmancial history revealed internal fmance was used to set up enterprises and retained 
earnings were used for enterprise growth. Banks, however were the most prominent source of external 
fmance and had played a critical role in fmancing industrialisation. Financial intermediation theory 
unravelled what banks do and how they do it. Trade credit was shown to be another external source of 
in-kind finance from suppliers. To bring in the innovation aspect of the study, I discussed Lall's 
(1992) technological capability framework and I argued that Lall omitted project finance by assuming 
efficient financial systems for garnering fmancial resources and physical investment, which is not the 
case in Zimbabwe or many other African countries. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology: Navigating Access, Data Collection and Analysis 
In Chapter I, I introduced the study arguing that the complexities surrounding financing African local 
pharmaceutical manufacture have been ignored in contemporary discourses on local pharmaceutical 
manufacture, especially the technological capabilities at pharmaceutical companies and lending 
technologies, expertise and politics of lending at banks. In chapter 2, I discussed African financial 
systems and pharmaceutical manufacturing, and also discussed what local pharmaceutical manufacture 
is all about. I gave a background to Zimbabwe's political economy, the rise of manufacturing, 
Zimbabwean fmancial systems, the pharmaceutical industry and the story of ARV manufacture. In 
chapter 3, I constructed the theoretical framework for the study. In this chapter, I link the previous 
three chapters and the succeeding five chapters by discussing the research design, the mixed methods 
research paradigm taken, data collection methods, data analysis and the challenges I faced in carrying 
out the study. 
In the next section, I discuss the multidisciplinary nature of the study and how I coped with the 
challenges of the many threads of enquiries and evidence that I could have included in this study. 
4.0 Introduction 
In 1979, as a ten-year-old boy, we moved house from a relatively simple set up of the brickflelds 
compounds in Mt Hampden, on the outskirts of Harare to a more populated and "more sophisticated" 
township; Dzivarasekwa about 10 kilometres from the city centre of Harare. The move from the 
single-class-per-grade Alpha Brick Primary School to the four-class-per-grade urban township Gombo 
Primary School was an eye opening and paradigm shifting experience. 
At break time on my first day at the new school, I looked for a friend. I asked his sister where he was 
and she pointed me to the soccer field. When I turned to the soccer field what met my unaccustomed 
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and ''unsophisticated'' eyes was a mesmerizing site. There were multiple tennis balls and other 
colourful plastic inflated balls whizzing past and criss-crossing each other, as boys of different grades 
ran in all directions (rather madly to me at that time). all playing soccer at the same time on the same 
field. What crossed my mind was how could these boys make sense of all this mayhem and madness? 
I later learnt, after becoming "street-wise", that many sets of teams could play soccer at the same time, 
on the same soccer field. The key to playing soccer in this environment was; first know who your 
team members are, second know which team is your opponent and third and most importantly keep 
your eyes on your ball (whatever form or size it was) at all times. With time, I learnt to ignore or push 
into the background the other teams and their balls, and made sure, I avoided colliding with the bigger, 
senior boys. In the end. the novelty wore off and I became a regular. but not-so-good soccer player in 
the mayhem and madness at break time in primary school. 
Fast forward to 2010; for a person schooled in the research methodology paradigm of the natural 
sciences and who made a mid-career change to banking and fmancing enterprises for seven years; 
embarking on PhD studies in Policy, Practice, and Development Studies required a paradigm shift 
similar to my primary school experience. Studying the fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacture 
of ARVs in Zimbabwe and the complexities and technological capabilities surrounding it, was also 
reminiscent of my move to a new primary school. As I discussed in chapter 3, building an eclectic 
theoretical framework using economic, social and fmancial history literature, financial intermediation 
theory, trade credit theory, pecking order and Lall's (1992) technological capability framework to 
research financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe, a country emerging from hyperinflation, 
presented a plethora of issues to consider. I had to learn to keep my eye on the ball of fmancing and 
its attendant complexities at all times, at the same time cognisant of the fact that fmance is part of an 
integrated system for technological capability upgrading in pharmaceutical companies. 
I learnt a new and unfamiliar language of epistemology, ontology and axiology. Lincoln and Gruba 
(1985) define epistemology as the science of know ledge, and the relationship between the knower and 
the known. Positivists believe that the knower and the known are independent, whereas naturalists 
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believe the knower and the known are inseparable (ibid). Ontology is the nature of reality with a 
dichotomy in perception between positivists and naturalists (ibid). The former argue that there is a 
single reality and the later advocate for multiple realities. This debate was traced by Johnson et al., 
(2007) to the early philosophers Socrates and Plato whose singular truth approach to viewing the 
world is in contrast to the Sophists (such as Protagoras and Gorgias) who favoured multiple or relative 
truths. Axiology covers the role of values in enquiry; positivists believe that enquiry is value free 
whilst naturalists argue that enquiry cannot be value free (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
Understanding the concepts described above helped in keeping focus on the study. My ball of interest 
involved using a fmance lens to understand the lending technologies, expertise, complexities and 
technological capabilities involved in fmancing ARV manufacture and the link between fmance and 
innovation. I used Lal1's (1992) technological capabilities matrix to link investment at fIrm level in 
the pharmaceutical company and the fmanciers. As I argued in chapters 1,2 and 3, it is not just about 
getting money. Financing technological capability upgrading and innovation of the local 
pharmaceutical industry is surrounded by complexities at the pharmaceutical company and at banks. 
As a banker, I was acutely aware that finance is part of a bigger and integrated system in local African 
pharmaceutical manufacturing which involves technology, technology transfer and human capital 
amongst many other factors that contemporary discourse cover. 
Although the Zimbabwean economic situation is uncharacteristic of other African countries, it 
provides an accelerated theoretical and empirical window to analyse and understand how many things 
can go wrong at the same time and what rebuilding an industry for a developing country emerging 
from an economic collapse entails. In this sense, Zimbabwe can serve as a microcosm to precipitate 
challenges that developing countries can face in local manufacture of drugs. I am cognisant that 
Zimbabwe's industrial development trajectory and economic history is peculiar, (see chapter 2), but 
focus on Zimbabwe can yield lessons learnt for other developing countries. 
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4.1 Research Objectives and Scope 
In this section, I discuss the link between the study, global health, access to medicines for African 
countries as well as emerging contemporary debates and initiatives to increase local pharmaceutical 
manufacture in Africa. I discuss the gap in knowledge and the complexity surrounding access to 
fInance in a developing country context. I also discuss how my fmdings can contribute empirically 
and theoretically to knowledge. 
4.1.1 What is the big story? 
The big story that this thesis contributes to is local pharmaceutical manufacturing, and access to 
medicines in Africa. There are renewed local manufacture thrusts with political backing spearheaded 
by the African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and East African Community (EAC) (UNIDO, 2011 b; EAC 
PMPOA,2011). Pan-African institutions such as ANDI (African Network For Drugs and Diagnostics 
Innovation) among others are promoting innovation in drugs, diagnostics and vaccines innovation in 
Africa (ANDI 4th Stake Holders Conference, 2011; Nwaka et al., 2012). The focus of these initiatives 
include technology transfer and institutional strengthening and capacitation, product and process 
innovation, vertical integration and drug regulation harmonisation (Nwaka et al., 2012; Rovira, 2006; 
UNIDO, 2010a; 2011b). Examples of these efforts can be found in the UNIDO (2010a, 20tb, 2011 a, 
2011 b) reports of four African countries manufacturing capability scans (Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe 
and Nigeria). 
Another example is the GIZ (Germany Development Agency)-EAC PMPOA (2011) five country 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities scan of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, 
and ANDI's 33 centres of excellence in Africa (ANDI 4th Stakeholders Conference, 2011; Nwaka et 
al.,2012). ANDI centres of excellence are a pan-African initiative to harness fragmented innovation 
capabilities in Africa through centres of excellence from which other African regions can learn, 
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utilising Ernst and Lundvall' s (1997) learning by doing approach to innovation. This thesis 
contributes from a theoretical and empirical basis to this big story of African local pharmaceutical 
manufacture, unravelling some complexities surrounding financing of ARV manufacture by focusing 
on the link between finance and innovation. 
4.1.2 Where is the gap in knowledge? 
There is an empirical and theoretical gap in knowledge on fmancing local African pharmaceutical 
manufacture. Firstly, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no theoretical and empirical work 
on fmancing local pharmaceutical production in Africa and secondly no empirical work has been done 
to explain why local pharmaceutical fmancing by banks is subdued. The complex interaction between 
banks, or other financiers for that matter, and pharmaceutical companies and the requisite firm level 
technological capabilities of project fmance necessary to successfully seek project fmance and 
advance project finance loans by fmanciers are assumed to exist; another gap in knowledge. As 
argued earlier it is not just about money but the process is complex and needs a theoretical and 
empirical grounding (see section 1.2 and Fig 1). 
There is a dearth of focus on fmancing local pharmaceutical manufacture in African innovation, 
industrial development, enterprise fmance, and technological capability literature. Literature that 
discusses local pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa focuses on technology, technological 
capability, technology transfer, human capability and economies of scale (Anderson, 2010; Bates, 
2008; Kaplan and Laing, 2005, Rovira, 2006; UNCTAD, 2011; UNIDO 201Oa, 201Ob, 20lla, 2011b; 
Wilson et al., 2012). The issue of fmance is mentioned in passing as a major hurdle for African 
pharmaceutical manufacturing and technological capability upgrading, especially the scarcity of long 
term loans (Anderson, 2010; Bates, 2008; Kaplan and Laing, 2005, Rovira, 2006; UNCTAD, 2011; 
UNIDO 2010a, 20 lOb, 20lla, 2011b; Wilson et aI., 2012). Access to fmance was identified by 
pharmaceutical companies in Africa as one of the major challenges to local drug manufacturing as 
evidenced in the UNIDO four-country scans and the GIZ-EAC East Africa five-country scans 
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(UNIDO 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b; EAC PMPOA, 2011; ANDI, 2011). There is 
acknowledgement that finance is a hurdle, but in many instances, the discussions are scant and usually 
the subject is exhausted in a paragraph or two. I argue that there is more to financing local 
pharmaceutical manufacture than contemporary literature discusses. 
The gap in knowledge, is a lack of theorising and in-depth empirical studies explaining institutional 
behaviours (politics of lending) of financial institutions in their interactions with local pharmaceutical 
companies when assessing projects for credit risk and when deciding to lend or carry out transactional 
banking (see chapters 6, 8 and 9). This is important as it provides some basis for discussion on who 
will finance African pharmaceutical companies' technological capability upgrading and innovation. 
This study intends to enrich discussions on sources of finance, why those sources of finance and most 
importantly whether African countries have financial systems that can finance African pharmaceutical 
industry technological capabilities upgrading that fosters innovation take-off. In most sub-Saharan 
African countries the accumulation process (national savings as a percentage of GDP) are depressed 
signifying low potential of using local sources of capital to finance pharmaceutical industrialisation 
(see Fig 8; chapters 2,3, 6 and 8). External finance in the form of bank debt (foreign currency offshore 
lines of credit) or FDI seem the most viable source of external finance for acquisition of plant 
equipment and machinery (chapter 2 and 3). However, FDI and offshore loans are highly linked to 
ease of doing business, country competitiveness, which are driven by macroeconomic and political 
stability. This rules out a significant number of African countries in accessing these financial 
resources for importing plant, equipment and machinery. 
Financial intermediation literature on Africa as discussed in chapter 2 covers traditional banking 
aspects on lending and costs, but do not cover the politics behind lending, and the dynamic interaction 
between banks and pharmaceutical companies. This thesis contributes to this gap in knowledge. The 
traditional moral hazard and adverse selection explanations for low lending in Africa do not tell the 
complete story. The politics of lending explanation enriches discourses on why African banks, lend 
little, at high interest rates and high interest spreads to African enterprises. 
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Figure 8: Gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa (1966 _ 2012). 
I acknowledge that finance is not the panacea. Finance is important but not sufficient for successful 
local manufacture of drugs and ultimately technological capability upgrading and innovation take-off. 
However, because of the neglect to date in contemporary discourses, I focus on this gap and contribute 
theoretically and empirically to enrich contemporary discourses on local pharmaceutical manufacture. 
Fig 9 below graphically shows the processes I am focusing in the financing of ARV manufacture to 
bring out the gaps mentioned above. At the phannaceutical firm level , I am focusing on who finances 
working capital and capital investment for research and development, and manufacturing. My interest 
is on who finances, how they finance and the technological capabilities involved in accessing working 
capital and capital investment finance. 
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Figure 9: A summarised graphical representation of the focus of this study. 
4.1.3 Scope of the study 
The focus of this study is uncovering complexities surrounding financing of local ARV manufacture in 
Zimbabwe. As argued in chapters 1 and 3, it is not only about money, but there are firm level 
technological capabilities for pharmaceutical companies and expertise and lending technologies for 
banks that determine access to finance. 
I therefore focus on technological capabilities of investment and project finance critical for accessing 
finance by pharmaceutical companies (see chapters 5 and 7). With regard to banks, I focus on lending 
technologies, know-how and expertise that influence the magnitude of lending to pharmaceutical 
companies (see chapter 6). I also focus on the politics of lending in light of institutional behavioural 
characteristics driven by credit policies, underwriting standards, credit risk analysis, credit risk 
management, and revenue streams strategies. These institutional behaviours are driven by bank 
ownership and pharmaceutical company ownership (see chapter 6 and 8). I also focus on the markets 
for drugs (the demand-pull factor) and how public health drug procurement can or cannot be used as 
an industrial development policy tool (see chapter 6). 
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The scope of this study covers the gap in knowledge identified in section 4.1.2. The study addresses 
the gap in knowledge by using empirical data on financing of ARVs in an African country. It also 
addresses the complexity surrounding access to finance. The unit of analysis is the pharmaceutical 
company and the commercial bank. 
4.2 Research Questions 
In this section, I crystallize the research focus by asking specific research questions on financing ARV 
manufacture in Zimbabwe that bring out the complexity surrounding access to finance for the 
pharmaceutical company and loan origination, disbursement and monitoring and control at the bank. I 
also consider the business and operating environment driven by the macroeconomics and other 
national technological capabilities. 
, 
4.2.1 Main research question 
The overarching research question is: How is local manufacture of ARVs in Zimbabwe financed 
and what are the complexities and technological capabilities surrounding this financing? 
I break down the main research question into five specific sub-research questions to bring out the 
complexity surrounding financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe below (see Table 14): 
1. How are capital investment and working capital requirements for ARV manufacture financed? 
2. As the most prevalent source of external finance for enterprises, what role do commercial 
banks play in financing ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
3. At firm level, what technological capabilities are required for pharmaceutical companies to 
access finance and the expertise and capabilities at banks required for loan origination? 
4. What institutional factors drive bank strategy on revenue streams, lending, who to lend to and 
at what price? 
5. What are the key business and operating environmental factors that influence financing of 
ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
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Table 14: The main research question, sub-research questions, arims offocus and analysis. 
How is local manufacture of ARVs in Zimbabwe 
financed and what are the complexities and 
technological capabilities surrounding this 
financing? 
I. How are capital investment and working capital requirements for 
ARV manufacture financed? 
2. As the most prevalent source of external finance for enterprises, 
what role do commercial banks play in financing ARV manufacture in 
Zimbabwe? 
3. At firm level , what technological capabilities are required for 
pharmaceutical companies to access finance and the expertise and 
capabilities at banks required for loan origination? 
4. What institutional factors drive bank strategy on revenue streams, 
lending, who to lend to and at what price? 
5. What are the key business and operating environmental factors that 
influence financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
Sources of funds: Whether intemal or external (bank debt) at the various 
categories ofshor!, medium and long term . Did any funds come from 
Financial Institutions, Government, FDI, or Shareholders? 
This interrogates whether commercial banks playa significant role in 
financing technological capability upgrading and innovation for AR V 
manufacture in Zimbabwe. 
The aims is to elucidate the complexities surrounding access to finance 
for local pharmaceutical manufacture. For banks this involves looking at 
capabilities involved throughout the processes ofloan origination, credit 
risk assesment and credit manageme 
This speaks to the politics oflending embodied in institutional 
behavioural characteristics driven by revenue streams strategy, credit 
policy and underwriting standards. The focus is to find other explanallUi 
other than moral hazard and adverse selecti 
The focus of this research question is Lall's (1992) national technological 
capability framework of capabilities, incentives and institutions and how 
failure at practise and policy level can cause a compensatory reaction at 
firm level leading to policy an 
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4.3 Research Context and Genesis of the Study 
The genesis of this study has roots in very close encounters with family, friends, relatives and 
colleagues affected by HIV/AIDS who could not access ARVs from both cost and availability 
perspectives during the 2000 - 2010 decade in Zimbabwe. If management of HIV I AIDS was such 
a critical issue and high on the agenda of the Government of Zimbabwe, NGOs, Ministry of Health, 
National Aids Council and Company Social Responsibility programmes why was the local supply 
of ARVs not expanding? Especially so, for a country once touted as the next newly industrialising 
country in the same breath with South Korea, and Singapore (Mlambo et at., 2000, Phimister, 
2000; Stoneman, 1990). The same country had a financial system heralded as one of the most 
advanced in Africa and a pharmaceutical industry established as far back as 1953 (Dailami and 
Walton, 1989; UNIDO, 2011b). 
, 
I recalled that during my banking days with an international bank, we did not consider the local 
pharmaceutical companies attractive credit prospects or as a significant investment opportunity, 
except for one company, later de-emphasised because of what were deemed to be management 
issues (see chapter 5). We classified the rest of the pharmaceutical companies as small to medium 
enterprises; but in essence, they were too big to be small to medium enterprises and too small to be 
large corporates. With this background in mind, I set out to understand how working capital and 
capital investment for manufacturing ARVs is financed in Zimbabwe. I was interested in the 
projected trajectory for the sector in its quest for technological capability upgrading, productive 
capacity expansion and industrial development. 
This study is cross-disciplinary, straddling finance (banking), and innovation (technological 
capability upgrading), and draws literature from economic, social, and financial history, trade 
credit, financial intermediation, and technological capability. This eclectic collection of literature 
reflects the complexity and richness of studying financing of local ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe 
using a finance lens within an innovation context. 
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4.3.1 Cross-functional study after a hyperinflationary environment and economic 
collapse 
Studying the fmancing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe from 2003 to date was always likely to 
carry risks, chief of which is the difficulty of teasing out the contagion and overextended effect of 
the economic collapse and hyperinflationary environment that prevailed. The economic collapse 
and -hyperinflation pose challenges in clearly dissecting influences and directly attributing causative 
factors. These peculiar economic events had a huge impact on pharmaceutical manufacturing and 
manufacturing at large in Zimbabwe. Teasing out how these factors interacted to influence fmance 
and credit availability can be a daunting task, and clearly distinguishing the different actors 
becomes difficult as any factor could be attributed to the vagaries of hyperinflation and economic 
collapse. I do not carry out a review of the hyperinflationary environment and its effect on the 
economy. Ndlela (2011) gives a detailed discussion of the economic events and hyperinflation in 
Zimbabwe; Evolution of Zimbabwe's economic tragedy: a chronological review of macroeconomic 
policies and transition to the economic crisis, and; Macroeconomic policies and transition to the 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe. Other authors who studied the same era of hyperinflation and 
economic collapse include amongst others Kairiza (2009), and Coomer and Gstraunthaler (2011). 
The purpose of this study was not to study the hyperinflationary environment. 
What makes a study of this nature more challenging is the fact that it straddles two industries; 
pharmaceutical manufacturing and commercial banking, each of which faced its own peculiar 
business and operating challenges during this economic phase. Banks had to deal with cash 
shortages, a currency whose value was eroding fast daily as lending in Zimbabwe dollars became 
meaningless. As a result, I do not focus on Zimbabwe dollar lending in this study, as analysing that 
is not useful. The pharmaceutical companies for some time were constrained by law to deal in the 
local currency which was losing value daily, whilst importing active pharmaceutical ingredients 
using foreign currency, which forced some of them to mothball certain operations. 
Notwithstanding all these challenges, the story of how working capital requirements and capital 
investment fmancing for ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe is of historic, policy and academic 
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interest. Studies of this nature can assist in building an understanding of the context, breadth, and 
depth of challenges that a country emerging from hyperinflation and economic collapse· faces in its 
quest to industrialise or re-industrialise as in the case of Zimbabwe. 
In this study I focused on fmance, specifically working capital fmance and capital investment; who 
fmanced; using which sources; at what cost and why (see chapters 5 and 6). I focused on firm level 
and national technological capabilities (Lall, 1992), at the pharmaceutical firm manifesting in 
project finance, investment, business and operating environment, policy terrain and infrastructure 
to understand fmancing of ARV manufacture (chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7). For the banks I focused on 
lending technologies, fmancial intermediation and the expertise involved in loan origination, 
disbursement and monitoring and control. 
, 
I turn now to how I designed the study in the next section. 
4.4 Study Design 
There are diverse ways of carrying out social science research including; case study, experiments, 
surveys, histories, and analysis of archival information. Each strategy has peculiar advantages and 
disadvantages depending on the following three conditions (Yin, 2003): 
1. the type of research question, 
2. the control the investigator has over actual behavioural events and, 
3. focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena. 
In the next section I discuss why I chose the case study approach to study fmancing of ARV 
manufacture in Zimbabwe. 
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4.4.1 Case study 
I chose the case study approach for this study because I intended to carry out an empirical enquiry, 
investigating a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, where the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context were not evident. This kind of research is best done using the 
case study approach (Yin, 2003). Stake (1995) asserts that a case study looks at the particularity 
and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances, 
by looking at the details of interaction within its contexts. Thus, the case study is more suited when 
considering how or why questions, when the investigator possesses little control over events, 
especially real life events of a contemporary phenomenon and wants to cover contextual conditions 
(Gray, 2004; Yin, 2003). I used the case study strategy to cover the logic of design, data collection 
techniques and data analysis as it benefited from the development of theoretical propositions (see 
chapter 3) to guide data collection and analysis. Yin (2003) splits the components of research 
design into the following five segments; 
i. a study'S questions, 
ii. its propositions if any; 
iii. units of analysis, 
iv. the logic linking data to the propositions and, 
v. criteria for interpreting the data. 
In this study, I am answering the how and why questions, making the case study approach the most 
appropriate. The proposition on which this study is based is that lack of [mance and the complexity 
surrounding accessing [mance for working capital and capital investment are some of the key 
reasons why Zimbabwe's pharmaceutical manufacturing industry is not experiencing technological 
capability upgrading and innovation. This proposition helps in identifying where to start looking 
for relevant evidence (Yin, 2003). The case in this study is the pharmaceutical industry and 
commercial banking sector and the units of analysis are the pharmaceutical companies and the 
commercial banks, the most viable source of external [mance for enterprise growth in Zimbabwe. 
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A case study in and of itself does not generate data, but is a framework and context within which 
data can be collected through interviews, participation, questionnaires, or combinations of all these 
(Bryman, 2004). 
4.4.2 Mixed methods 
I chose the mixed methods paradigm for gathering data. Johnson et al., (2007) argue that mixed 
methods research is part of a trilogy of major research paradigms; qualitative research, quantitative 
research and mixed methods. Their defInition of research paradigm is built on Kuhn's (1962, 
1977) coining of the word paradigm. Johnson et al., (2007) defme a research paradigm as "a set of 
beliefs, values and assumptions that a community of researchers have in common regarding the 
nature and conduct of research". These beliefs include but are not limited to ontological, 
epistemological, axiological, and methodological beliefs (ibid). 
The mixed methods approach allowed use of various data gathering methods, which included; 
semi-structured interviews, informal discussions, conference presentations and interactions with 
pharmaceutical professionals for primary data, and document reviews for secondary data. Both 
quantitative and qualitative data were collected giving a rich data set. The quantitative data 
pertained to loans advanced, cost of the loans (interest and management fees), manufacturing costs 
of ARVs and projections of optimal capital investment for the pharmaceutical sector. I also 
gathered quantitative data on time scales involved in importing raw materials and spare parts, and 
credit terms advanced to customers by the pharmaceutical sector. Qualitative data was collected 
using the semi-structured and informal interviews. Qualitative and quantitative data complemented 
each other in building a deeper understanding of dynamics at play. 
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4.4.3 Sources of evidence 
Yin (2003) lists six possible sources of evidence: documentation; archival records; interviews; 
direct observation; participant observation and physical artefacts. In this study, I used two main 
sources of evidence in various forms; interviews and documentation. I used semi-structured 
interviews, informal interviews and discussions. Amazingly, it was during chance meetings that 
ten~ed to be short that I gained really insightful and useful information as follow-on to initial 
discussions. Some of the unusual places that I leveraged to gather data included chance meetings 
with Senior Executives at food outlets during lunch times. Immediately after these informal 
discussions, I documented the information in my field notebook. Other informal discussions and 
feedback were on the side lines at cocktail parties, workshops, and conferences in Zimbabwe, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, and France, with key players in the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, 
regulators, academics, and policy makers. 
I held semi-structured interviews with key personnel in the pharmaceutical and commercial 
banking sectors and in a Zimbabwean Economic Think-Tank, drug procurement agencies and other 
organisations (see Tables 15 and 16 for a detailed description of key interviewees). I also used 
I archival documents to collect background information and secondary data. Some sources of 
documents included: The World Bank (WB); International Finance Corporation (IFC); United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO); United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCT AD); GIZ; East African Community (EAC); Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(RBZ); Ministry of Health and Child Welfare; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Industry and 
International Trade; African Development Bank (AfDB); PTA Bank; and various NGOs. I also 
used various newspapers to collect published commercial banks' half year and fully year fmancial 
results. 
It quickly became clear to me as I scanned published academic literature on manufacturing and the 
pharmaceutical sector in Zimbabwe that there was a dearth of data on fmancing local 
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pharmaceutical manufacture in accessible academic and grey literature. Literature for 
manufacturing only and not pharmaceutical manufacture dates back to the early 1980s and 1990s 
but as for current work; done in the 2000s, it was difficult to access except for a few books 
accessed from the British Library. Furthermore, published literature in journals on the 
pharmaceutical sector in general, and on fmancing local pharmaceutical manufacture in Zimbabwe 
or Africa is not available to the best of my knowledge. I relied on grey literature, accessing 
institutional publications from the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank (WB), 
UNIDO, GIZ, UNCT AD, PTA Bank, Afreximbank, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Confederation of 
Zimbabwe Industries (CZn and other documents accessible on the web. The fact that data and 
literature specific to African pharmaceutical manufacturing and its fmancing was not available 
underscores the gap in knowledge identified in this study and the need for in-depth empirical data 
generation and analysis. 
Academic literature on Zimbabwe's banks and the fmancial sector was also limited and covered the 
pre-1995 era with a bias towards mostly economic history and political economy. This lack of 
published academic literature on both the pharmaceutical and fmancial sector in Zimbabwe forced 
me to rely on my banking and manufacturing experience and practical knowledge of Zimbabwe. 
Unfortunately, during my career as a banker, I had neither managed nor advanced loans to the 
pharmaceutical sector, so there was no professional background to leverage except to scour grey 
literature, and relying on key personal contacts in the sector. The lack of professional experience in 
the pharmaceutical sector in a sense became an advantage as it freed me from issues of bias and 
insider status, which I had to deal with in the financial sector. 
In addition to key publications on local production of medicines in Africa (UNIDO, 2007, 2010a, 
2010b, 20lla, 20llb; Berger et al., 2009; IFC, 2008; EAC PMPOCA, 2011), I used the snow 
balling effect to search for literature and other publications pertinent to this research cited in 
accessed literature. I also used Google scholar and electronic journals on the University's library 
website's flexibility of offering similar papers and who had cited the papers to search for relevant 
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literature using key words such as fmancing, industrialisation, local phannaceutical manufacture in 
Africa, ARV manufacture, to mention just a few. I also accessed papers via referrals by academics 
and policy makers at workshops that I attended in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and France 
where I presented my work in progress. 
4.5 The Conceptual Framework 
As discussed in chapter 3, I built the conceptual framework from an eclectic collection of literature 
and theories from economic, social, and fmancial history, pecking order theory, trade credit theory, 
fmancial intermediation theory and Lall's (1992) technological capability framework. I discussed 
the framework in chapter 3. The justification was that use of a single body of literature was not 
sufficient to precipitate the depth and complexity surrounding financing of local pharmaceutical 
manufacture. It would miss the complex firm level technological capabilities of project fmance at 
the phannaceutical company, the politics of lending and project fmance appraisal at the bank and 
the national technological capabilities of incentives, capabilities and institutions (Lall, 1992) that 
influence the business and operating environment and whose failure at policy and practice level can 
cause policy and practice gridlocks. 
4.6 Research Process 
In this section, I discuss sampling methods, data collection techniques for primary and secondary 
data and data analysis. As Stake (1995) asserts gathering data means going into someone's home 
turf raising issues of access such as; who you approach, how you approach them and how you 
collect the data. 
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4.6.1 Sampling and accessing the respondents 
Because of the low and manageable number of pharmaceutical manufacturing companies andkey 
commercial banks, I adopted the purposive sampling method. There are five main pharmaceutical 
manufacturing companies commanding up to 90% of local production and of these, I accessed 
three. There were seventeen commercial banks in Zimbabwe during my fieldwork and of these; I 
accessed nine of the major market-movers in terms of asset base, and influence, which was more 
than adequate, as these banks lent the most to the sector. For the pharmaceutical companies the 
downside to not accessing all the companies is not getting to understand why the two companies I 
could not access were not manufacturing ARVs. However, it became apparent as I spoke to the 
executives from the three other companies that they knew their market well and they allayed my 
fears that I did not miss much other than "hearing it from the horse's mouth" . 
... 
4.6.2 Targeting the pharmaceutical companies 
I leveraged my local knowledge of key contacts in the pharmaceutical industry, banking experience 
and the UNlDO pharmaceutical manufacturing scans to identify which companies to approach. 
The UNlDO (2007, 2011b) publications on Zimbabwe confirmed my local knowledge and helped 
give empirically based background information. I could therefore concentrate on the banking and 
technological capability nexus, which was at the heart of my research. Two pharmaceutical 
companies approached did not decline outright, however repeated efforts to gain access were met 
with silence; a polite "Zimbabwean" way of saying, "sorry I cannot help you, but I do not want to 
hurt your feelings". 
I made initial contact with one of the pharmaceutical companies whilst I was still in Milton Keynes 
(UK). The initial response was positive, however after submitting the written proposals, emails 
went unanswered and contact phone numbers I had been given were no longer accessible. When I 
arrived in Zimbabwe, I arranged an appointment with the company Director through his secretary, 
who I had initially made contact with whilst in Milton Keynes and emailed a written proposal. The 
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meeting was postponed once, and when I arrived for the rescheduled meeting, I waited for almost 
one and half-hours. When he arrived, the director seemed interested and for the second time asked 
me to send a written application to him, which I did the same day. The response once again was 
silence. The negative experience was the same with the second company; a phone call to introduce 
myself, a request for a formal letter, emailing the letter and again silent treatment. A key contact 
had warned me that I was wasting my time trying to access those two companies, as I was unlikely 
to ~e granted access. The key contact had just completed a study on the local pharmaceutical 
manufacturing industry and could have been speaking from experience. This key contact helped 
with other companies as he introduced me to Executives, such that by the time I went for the 
interviews they all acknowledged that they had already been briefed about my research work and 
its importance. 
The reception from the Chairman of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and MD of one 
pharmaceutical company was warm and professional right from the start. I had contacted him 
during my first year of study. Email and phone call exchanges culminated in a meeting and an 
endorsement of my study as he felt the study would be beneficial to the local pharmaceutical 
industry. This endorsement went a long way in my acceptance by the industry as a valid 
researcher. 
I also learnt the dangers of unseen circumstances when arranging meetings during fieldwork. I had 
made headway during my first year of study to arrange for interviews with the key and only 
company that was manufacturing ARVs in Zimbabwe. However, after a long period of silence I 
decided to call and follow-up with the key contact at the company I had been communicating with 
and who had given some positive response. However, on following up, I learnt that the contact had 
left the company and I had to start afresh; and my request was met with a solid no. This was 
disheartening as it meant the whole project would flop. How could I tell the story of fmancing of 
ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe if the only company then manufacturing ARVs denied me access? 
Through serendipity, a family friend who is the Director of a Leadership and Management 
Academy asked me if I had spoken to the MD as he knew him in Professional circles. I explained 
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that I had tried to gain access and I was not being successful. He promised to call the MD, and by 
the following morning, I was given the contact number of the MD who literally opened the doors to 
all key departmental heads, and personally introduced me to some, asking them to hand me over to 
the next managers. As a result of the introductions from the MD, I gained the validation I needed 
to access key management, and this proved very useful. Consequently, I interviewed key 
executives and management. I also had a factory tour to see the types of capital equipment used 
and observe in situ the production process for ARVs in a WHO-prequalified plant. I made every 
effort to remain objective and not be captured. 
4.6.3 Targeting the commercial banks, regional banks and other organisations 
As mentioned earlier I purposively sampled commercial banks, accessing nine key commercial 
banks in Zimbabwe by asset size, market power and influence out of the registered 17 commercial 
banks. The access situation with the commercial banks was much easier than with the 
pharmaceutical sector. I leveraged personal contacts and industry experience to contact former 
colleagues in the financial services sector to set up interviews. As a result of this pool of former 
colleagues and industry contacts, I accessed senior management and executives in the commercial 
banks. Access to senior executives was critical as it gave me top management's view on the 
industry, their view of the pharmaceutical sector and the drivers of the politics of lending in banks. 
Senior management designs or influences the design of credit policy, underwriting standards and 
revenue stream strategies depending on bank ownership (international or local), which ultimately 
drives the politics oflending. A detailed list of the interviewees accessed is shown in Table 16. 
As for access to the African regional banks, I was successful with one but not with the second 
regional bank, as I had no contact there. The representative asked for a written submission, to 
which they responded by sms and later by phone, informing me that they were unable to assist me 
locally. I had to contact their head office in Kenya if I wanted the data I was seeking. As a result, I 
did not access this regional bank but relied on accessing their annual reports via their website. 
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I used the strategy of referrals by friends and friends of friends to gain access to other organisations 
detailed in Table 17. However, the situation with an economic Think-Tank was different. I had 
come across their work through a local press report (The Herald) and on writing to them, the 
Secretariat was very welcoming and gave me the report they had produced on the pharmaceutical 
sector as well as other pertinent background documents on research done on the Zimbabwean 
economy. I took the opportunity to ask the Secretariat for an interview which was granted. The 
interview with the Secretariat was critical to understanding the business and operating 
environment, macroeconomic policies, as well as collaborative institutional connections this 
organisation had with labour, government, and industry in efforts to revive the economy looking at 
fiscal and monetary policies, trade policies, and industrial policies. 
I also interacted with policy makers, pharmaceutical executives and regulators from East Africa, 
Southern Africa and other African countries through my participation at the ANDI fourth 
stakeholders' conference in Ethiopia, the East Africa Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan of Action 
in Arusha Tanzania and the AIDS conference in Zimbabwe (see Table 15 and 17). At the ANDI 
and East Africa conferences, I presented my work on financing local pharmaceutical companies 
and took the opportunity to find out the situation in East, West and other Southern Africa countries 
I pertaining to local pharmaceuticals sector. Interaction with policymakers, pharmaceutical company 
executives and regulators from other African countries broadened my understanding of issues 
affecting financing of local pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa. 
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Table 15: A breakdown of pharmaceutical industry respondents from Zimbabwe and the SADC region in 2011. , 
1 
Harare, Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 
Table 16: A breakdown ofrespondents from the banking industry in Zimbabwe in 2011. 
Executive Director Corporate Banking 1 
2 I Chief Risk Officer 1 
I Director Organisational Learning 1 
ector Sales 1 
3 Managing Director Project Funding 1 
4 Executive Director Corporate Banking 1 
5 Executive Director Corporate Banking 1 J Harare, Zimbabwe 
6 Head of Corporate Banking 1 I 
7 Head of Corporate Banking 1 
8 Head of Corporate Banking 1 
9 Senior Manager Corporate Banking 1 
10 Senior Relationship Manager 1 
11 Regional Manager Southem Africa 1 
12 Head of Business Development 1 
Director Pension Fund House 1 
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Table 17: A breakdown of respondents from the NGO and other sectors in Zimbabwe and Africa. 
/ 
14 
4.6.4 Data collection 
I used two interview techniques; semi-structured interviews and informal conversational interviews 
as described by Gray (2004) who asserted that semi-structured interviews can be categorised as 
non-standardised and are often used in qualitative analysis, where the interviewer has a list of 
issues and questions to be covered. However, the interviewer may not deal with all of them and 
has .the flexibility to change direction depending on the direction the interview may take (ibid). 
Informal conversational interviews on the other hand depend on spontaneous question generation 
and represent the most open-ended form of interviewing techniques (ibid). I used the semi-
structured interview approach to gather data on operations of the pharmaceutical sector and 
commercial banking sector to unearth the politics of lending and technological capabilities 
involved in financing enterprises. I used the conversational interview type with key informants to 
explore banking and pharmaceutical technological capability dynamics. In many instances after 
the semi-structured interviews, when there was still time, I used the conversational type interview 
technique to gain an in-depth understanding of industry dynamics from senior executives and 
during the factory tour. 
I 4.6.5 Accessing archived material before getting study visa. 
My research work commenced before I came on campus at Milton Keynes in February 2010, 
because of complications in getting my study visa on time. The visa processing centre was moved 
from Harare and is now handled in Pretoria, South Africa. There was a delay in approval of the 
visa and it was more prudent to start collecting data whilst the second visa application was under 
process. I collected RBZ publications from the RBZ library and the budget blue books, which are 
the Ministry of Finance compilation of the budget presented in Parliament. I also made efforts to 
access the Central Statistics Office as well as The Ministry of Health and Child Welfare. I 
collected statistical information on health indicators and other pertinent documentary information 
some of which was printed material and the other on CDs. I took advantage to collect these books 
and publications as it would have been difficult to access them when in Milton Keynes. 
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4.6.6 Preliminary data collection in first year of study. 
I also collected data in the fIrst year as I developed the research question, devised the research 
design and prepared the probation report. I did this through telephone contact with key people in 
the pharmaceutical industry and conunercial banks. One of the key contacts developed was 
UNIDO in Vienna, Austria. I came across their work in pharmaceutical manufacturing scans and 
promoting local manufacture. UNIDO informed me of their work on pharmaceutical sector 
profiles for Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda. They later published and disseminated these 
publications in April-May 2011. The Zimbabwe document was the second UNIDO project 
following up on a 2007 document. I used information in the UNIDO (2007, 2011 b) documents to 
pursue areas that needed clarity, which saved me time from gathering background data on the 
industry. SuffIce to say both UNIDO documents, as well as those for other countries, although 
they mentioned access to finance as a key hurdle to growth, did not explore the complexity 
... 
surrounding fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacture and the role played by banks in 
fmancing technological capability upgrading; the gap I identified as the focus of this thesis. 
4.6.7 First and second field trips to Zimbabwe 
I carried the fIrst fieldwork from March to May 2011. This served both as a pilot and first phase of 
fieldwork. There were rumours and insinuations of elections being held that year and I decided to 
play it safe to gather as much data as possible just in case it became difficult to access the field if 
and when elections were held. Elections are an unpredictable event and usually have the effect of 
making respondents nervous and I did not want to take this chance of leaving data collection for the 
second round. I collected primary data from three pharmaceutical companies and nine conunercial 
banks, one regional bank, one local project fmance company and one local pension house. 
Building rapport as argued by Gray (2004) is important for establishing trust and respect between 
the interviewer and respondent. This process was much easier in the conunercial banking sector, as 
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I knew many of the respondents as contemporaries in the market. At the beginning of each 
interview, aspects of informed consent, a brief background of who I was, the institution I was 
working with and the study I was conducting were explained to the respondents (see Appendix. 
Section 11). This was followed by asking respondents if they were comfortable with an audio 
recording of the interview. Of all the interviews held, except for the informal and introductory 
ones, only one respondent refused to be audio recorded. The estimated duration of the interview 
and the option for the respondent to opt out of the interview was explained to the respondents. 
Anonymity was promised to all the respondents that their names would not appear in the final 
report, and this has been observed. 
In the next section I discuss data analysis. 
4.6.8 Data analysis 
Gray (2004) argues that there are two general strategies to analyse case study evidence namely 
based on the original theoretical propositions and research objectives emanating from them and the 
second strategy is to develop a descriptive framework on completion of the case study. The danger 
I of the former approach however is lock-in and not seeing other new and relevant issues. Yin 
(2003) however recommends the former approach. Yin (2003) details five specific techniques for 
analysing case studies and these are; pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, 
logic models and cross case synthesis. I carried out examination, tabulation, categorisation and 
testing of data using both quantitative and qualitative evidence as constituting data analysis (Yin, 
2003). I tabulated the quantitative data on size of loans, costs of fmance and other pertinent 
fmance data concerned with financing of the pharmaceutical sector, to compare loans availed per 
company and the cost of those loans. I took advantage of analytic manipulations and presented the 
data as flowcharts, tables and photographs. 
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To understand the story behind the provision or lack of loans I relied on qualitative data, which was 
analysed using manual coding, categorizing and thematic analysis since the sample under analysis 
was manageable. The results came from semi-structured interviews where I grouped questions in 
different thematic categories as well as the conversational interviews. Richards (2005) argues that 
qualitative coding is about data retention, with the purpose of learning from the data by an iterative 
process of going back to the data until an understanding of the patterns and explanations fully 
emerge. The process leverages coding, to assist in getting past the mass of data to a category, and 
then working with the different data segments about the categories (ibid). There are various ways 
of coding including descriptive coding, topic coding and analytic coding (ibid). Analysis is an 
iterative and continuous process and the purpose of which is to give meaning to fIrst impressions 
and the final write-up through taking findings apart (Stake, 1995). Braun and Clarke (2006) as well 
as Boyatzis (1998) defme thematic analysis as a method for identifying, analysing and reporting 
themes or patterns within data by organising data and describing it in rich detail. They describe 
" 
what counts as a theme as something important about the data in relation to the research question, 
representing some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set (ibid). I coded the 
data as described earlier in different thematic areas and carried out the continuous iterative process 
to build an understanding of the results (see chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
In analysing the data I relied on theoretical propositions that led to the case study, the theoretical 
framework, research questions and the literature reviewed (Yin, 2003). I also made use of 
chronological events especially in analysing the effects of politico-economic events on national 
savings, financial architecture, incidence of lending technologies, technological capability loss 
through emigration and fmancial system architectural change, allocation of capital to industry and 
availability of term fmance for technological capability upgrading. 
I used the linear-analytic structure in writing up the case study, where I built up the study by 
establishing the theoretical framework, setting up the propositions followed by data collection, 
analysis, conclusions and implications from the fmdings in the discussion section (Yin, 2003). 
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4.7 Research Ethics 
I followed Ruane's (2005) approach to research ethics that research should not cause hann to 
respondents, the researcher should obtain infOlmed consent and researchers should respect 
respondents' privacy and avoid conflict of interest. In that regard, I obtained the Open University's 
ethical approval and observed confidentiality, and anonymity of the respondents. I infonned the 
inte~ewees that they could withdraw from the research at any time. Before each interview, I 
sought permission to record the interview with an audio recorder. If the interviewee was 
uncomfortable then I did not use the audio recorder. Of all the respondents in the phannaceutical 
and commercial banking sectors, only one Senior Banker refused to be recorded, and the audio 
recorder in that instance was not used, but I took notes during the interview. 
4.8 Research Challenges 
Investigating the past, present and future trajectory of the story of fmancing of ARV manufacture 
in Zimbabwe within an innovation context poses challenges of which lens or lenses to use in view 
of time and resource limitations characteristic of a PhD study. Using just a fmanciallens may tell a 
I portion of the story, whilst using the policy, business management or industrial development lens 
would equally not shed light on a multidimensional story. Leaving out technological capability and 
policy lenses would mean a less rich account of the trajectory. As I discussed in chapter 3, I used 
economic, social, and financial history as well as innovation, finance, and fmancial intennediation 
literature to build a theoretical framework that would bring out a rich account of the complexity 
surrounding fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacture of ARVs in Zimbabwe. I now turn to 
the specific field challenges I met. 
One of the main challenges I faced was the bias factor; how does an investigator who used to be a 
practitioner in a certain field manage the bias effect? The fact is it is impossible to be totally 
objective when dealing with a field where one was trained professionally. What I tried to do to be 
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as objective as possible was to let the data speak for itself. I took care to use data obtained during 
the research. The advantage of practice, which may be a disadvantage from another perspective, is 
the ability to quickly and effortlessly assess key issues used by fmanciers to assess credit status and 
not be easily misled. However, practice could also straightjacket me into path dependence so that I 
could miss certain nuances that would be easier to note for an outsider. To circumvent this, I relied 
as much as I could on the primary data from the respondents minimising my own voice in the 
results. I however, leveraged my own experience in the analysis and description of the results, as is 
shown in the flow diagrams that I constructed using literature, respondents and my own practice 
experience to explain some of the technical banking aspects that qualify under the technological 
capabilities key for financial institutions. I also leveraged my practice experience and advantage as 
an insider who is now an outsider looking in, cognisant of some of the tacit practices, which I used 
to develop the politics of lending thesis. 
, 
4.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed how I designed the case study, and the theoretical (conceptual) 
framework I used to frame the research. I reiterated how important it was to incorporate literature 
from economic, social, and financial history, fmancial intermediation theory, pecking order theory, 
trade credit theory and technological capability framework to capture the richness and complexity 
surrounding fmancing technological capability upgrading and innovation in local ARV 
manufacture in Zimbabwe. I discussed how I delimited the study by focusing on fmancing of ARV 
manufacture using a fmance lens within an innovation scope, with particular interest in 
technological capabilities at firm level (pharmaceutical companies) and lending technologies at 
banks surrounding access to fmance. I detailed how I purposively chose my sample companies to 
interact with, how I approached key informants, and the challenges I faced and how I overcame 
them. I also discussed how I collected data and how I analysed it. I discuss this data in detail in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7, and analyse it in chapter 8. 
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Chapter 5: ARV Manufacturing in Zimbabwe 
5.0 Introduction 
In chapter 1, I argued that fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacturing in Africa and the 
complexities surrounding fmancing local drug production have been neglected in contemporary 
academic and professional discourses. In chapter 2, I discussed the background to African 
fmancial systems and pharmaceutical manufacturing to give the African context. I also discussed 
the background to Zimbabwe's political economy, fmancial systems, the rise of manufacturing, 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, and the story of ARV manufacture in the same chapter. I built the 
theoretical framework in chapter 3 and discussed the methodology in chapter 4. In this chapter, I 
present empirical evidence on financing of working capital requirements and fixed (capital) 
investment by pharmaceutical companies for ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. 
I focus on empirical data that addresses, with respect to pharmaceutical companies, research 
questions 1, 2 and 3 detailed below: 
1. How are capital investment and working capital requirements for ARV research and 
development, and manufacture fmanced? 
2. As the most prevalent source of external fmance for enterprises, what role do commercial 
banks play in fmancing ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
3. At firm level, what technological capabilities are required for pharmaceutical companies to 
apply for fmance and for banks to assess and advance loans? 
To address research question 1, I focus on the sources of funds used by Zimbabwean 
pharmaceutical companies in comparison to sources of fmance for industry such as foreign direct 
investment, internal sources of fmance, bank debt, and venture capital and capital markets (see 
sections 2.7 and 3.7). To address research question 2, I focus on the role that commercial banks 
play in financing ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe based on section 3.3, where literature suggests 
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that banks played a critical role in industrialisation of other countries. In section 3.2.4, I discussed 
the relevance of trade credit as a source of short-term in-kind fmance for fmancing working capital 
in enterprises. In this chapter, I also focus on trade credit as a source of fmance for local 
phannaceutical companies in Zimbabwe. I use the pecking order theory (section 3.4) to understand 
how managers choose which source of fmance to fund the manufacture of ARVs in Zimbabwe. 
Lastly I apply Lall's (1992) technological capability framework to understand the technological 
capabilities necessary for a productive fIrm to access fmancial resources for physical investment 
that stimulates technological capability upgrading and innovation. I however focus more on the 
investment capabilities, especially the missing link of project fmance capability and how the 
companies access fInancial resources for physical investment and fmancing their operations. 
It is important to note at this point that I focus on two types of fmance for enterprise; working 
capital fmance and capital or fIxed investment fmance. Working capital is defIned as current assets 
less current liabilities (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). The current assets are debtors, cash and cash 
equivalents, stock (inventory), short term investments and pre-paid expenses, whilst current 
liabilities (all payable within one year) include creditors, short-term borrowings, current maturities 
of long-term debt, taxes and wages and salaries (ibid). Working capital management involves 
management of current assets and current liabilities in corporate finance and consequently 
determines the liquidity and profitability of a company (ibid). Assets can be a source of funds for 
the company if current assets exceed current liabilities, a positive working capital situation. A 
positive working capital situation leads to liquidity such that the company relies less on expensive 
external fmance for day-to-day operations (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Mathuva, 2010). Working 
capital fmance funds day-to-day operations for a company, covering amongst other things, payment 
of wages, raw materials, and selling and general expenses (ibid). 
Capital investment or fIxed investment, on the other hand, fmances acquisition or replacement of 
machinery, equipment and plant and funding of the permanent portion of core working capital 
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(Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Mathuva, 2010). Capital investment finance comes in the form of 
long-term debt, equity or FDI (see section 3.2). Capital investment is viewed as patient capital 
required for financing innovation and technological capability upgrading. Consequently it is not 
surprising that capital investment features in many debates on the ability of local pharmaceutical 
companies to develop. 
The distinction between working capital finance and capital or fixed investment is important as the 
type of finance available to a company determines whether it will barely survive or engage in 
technological capability upgrading. Long-term finance is the most suitable to fund importation of 
capital goods. Dahlman and Westphal (1982) describe capital goods as the embodiment of the 
physical aspects of technology. In company operations, working capital and fixed investment can 
compete for the same money, making the issue of getting the right type of finance for the right type 
of project critical (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). With this background in mind, I consider sources 
of working capital finance and capital (fixed) investment finance for manufacturing of ARV drugs 
in Zimbabwe. 
For the purposes of the discussion on financing ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe, it is important to 
point out that there is only one company currently manufacturing ARVs in Zimbabwe. Another 
company that used to manufacture ARVs has since stopped and a third company is planning to 
manufacture ARVs. Therefore, the bulk of the discussion revolves around evidence from the 
company manufacturing ARV s in addition to the views of the company about to commence ARV 
manufacture and the one not manufacturing ARVs. The discussion will not involve calculating 
working capital or fixed investment requirements or any analysis of the financial accounts of the 
company, as I could not access them. All the companies I interacted with are privately owned and 
have no obligations to make their financial statements public. The evidence that I present on 
sources of finance for working capital investment was obtained from interviews with 
pharmaceutical company executives and management. To enrich the discussion on financing 
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ARVs in Zimbabwe, I incorporated evidence from the two other companies not currently 
manufacturing ARVs . Their reasons why they have not commenced manufacturing ARVs tell the 
story of ARV manufacturing from another angle. 
The Development Process Procurement, Manufacturing, Sales and Distribution 
Procurement 
t 
Mdnufilctuflng 
t 
Markets for 
Products 
Supply Logistics 
Quality Control 
Distribution 
Logistics 
Source: Developed with input from Director, Research and Development, 20 I I; Production Manager, 20 II ; 
Procurement Manager, 20 I I; Marketing Manager, 20 1 I. 
Figure 10: The business of ARV Manufacturing in Zimbabwe. 
I set up the chapter to follow the structure in Fig 10. In section 5.1, I discuss the research and 
development followed by procurement in section 5.2. In section 5.3, I discuss the manufacturing 
process narrowing down on financing of machinery acquisition in section 5.4. I focus on project 
finance in section 5.5, followed by markets for drugs in section 5.6, and conclude the chapter with 
section 5.7. The other boxes are discussed in function as part of other discussions related to the 
study. 
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5.1 Research and Development 
In this section, I discuss the research and devel~pment process (see Fig 10) and sources of finance 
for these operations. 
The pharmaceutical manufacturing business model in Zimbabwe as discussed in chapter 2 is based 
on the secondary activity of generic drug manufacture, with research and development activities 
limited to formulation development (UNIDO, 2007, 2011b). Zimbabwe however, is an active 
centre for clinical trials for new drugs especially HIV / AIDS drugs by international pharmaceutical 
companies as evidenced by research papers presented at the AIDS conference held in Harare in 
September 2011 17• 
Current research and development (R&D) activities in Zimbabwe (see Fig 11) are limited to 
formulation development and the local value chain starts at re-formulation of generic drugs and 
adaptation to local conditions. Bioequivalence studies are done by Contract Research 
Organisations (CROs) in India, and drugs are registered with the Medicines Control Authority of 
Zimbabwe (MCAZ) (Research and Development Director, 2011). 
The R&D laboratory searches patents, identifying potential products whilst ensuring they are not 
infringing any patents. They try to improve on the formulation utilising TRIPS flexibilities, which 
allow generic drug manufacturers in developing countries to come up with fonnulations for the 
domestic market (Research and Development Director, 2011). All raw materials for the 
development process of ARVs are imported (Research and Development Manager, 2011). ARV 
formulations currently under development include Efavirenz, Tenofovir with combinations of 
Lamuvudine and Nevirapine (Research and Development Director, 2011; Managing Director 1, 
17 The National Aids Council in Zimbabwe hosted an annual AIDS conference which was held at Celebration 
Centre in Harare in September 2011. The researcher attended this AIDS conference and interacted both with 
presenters and participants to gain an in depth understanding of the HIV/AIDS terrain in Zimbabwe and the 
relevance of ARVs being manufactured locally. 
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2011). Nevirapine formulations are in tablet form for adults and paediatric syrup formulations for 
children. 
Contrac t Resea rch 
Orga ni sa tion s 
(CROs): India 
Source: Developed by author with information from Fieldwork (20 I I) ; UNIDO (20 II b) 
Figure 11: ARV research and development activities in Zimbabwe. 
M edical Control 
Authority of 
Zimbabwe (MCAZ) 
After development activities, the formulations are sent for bioequivalence studies at Contract 
Research Organisations (CROs) in India (ibid). Bioequivalence studies test whether the 
formulation is comparable in terms of efficacy and other drug properties; drug metabolism, drug 
delivery and blood levels in the body. Local companies argue that they use Indian CROs because 
they are cheaper. CROs in India charge US$ 40 000 for a single dose formulation and up to US$ 
100 000 for fixed combination doses of ARVs (ibid). CROs from Europe or North America are 
more expensive as USA CROs charge from US$150 000 to US$200 000, and Canadian CROs 
charge from US$ 140 000 to US$180 000 (ibid). Western Europe CROs on the other hand charge 
from US$ 120000 to US$160 000, Eastern Europe CROs charge from US$80 000 to US$160 000 
(Managing Director 1,2011 ; Research and Development Director, 20 II). AIBST I8 a local research 
18 AIBST (African Institute of Biomedical Science & Technologies) was chosen as one of the centres of 
excellence for Africa at African Network for Drug and Diagnostics Innovation (ANDI) to spearhead In-silico 
Drug Metabolism & Pharmacokinetics and Toxicology Studies I met Professor Masimirembwa at an ANDI 
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organisation argues that bio-equivalence studies done in India can be done in Zimbabwe at a lower 
cost, with an added advantage of physiological studies being much closer to final users of drugs. 
To date the local pharmaceutical industry shows no indication of using local research institutions 
such as AIBST in spite of it being an AND! centre of excellence (Nwaka et at., 2012) to spearhead 
in-silico drug metabolism & pharmacokinetics and toxicology studies in Africa. AND! centres of 
excellence in Africa serve as nucleation centres for innovation and technology transfer (ANDI 4th 
Stakeholders Conference, October 2011). 
The failure of Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies to use a local research organisation; AIBST 
demonstrates a lack of linkage capabilities LaB (1992). By choosing not to develop local R&D 
linkages and going for a more expensive external linkage, the local pharmaceutical companies are 
foregoing an important innovation opportunity and negating efforts to develop local backward 
linkages instrumental for improving technological effort and innovation capabilities (Dahlman and 
Westphal, 1982). Lall (1992) asserts that linkages impact productive efficiency, diffusion of 
technology as well as deepening of industrial structure. Thus a strategic decision to use Indian 
CROs increases financial costs and from an innovation perspective, has retrogressive effects on 
technological efforts and local technological capability upgrading. This deficit emanating from 
lack of linkage capability imposes both a financial cost and a technological effort loss for the 
integrated industry. 
Turning to licensing of drugs, lead times to licencing a product can take up to two years or more 
(Managing Director 1,2011). The period is made up of 3 months to produce a dossier, up to 12 
months to get approval from the drug regulatory authority, MCAZ (although they claim it can be 
done in 6 months), and chemical stability tests taking up to 12 months (ibid). Development 
activities are long-term projects, which need to be funded by long-term finance. The Managing 
conference and he also con finned that they can carry out bio-equivalence tests locally even though the local 
phannaceutical companies have not yet started using their services. 
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Director of one phannaceutical company reiterated the long-tenn nature of development activities 
in the remark below: 
"It takes almost two years to get the drug registered. So the investment 
that you put in now, you are bound to recoup after two years. So it's 
more like a long tenn capital commitment" (Managing Director 1,2011). 
Capital investment and working capital requirements for research and development activities are 
financed by internally generated funds (Research and Development Director, 2011; Managing 
Director 1, 2011). This presents a problem for Zimbabwean companies which are not cash rich. 
Consequently they can spend up to three years saving foreign currency to purchase machinery and 
equipment (ibid). They mastered this saving approach and strategy during the hyperinflationary 
environment and were able to lock their value in physical investment to preserve value (ibid). The 
companies leveraged EU tenders to save foreign currency, which they used to also fund research 
, 
and development activities, in addition to capital equipment acquisition mentioned earlier (ibid). 
They had to surrender a portion of their foreign currency earnings at varying proportions as the 
regulations set by the Central Bank at official exchange rates (Managing Director 1, 2011). 
Reliance on savings and retained earnings where demand for drugs is low (see section 504) forces 
local phannaceutical companies to wait until they have saved enough to import capital goods. The 
implication is that local phannaceutical companies cannot compete with other countries' 
pharmaceutical companies that are cash rich or have access to long-tenn finance for capital 
investment. Finance though is not the only challenge that the companies face in research and 
development as reflected in the quote below: 
"I am saying there is lack of finances and resources but also knowledge 
and expertise is important." (Research and Development Director, 2011). 
The above quote precipitates the gravity of lack of long-tenn finance. However, over and above 
this, it is the linkages to and with skills, knowledge, and technological capability (Lall, 1992) 
embodied in human capital; the know-how, know-who and know-why of learning and knowledge 
(Ernst and Lundvall, 1997) critical for innovation that is telling. During the hyperinflation era, one 
company shrunk its R&D team by 50% and was only starting to rejuvenate those functions at the 
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time of this research (Research and Development Director, 2011). Human capital emigrated to 
South Africa and Europe (ibid). 
The fact that finance is raised in tandem with skills, knowledge and expertise challenges reinforces 
my earlier assertion that finance is part of an integrated larger system in the context of national 
system of innovation, knowledge, learning and innovation (Ernst and Lundvall, 1997; Lundvall, 
1998; 2007). However, it also reveals the challenge of technical expertise not only in R&D, and 
production but also in the finance department, where the finance team is supposed to be technically 
competent to synthesise robust project finance proposals to access external finance from 
international and regional financiers as I discuss in section 5.5. 
Local R&D activities are limited to formulation development with no drug discovery activities. 
The R&D activities and R&D equipment acquisition are financed using internally raised funds. 
The local pharmaceutical companies contract Indian CROs for bioequivalence studies leaving a 
local institution AIBST, thereby missing an opportunity of deepening local industry through 
linkages. The challenges that the R&D function faces are not limited to lack of finances only but 
human capital challenges through loss of skills and expertise (see also section 7.2.3). 
5.2 Procurement 
In this section, I discuss the procurement function and its role in managing working capital 
requirements. The procurement function sources and arranges for delivery of APIs (active 
pharmaceutical ingredients), excipients, packaging materials, consumables, and utilities. 
Equipment and machinery for the R&D laboratory, Quality Control laboratory and factory is 
procured in conjunction with the heads of the functions (Procurement Manager, 2011). The local, 
regional or international sources of inputs, machinery and equipment are shown in Table 18 below. 
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Table 18: Sources of raw materials, machinery, and equipment for pharmaceutical companies. 
Raw Materials 
Consumables 
Utilities 
Spare Parts 
Protective Wear 
Production Machinery 
Research and Development fJ~=DW"WWW"W;WWWW""JJJJJJJJJJfJJJJHJJ"W""JJJJfJJ~JJ~ 
Quality Control 
Source: Developed with input from Procurement Manager, 20 I I ; Managing Director I, 20 II ; Marketing Director, 
2011 . 
S.2.1 Source of API 
Shanghai Desano in China and Aurobindo in India are the mam suppliers of APls for ARVs 
(Procurement Manager, 20 II ). Currently there are no African suppliers of APIs for ARVs, hence 
dependence on imports (ibid). Excipients are procured from brokers and regional suppliers in 
South Africa (ibid). Reliance on two suppliers fo r ARVs Shanghai Desano and Aurobindo is 
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because of WHO pre-qualification status which requires audited documents, as reflected in the 
remark below: 
"There are a lot of Asian companies who sell ARV raw materials but very 
few have the necessary requirements, such as audited documents." 
(Procurement Manager, 2011). 
The audit requirement forces procurement of APIs for ARVs from companies with audited 
documents (ibid). To compound the problem the same Chinese and Indian suppliers with audited 
documents are vertically integrating and venturing into ARV manufacturing (ibid). This has led 
them to either raise prices of APIs or undercut local manufacturers On price of finished products 
when competing for tenders in Zimbabwe or the region (Procurement Manager, 2011). 
Supplies for APIs and excipients are paid for in cash and in advance, because of country risk; a 
historical phenomenon from when Zimbabwe had serious foreign currency shortages (ibid). Local 
companies have low bargaining power because of small quantities purchased, and suppliers are not 
bothered if they lost Zimbabwean customers as reflected in the remark below: 
"I think it's both [country risk and the quantities we purchase], because 
our quantities are not really significant to their book, if they lose us as a 
customer it's not a big deal to them, because they will tell you I have got 
someOne who buys 5 tonnes at a time. But I buy at most a tonne if I have 
got a tender. Bargaining power is almost zero. At the moment they 
actually dictate to you what the price is, and what the payment terms are. 
In the case of Shanghai Desano, they have tried to accommodate us, and 
they say we will give you terms but we need an LC (letter of credit) .... 
we are funding the LC, so it's not really a term, because it is covered by 
an LC ... [where there are high bank charges] establishment charges and 
so on." (Procurement Manager, 2011). 
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As a result of these dynamics, local pharmaceutical companies procure raw materials from 
merchants and brokers with the volume business to procure container loads (15 to 30 tonnes). 
Brokers ship APIs and excipients to South African brokers who then sell smaller quantities at 
higher margins to local pharmaceutical companies (Procurement Manager, 2011). Where 
international suppliers tried to accommodate them, they cover themselves from payment and 
country risk by demanding a letter of credit (LC) (ibid). An LC costs 2.5% of the LC value, plus 
establishment fees for each transaction in bank charges. Approaching banks for the LC forces the 
company to incur high bank financing costs defeating the whole purpose of trade credit (see section 
3.2.4), which is supposed to reduce the need for expensive bank finance. 
There are a number of potential suppliers of APIs in India such as Ranbaxy, Matrix, Strider, Hetero 
and Cipla, with documentary requirements; however they are more expensive (Procurement 
., 
Manager,2011). The price differential can be as much as US$ 20 per kilogram, a huge differential 
"when you are talking about third world countries" (ibid). Efforts are being made to increase 
suppliers and increase competition (ibid). Excipients as mentioned earlier are sourced from brokers 
and traders in South Africa, and Warren Chemicals and Savana are the main suppliers, but they still 
demand advance payment (ibid). This is at variance with practice in East Africa where local 
pharmaceutical manufacturers get terms of up to 90 days from Germany and other suppliers of 
APIs and excipients, which reduces their working capital financing requirements (EAC PMPOA, 
2011). Germany suppliers source in bulk from India and China and sell small quantities to local 
manufactures in East Africa, giving credit terms of up to 90 days, thus alleviating the need for 
expensive bank finance. Lack of trade credit in Zimbabwe is reflective of national technological 
capability failure (see chapter 7). As a result of macroeconomic instability, local firms shoulder 
risks emanating from a broad national economic performance and issue. 
Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies finance suppliers in India and China, a situation similar to 
a perverse subsidy discussed by Mackintosh (2009), where the developed world benefits from the 
developing world although in this case India and China are not necessarily classified as developed 
countries. By financing suppliers, the resultant cashflow squeeze forces them to resort to expensive 
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bank finance characterised by high interest rates of up to 30% per annum, multiple management 
and drawdown fees per year (see chapter 6). It has not always been like this in Zimbabwe. 
Fafchamps (1997), using evidence from the 1993 World Bank sponsored Regional Program for 
Enterprise Development (RPED) panel survey of 200 companies, found out that trade credit played 
a significant role in financing enterprises in Zimbabwe. Trade credit as a percentage of outstanding 
balances constituted 27% for micro enterprises; 26% for small enterprises; 30% for medium 
enterprises; and 30% for large enterprise (ibid). The economic and political deterioration that 
occurred in the 2000s decade caused a high level of uncertainty, shortage of foreign currency and 
increased country risk. Consequently local pharmaceutical manufacturers cannot access trade 
credit from suppliers of the most expensive raw materials; APIs and excipients (see section 5.3). 
The dearth of trade credit and reliance on expensive bank finance throttles financial breathing space 
for the companies. Current efforts to establish bonded warehouses (see section 5.2.2 below) in 
Zimbabwe to lessen shipping time and extended capital outlay through advance payment are a 
commendable strategic management move, that can assist in better managing working capital. 
I now tum in the next section to clearance of imported supplies, costs, and requisite financing. 
5.2.2 Clearance of goods, lead times and shipment costs 
Supplies brought in by sea take 6 to 12 weeks to land in Zimbabwe depending on time taken to 
consolidate and clear shipments at Beitbridge border post (Managing Director 1,2011). Beitbridge 
border post is a key entry point for goods into Zimbabwe shipped by sea through Durban and later 
by road to Beitbridge. It is also a key entry point for goods travelling up north from South Africa 
to Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (ibid). For airfreighted 
goods, the delivery period is reduced to 4 weeks at a cost of US$ 2-5 more per Kg. When shipping 
small quantities of very expensive APIs, they prefer to import by air (ibid). However, for bulky 
and cheap goods, sea freight is more expedient (Managing Director 1,2011; Procurement Manager, 
2011). The major determinant of shipment mode is therefore cost of goods relative to shipping 
costs per kilogram. The logic is that freight cost should not exceed 10% of purchase cost, thus 
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when importing an API costing US$500 per Kg, airfreight is the choice of transport (Managing 
Director 1, 2011; Procurement Manager, 2011). Sixty per cent of raw materials in value terms 
come in by airfreight and 40% by sea, however in terms of quantity (volume), 90% comes by sea, 
and 10% is airlifted into Zimbabwe reflecting the expense of APIs compared to other raw materials 
(Managing Director 1, 2011). 
The significance of this relates to national technological capabilities in terms of institutions and 
capabilities that determine infrastructural architecture, incentives covering import duties and taxes 
and the institutions that determine the level of bureaucracy involved in customs clearing of 
imported goods. Goods clearing cost is a flat 1 % of duty value of the consignment; a summation of 
Cost Insurance and Freight (CIF) and any other storage and transportation costs up to the border. 
Finished drugs (ARVs) and raw material imports (APIs and excipients) for ARVs are exempt from 
duty, however, local manufacturers still pay value added tax upfront for non ARV raw materials. 
The arrangement is that VAT can be claimed from the Revenue Authorities; a long and 
cumbersome process (UNIDO, 20 11 b). Other consumables such as filters imported from South 
Africa as mentioned earlier are not exempt from duty (Procurement Manager, 2011). Local 
companies invariably have higher manufacturing costs. 
Long clearance periods and high duties, as is the case in Zimbabwe prejudice the pharmaceutical 
companies as they are forced to fund stockpiles of idle raw materials and incur high charges to 
clear them (ibid). These timeframes affect delivery timelines for local manufacturers in addition to 
ratcheting up the cost of local manufacture on local tenders for ARVs (ibid). Local wholesalers 
and agents for Indian pharmaceutical manufactures, procure finished ARVs duty-free from India, 
with a lead-time of just 3 weeks. This is in contrast to 8 to 12 weeks lead time for raw materials 
ordering, shipment and clearance by local manufacturers, followed by an additional 4 weeks to 
manufacture ARVs before delivering finished product. Local companies thus find it difficult to 
compete with the finished ARV imports on local tenders if the local preference of 10% price 
differential is not used. 
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The local pharmaceutical companies have however come up with an ingenious process innovation 
in in-country bonded warehouses. The intention is for bonded warehouses to be built in Zimbabwe 
and Chinese or Indian suppliers to ship APls or excipients on consignment at their own costs to 
Zimbabwe (Managing Director 2, 2011). The ownership of the goods (title) essentially remains 
with the supplier until the local pharmaceutical company pays for all costs including customs and 
duty fees. Then the goods are cleared through customs and become the property of the local 
company (ibid). This cuts out the 8 to 12 week lead-time, which needed to be financed either 
internally or through expensive bank finance. By doing so, it eliminates high stock holdings, which 
lock up valuable cashflows in inventories (Managing Director 2, 2011). This is a key technological 
capability of leveraging economic linkages between suppliers and the company in its supply chain 
financing, reducing working capital finance requirements in an environment where trade credit is 
not available. 
In summary APIs and excipients, the most expensive raw materials are all imported and paid for in 
cash and advance. Trade credit, a key source of in-kind finance from suppliers is not available 
because the Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies have low bargaining power and the suppliers 
also try to hedge themselves from payment risk and foreign currency availability risk. The 
payment risk was caused by foreign currency shortages before Zimbabwe started using a basket of 
foreign currencies. The companies have arranged for bonded warehouse arrangements where they 
shorten the lead times to get essential raw materials and also shorten the times when they are out of 
pocket when they pay for raw materials in advance. 
5.3 The Manufacturing Process 
In this section, I briefly describe the tablet manufacturing processes. I do not delve into specific 
details of the mechanics of tablet manufacture as my focus for this study was on machinery and 
equipment; how it is procured and the suppliers. 
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The major inputs are APIs (the most expensive), excipients, packaging materials, and coating 
materials. Most packaging materials for ARVs are cheap because they are obtained locally 
(Production Manager, 2011). The main tablet manufacturing processes (see Fig 12) are direct 
compression, dry granulation, and wet granulation (ibid). Excipients are pharmacologically 
inactive substances used as a carrier for the active ingredients of a medication or as lubricants 
during the manufacturing process (Production Manager, 2011). APIs, excipients and other raw 
materials are prepared in the weighing room under positive pressure to avoid cross contamination 
(ibid). The weighing and preparation area is separate from other areas, and sensitive analytical 
balances are used to weigh APIs. The ingredients are then transferred for processing. 
In the direct compression route, (Fig 12) APIs and excipients are mixed and milled followed by 
compression into tablets and thereafter packaging (ibid). In dry granulation, the process is more 
involved'and starts with milling and mixing of excipients followed by compression into slugs. The 
slugs are milled a second time and mixed with lubricants and dis-integrants. The mixture is 
compressed into tablets and packaged. In the wet granulation route, (Fig 12) the first step is 
milling and mixing of APls and excipients. A binder solution is prepared and added to the mix, 
leading to a wet mass. The wet mass is screened followed by drying of the wet granules in the 
fluid bed dryer (Fig 15). The dry granules are screened and blended with lubricants and dis-
integrants to produce a running powder, which is compressed into tablets and packaged (ibid). 
Pharmaceutical manufacturing requires water of high purity. Potable water delivered by utility 
providers in Harare or Bulawayo does not meet pharmaceutical manufacturing standards (ibid). 
Consequently, on-site purification of water is done using the reverse osmosis plant (see Fig 13) to 
produce water of required microbiological purity and conductivity standards (ibid). The poor water 
quality causes high soiling rates for filters and frequent replacement, causing high manufacturing 
costs. The imported filters are subject to customs duty and VAT (Procurement Manager, 2011). 
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Source: Prepared by author with infonnation from the Production Manager (2011). 
Figure 12: General Tablet Manufacturing Processes 
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To alleviate water cuts, pharmaceutical companies sank boreholes to supply water when 
municipalities take long to repair burst water pipes (ibid). This investment. in alternative 
infrastructure imposes additional manufacturing costs on local companies (see chapter 7). 
For the WHO-prequalified plant, manufacturing occurs in a sterile environment requiring positive 
pressure to avoid cross contamination as mentioned earlier. This is achieved through the Heating 
Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (HV AC system) highly dependent on consistent supply of 
electricity (Production Manager, 2011). With frequent power cuts in Harare (it is not unheard of 
for power cuts to last up to 5 hours in a day), one company procured a 500KVa generator that 
consumes 110 litres of diesel per hour (ibid). Infrastructural input failure at a national level 
(energy provision) is mitigated by firm level acquisition of alternative infrastructure (standby 
generators) which further builds up production costs (see chapter 7). Alleviating a national level 
policy and practice failure by firm level policy and technological intervention is a typical example 
of policy and practice grid locks that do not augur well for competitiveness of locally manufactured 
drugs (see section 7.2.1). 
5.3.1 Cost structure of ARV 
The cost structure of ARV manufacturing (Table 19) shows that API costs constitute the greatest 
contributor to manufacturing costs, with labour costs contributing the least except for Stavudine. 
Allocated costs are appreciably higher than direct labour costs. Pinheiro et at., (2006) showed that 
in Brazil, active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) constituted the greatest portion of production 
cost (mean of 65.8%), with labour and equipment (1.8%), excipients (1.2%), packaging (1.3%) and 
quality control (4.6%). The data from Brazil is confirmed by the Zimbabwean data. In Brazil, 
overall total direct cost of ARV manufacture contributed 74.8% to the final price of the drug. 
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Table 19: Cost structure of ARV: ex-factory price. 
Direct Labour 17.07 2.30 3.78 6.30 6.27 2.49 3.72 
Overhead 34.65 4.66 7.68 12.79 12.73 5.06 7.56 
Packaging 18.10 5.32 20.89 8.79 21.40 8.29 3.76 
Excipients 12.88 5.42 28.61 9.23 8.22 2.82 4.13 
API 17.29 82.31 39.04 62.88 51.38 81.33 80.83 
Grand Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Data from one of the pharmaceutical manufacturing companies, 20 II 
This data reveals how critical trade credit is for lowering working capital finance for the 
manufacturing operations and ultimately the exit price. The strategy to increase suppliers and 
supplier competition can be beneficial, if it can lower the cost of APls and excipients, in addition to 
the in-country bonded warehouses strategy that reduces the amount of time the companies are out 
of pocket, thereby improving their liquidity. 
As APls and excipients constitute the greatest portion of manufacturing cost, trade credit assumes 
great importance and is a critical financing advantage that is currently being lost. By paying cash 
in advance for APls and excipients; raw materials responsible in many instances for more than 70 
to 80% of ARV manufacturing costs, the local pharmaceutical companies are severely squeezed in 
their cashflows. It follows therefore that after initial capital outlay for acqu isition of machinery and 
equipment, the highest cost in the ARV manufacturing comes from APIs, making trade credit a key 
area of managing working capital that needs to be addressed for access to cheap in-kind finance 
and avo id expensive bank finance (see chapter 3). 
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5.4 Financing the Acquisition of Machinery 
In this section I focus on fmancing of acquisition of machinery and discuss sources of finance for 
capital investment, the reasons why companies used those sources, and why they procure analytical 
and laboratory equipment from Germany and Japan and from production equipment from China 
and India. The companies imported new machinery such as the fluid bed dryer, tablet coating 
machine, automatic tablet counting machine, and analytical equipment. As Table 18 shows, not all 
machinery is old as shown by machinery age ranges for Datlabs, Plus 5 and Varichem (see also Fig 
13 to Fig 21). 
5.4.1 Determinants of which machines to procure and from where 
Production machinery and equipment is imported from India and China where the prices are 
affordable compared to Western Europe equipment prices (Managing Director 1,2011; Managing 
Director 2, 2011; Procurement Manager, 2011; Production Manager, 2011). Finance (foreign 
currency) to procure equipment and machinery was raised internally, and this was the major 
determinant of which machine to purchase and from where (Managing Director 1,2011; Managing 
Director 2, 2011; Procurement Manager, 2011; Production Manager, 2011). Consequently, 
production machinery and equipment were imported from India and China (Managing Director 1, 
2011; Managing Director 2, 2011; Procurement Manager, 2011; Production Manager, 2011). The 
use of internally generated funds is not driven by pharmaceutical companies being cash rich, but by 
necessity, due to the unavailability of long-term finance (foreign currency) (Managing Director 2, 
2011; Production Manager, 2011). Lease finance and asset backed lending technologies have not 
been active in Zimbabwe for over a decade as finance houses and merchant bank operations were 
de-emphasised. However, even if they had been operational they would still have to face the 
foreign currency scarcity challenge in availing lines for importing technology (see chapters 2 and 
6). Reiterating the lack of long-term (foreign currency) finance, a Production Manager with one of 
the pharmaceutical companies said they hardly got any loans in the last decade and consequently 
they were forced to save money and procure affordable production equipment and machinery from 
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India and China. Explaining the determinants of where to procure machines from and why, the 
Production Manager remarked as follows: 
"First and foremost the economy that we are operating in results in a lot 
of challenges. We have a lot of other things to do so we prefer to go for 
cheaper equipment. It takes long to save and even if you save you opt for 
something cheaper so that you can balance a lot of things and make up 
for other requirements ...... to save for a USD 700K machine it can take 
more than a year or two years .. .raw materials are expensive and 
sometimes when we get foreign orders, the money goes to buy raw 
materials, sometimes we have to divert that money to say salaries or 
something else. So saving even USD lOOK can take us very long 
depending on the circumstances" (Production Manager, Pharmaceutical 
Company A, 2011). 
Relying on saved funds (foreign currency) to purchase machinery and equipment slows the rate of 
technological capability upgrading. Companies do not purchase state of the art technology, but 
·what they can afford in order to balance a lot of things, as in the quote above. This has serious 
implications for technological effort, learning, and knowledge, and rapid permeation of leading 
technology in the industry and local economy through adoption and adaptation by local skills (Lall, 
1992; Ernst and Lundvall, 1997). Consequently, capacity expansion is hampered for long periods 
(for example the two years in the quote above) as companies starve operations of working capital 
whilst saving for new machinery. Juggling many things and trying to allocate meagre internal 
resources points to firm level intervention augmenting financial disintermediation; a key national 
technological capability level failure where banks or financial institutions fail to function as 
catalysts for industrial development (see chapters 3 and 6). The dearth of long term savings (in this 
case foreign currency) and the institutional capacity and capability in the form of merchant banks is 
one of the drivers of this malady (Group Chief Executive, Domestic Bank F, 2011). This 
underscores the importance of project finance for the pharmaceutical companies to access finance 
to import technology from regional banks that are active in the long term finance arena. 
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Analytical machinery and equipment for research and development and quality control, are sourced 
from Japan and Germany using internal funds as reflected in a quote from the Managing Director 
of one pharmaceutical company: 
"Some [analytical equipment] we are getting from Germany, some 
especially the advanced ones from Japan, especially the testing 
equipment because these have to be world standard, in terms of 
certification and calibration, and the other ones [manufacturing machines] 
we are buying from China and India, because they are cheaper especially 
on production equipment" (Managing Director 1, 2011). 
The Managing Director reinforced the choice determinants of suppliers of production equipment as 
being cost, whereas for analytical and laboratory equipment they pay for high quality capital goods. 
Purchasing cheap or affordable manufacturing equipment from India and expensive analytical 
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equipment from Japan or Germany seems prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa as confirmed by 
conversations with pharmaceutical manufacturers from East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Burundi, and Rwanda) at an East African Pharmaceutical Plan of Action Launch workshop in 
Arusha Tanzania in December 2011 (EAC PMPOA Workshop, 2011). Pharmaceutical players in 
East Africa explained that countries such as Germany are giving companies in India and China 
rights to manufacture production machines under license and Indian and Chinese manufacturers 
produce affordable machines for emerging markets pharmaceutical manufacturing companies 
whilst paying royalties to German companies (ibid). However, for analytical equipment the 
Germany companies would rather manufacture them than license out (ibid). 
Table 20 below shows estimated costs of acquiring different types of machines from India or China 
based on discussions with two pharmaceutical companies. The last item in Table 20 is the cost of 
factory upgrades, which I discuss in chapter 7. Suffice to say that even factory upgrades were 
financed using internal funds for one company, whilst for Varichem it is well documented that a 
US$ 2.1 million loan was availed by UNDP (UNIDO, 20 11 b). The amounts of funds required for 
capital investment are huge and depending on internally generated funds means access to long-term 
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finance (foreign currency) is a major hurdle to technological capability upgrading, technology 
transfer and productive capacity expansion. This clearly shows that finance is one of the key 
drivers that determine the velocity of technological capability upgrading, innovation, learning, and 
the development of local African pharmaceutical companies. 
Table 20: A sample of machinery and other activities required for pharmaceutical 
production activities and their cost. 
Machitu.·/ Activity Ln\\ Ct· Cnst II ppc,· Cnst 
Encapsulation Machine 200K 350K 
Compression Machine 240K 400K 
Tablet Counting Machine 400K 
Factory upgrade 1.3M 3M 
Source: Prepared using information from Managing Director I, 201 I; Production Manager, 201 I. 
Figures 13 through to 21 are photographs of typical machinery and equipment that local 
pharmaceutical companies imported using internal funds. The equipment is of general use and can 
be used for ARV manufacturing as well as production of other pharmaceutical product lines. As 
mentioned earlier, acquisition of machinery and equipment was financed solely by retained 
earnings and savings in the last decade. Long-term finance (foreign currency) loans were not 
availed by foreign or domestic banks. Varichem and CAPS accessed funds from UNDP and 
Fredex Financial Services respectively (see chapter 6). Varichem obtained a US$ 2.1 million loan 
from UNDP, which was used for the factory upgrade, culminating in WHO pre-qualification 
(Consultant Pharmaceutical Industry, 2011 ; UNIDO, 20 11 b). CAPS, on the other hand, leveraged 
cross-ownership with Fredex Financial Services by the Executive Chairman to get shareholder 
loans that were applied to retooling the factory in addition to commercial bank short-term loans 
(CAPS Financial Statements, 2008, 2009, and 2010). I return to this discussion in chapter 6 and 7. 
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Figure 13: The reverse osmosis plant used to purify municipal water. 
Figure 14: A V-blender used to mix APls, excipients and other ingredients. 
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Figure 15: A fluid bed dryer used in the wet granulation process of tablet manufacture. 
Figure 16: A 35-station tablet compression machine used for tablet compression. 
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Figure 17: A close-up photo of the 35 station tablet com pressing machines. 
Figure 18: A coating machine to improve organoleptic properties of tablets. 
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Figure 19: Packaging used for various types of ARVs. 
Figure 20: An automated tablet counting machine. 
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Figure 21: Automated tablet counting machine showing the console. 
In the next section, I tum to machinery age and efficiency ratios. 
5.4.2 Machinery age and efficiency ratios 
The general life span of machinery in use is 10 years or more (see Table 21), however the 
machinery is not refurbished but worn out parts are replaced or repaired as and when required 
(Maintenance Engineer, 2011; Production Manager, 20 II). Consequently, machines are slow, 
breakdowns are frequent, and sometimes the mechanisms of operation fail (Production Manager, 
2011). Maintenance costs for one of the plants was estimated at US$ 20 000 per month 
(Maintenance Engineer, 20 11). A detailed appraisal of status of manufacturing facilities, 
equipment age and funding requirements is documented in the UNIDO (2011 b) report, a summary 
of which is presented in Table 21 below. 
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Table 21: State of manufacturing facilities, capacity utilisation, equipment age a nd funding 
requirements. 
Status of Manufacturing Facilities : Capacity Utilisation, Equipment Age and Funding Requirements 
C 1P' D,lll ,lb , PIl ,1I111.l1l0V.l PIth S V,1I lC 11 " 111 
17.5% (Plant 
Capacity Utilisation 20-30% (2009) 32% (2009) Not known shutdown for 30-60% 
~rade~ 
GMP Compliant, 
Facility Design and Recently refurbished 
Requires Requires upgrade. recent ly 
upgrade. Not known refurbhised. 
ia~out but requires HVAC Requires HVAC Requires HVAC HVAC 
operational 
Average Age of 
Not known 
16.5+Yrs (Ra nge 1 
Not known 
8.25 yrs (Range 0.5- 9.6 yrs (Range 2-
Equipment 30'irs) 2M~~ 30-"ears) 
Additional Pieces of Not known 24 
Equipment Needed 
Not known 30 18 
Capital Required 
For Additional Not known US$ 1.5 million Not known US$ 1.5 million US$ 1.0 million 
Equipment 
Source: UNIDO, 20 II b 
The data presented in Table 2 I was collected in 20 lO when companies were starting to recover 
from the hyperinflationary environment and capacity utilisation tells the story of public health 
systems' ability to procure locally manufactured drugs. The last row in Table 21 underscores the 
importance of accessing long-term (foreign currency) loans to import machinery and equipment. 
For the three companies that disclosed their equipment requirements, the total need for capital 
eq uipment is US$ 4 million, and when one contrasts this against the ZETRAF line of credit to 
recapitalise whole industry of US$ 70 million, it becomes apparent that challenges to access long-
term finance in-country are daunting. Project finance as a technological capabi lity to accelerate 
investment capability becomes even more relevant as local pharmaceutical companies look to 
external sources for capital investment finance (see section 5.5) 
I toured one pharmaceutical manufacturing factory and observed the challenges faced with some of 
the old machinery operating at non-optimised rates, especially the encapsu lation machine. The 
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machine should separate capsules automatically, followed by powder filling and closure. However, 
there were challenges of separation and denting of capsules. Both the automatic machine and semi-
automatic machines were sourced from the same Indian supplier (Production Manager, 2011). The 
semi-automatic machine is more reliable compared to the automatic encapsulation machine 
depending on the state of the blend (ibid). The automatic machine can run 10 kg per hour (range is 
8.5 to 10 Kg), almost the same productivity as the semi-automatic encapsulation machine, a 
situation the Production Manager described as " typical inefficiency", because the idea was the 
automatic machine would produce 40 000 capsules per hour but it is currently operating at about 
66% of that capacity (ibid). 
To reinforce issues of efficiencies, the Production Manager remarked as follows giving an example 
of the encapsulation process and the challenges emanating from aged machinery: 
"Sometimes they [encapsulation machines] are slow and there are 
frequent breakdowns ... basically these machines are now old and they 
break down frequently and they are not as efficient as they should be 
hence the need for financing to import new machinery" (Production 
Manager, 2011). 
This particular company, as mentioned earlier has two encapsulation machines, both sourced from 
India. The automatic machine (10 years old) has not been efficient, ever since it came (ibid). The 
other semi-automatic encapsulation machine (14 years old) requires manual intervention and is 
therefore labour intensive. Importation of the automatic encapsulation machine was supposed to 
result in higher efficiencies and less manual intervention, however this has not materialised, as run 
rates are almost the same for both machines (ibid). The inefficiencies result in longer processing 
times translating to higher production costs. The company has to run two shifts where one would 
have been sufficient as illustrated in the quote below: 
"When I am talking of efficiencies I am talking of the rate at which they 
[encapsulation machine] are going to convert the blend into capsules, per 
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hour. The semi-automatic machine can convert 7.S Kg per hour ..... a 
batch size will be 300Kg for ARVs .... other products batch sizes of 
SOOKg or 480 Kg. So you can imagine ..... Stavudine it will take you 40 
hours to finish the batch. So you need 2 by 24 hour shifts" (Production 
Manager, 2011). 
A replacement semi-automatic encapsulation machine would cost USD 2S0K, and a replacement 
automatic encapsulation machine ranges from USD 400 K to USD 1 million depending on the 
make and supplier (ibid). With the current lack of long term finance, low demand for products, 
importing more technologically advanced and higher efficiency machines is unattainable, leading 
to higher manufacturing costs, high rates of spoilage and wastage. This results in price 
uncompetitiveness at tenders against foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers with higher 
efficiencies, more advanced machinery and economies of scale (ibid). The implications on 
technological capability upgrading becomes apparent, as local companies have to perpetually play 
catch up with current ARV technology. The absence of local capital goods manufacturers or 
fabricators makes technological catch-up highly dependent on technology imports and hence 
foreign currency long term loans which leads to the need for project finance skills. 
I turn to proj ect finance in the next section. 
5.5 Project Finance Capability: They Could Have Looked Outside for Long-
Term Finance. 
In as much as Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies could not access long-term fmance (foreign 
currency) in Zimbabwe they could have looked for finance outside as other enterprises did. Table 
22 reveals medium-term loans (foreign currency) that Zimbabwean enterprises right through the 
hyperinflation era obtained from PTA Bank (Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development 
Bank; see section 2.3). Table 23 reinforces the above arguments as it shows that pharmaceutical 
companies from Uganda, Kenya and Malawi sought fmance outside their borders. This inability to 
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access fmance from outside Zimbabwe points to issues of capacity and capability for project 
fmance proposal synthesis and aggressively approaching possible funders by casting the net wide. 
A banking executive remarked that regional fmancial institutions could fmance local companies 
and if they did not approach them then there was an issue with the pharmaceutical companies as 
reflected in this quote: 
"Yes, there is no liquidity in the country at the moment. So it's only regional 
banks that are coming in like, PTA and AIDB. Those are the ones that can 
fmance them .... if they [pharmaceutical companies] are not aware it means they 
are living in some world. A number of investment conferences have taken place 
and anyone who had a need for medium and long term fmance would in my 
view have been talking to any of these institutions" (Executive Director, 
International Bank A, 2011). 
A pharmaceutical industry consultant was downright categorical and scathing in his attack when 
explaining the inability of the industry to look for long term fmance outside Zimbabwe as reflected 
in this remark: 
" ... vanotya ava [they are scared] to go and talk to the regional banks because 
they know they will be asked for a project proposal and they don't know how to 
do it .... money is out there and people must be able to do a proper industrial 
project proposal." (Consultant, Pharmaceutical Industry, 2011). 
The first part of the quote was said in the Shona vernacular language, and usually in a discussion 
when someone wants to emphasise a point they resort to the vernacular so that the meaning is not 
lost in translation. In this case, ''they are scared" reiterates the allegation that because the 
pharmaceutical companies cannot produce robust project fmance documents they would rather not 
approaching regional banks. The quote above demonstrates the importance of project finance as a 
technological capability that links into investment capability (see section 3.6). As I argued, project 
fmance capability is the missing link in Lall's (1992) firm level technological capabilities. The 
second issue that is brought to the surface is the importance of skills (know-how) (Ernst and 
Lundvall, 1997) in accessing long term loans manifesting as proficiency in investment capability 
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and linking it with project finance capability to access the financial resources required for physical 
investment. Lall (1992) had pointed out the importance of garnering financial resources on the 
back of an efficient financial system. However, as argued earlier and seen in section 5.4 the 
financial systems are not efficient to raise the resources required to import plant, equipment and 
machinery. 
On following up with the pharmaceutical company executives and asking them if they had 
approached regional banks; they all acknowledged that they had not. Some of them were not aware 
that Zimbabwean companies had accessed medium term loans from regional banks. One 
pharmaceutical company argued that they had not bothered to look for medium and long term 
finance for purely strategic reasons. They did not want to borrow when other fundamentals were 
not in place. The pharmaceutical company executives were only aware of the Zimbabwean driven 
long term financing initiatives involving Afreximbank and the Government of Botswana, but not 
regional bank initiatives. This reflects Ernst and Lundvall' s (1997) knowing and learning aspects 
of innovation and lack of linkage capability with key finance providers in the country and in the 
region (Lall, 1992). The finance function has challenges pertaining to project finance capability 
know-how, know-why, know-whom critical for accessing finance for technological capability 
upgrading. What is paradoxical is that some Zimbabwean companies with project finance 
capability approached PTA bank and obtained medium term finance (see Table 22), and there are 
other African pharmaceutical companies that approached PTA bank and were financed (see Table 
23). According to bankers, the pharmaceutical companies need to strengthen their project finance 
skills, project proposal synthesis and writing skills, as illustrated in the remark below: 
"The other problem also I think in these [pharmaceutical] manufacturing entities 
is that they are not using people who know project finance to be able to package 
their deals into bankable propositions. They [pharmaceutical companies] must 
also go to financial advisors, people who understand project finance, who will 
be able to interrogate them upfront before they go to banks. When you are 
proposing this what are the financial implications? Because some of the things 
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they start discovering is when the bank starts asking questions. And they say 
"ahhh I am not quite sure what the financial implications would be" [emphasis 
added]" (Executive Director, International Bank C, 20 I I). 
Table 22: Term loans to Zimbabwean enterprises from PTA Bank. 
Term Loans To Zimbabwean Enterprises from PTA Bank 
Year Recipient Loan Amount : Purpose US$ Million 
2005 Pioneer Corporation Pvt. Ltd . 6 Exapnd capacity. 28 Haulage Trucks and 33 trailers. 
Set up an oil seed processing complex to manufacture 
2006 Surface Investments Pvt. Ltd . 2.5 edible oil and animal feed ingredients. Finance part if 
machinery and equipment. 
2006 Rainbow Tourism Group 1.85 Procurement of equipment, vehicles, and furniture and fittings for establishment of 3 Star hotel in Beitbridge. 
, 
2007 RIOZIM Ltd . 3.31 Commissioning an open cast gold mine in Kadoma. 
2007 New Donnington Farm 1 Procurement of broiler slaughter equipment and 
refridgerated trucks for distribution . 
2007 Tanganda Tea Company Ltd . 1.676 Purchasing of plucking machines, tractors, other farm 
equipment and motor veh icles. 
2008 ARIPO (African Regional Intellectual 1.1 Construct 12 room guest house to accommodate Property Organisation) participants/students attending its courses. 
2008 Rainbow Tourism Group 3.2 Part finance upgrade of A'Zambezi Lodge from 3 Star to 4 Star. 
2009 Star Africa Corporation Ltd . 3 Finance renewal of the company's haulage capacity through acquisition of 20 new horses. 
2009 Eastern Highlands Plantations Ltd . 1.83 Purchase of mechanical plucking machines, tractors ,other farm equipment and motor vehicles. 
2009 Tarcon Pvt. Ltd . 6 Purchase of earthmoving equipment for civil and road 
construction. 
Source: PTA Bank Financial Statements, 2005-2009. 
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Table 23: Term loans to Kenyan, Malawian and Ugandan pharmaceutical enterprises 
from PTA Bank between 2005 and 2008. 
Term Loans To African Pharmaceutical Enterprises From PTA Bank 
Year RecIpient Loan Amount Loan Purpose USS Million 
Procurement and installation of new machienry 
2005 Kisakye Industries Limited: Uganda 1.67 and equipment. furniture and fittings to 
manufacture phannaceutical products in capsu le. 
tablet and liquid fonn . 
Palm' Healthcare International Limited : Finance procurement of machinery and 2005 Kenya 1.8 equipment for the establishment of a condoms 
manufacturing plant in Nairobi. 
Part finance procurement of machinery. 
2006 Maria Assumpta Phannaceuticals Limited : 2.385 equipment. furn iture and fittings for clinical Uganda absorbent cotton wool manufacturing plant in 
Kampala . 
Abacaus Parenteral Drugs Limited: Part finance establishment of an ultra modern 2006 8.53 blow-fill seal plant to manufacture intravenous Uganda flu ids and vials for water injections. 
Importation and installation of new equipment 
2008 SADM Phannaceuticals Limited: Malawi 2.2125 and machinery to complete the rehabilitation and 
expansion of a pharmaceutical manufacturing 
factory in Lilongwe. 
Source: PTA Bank Financial Statements, 2005-2009. 
Another banker reinforced th is perception by suggest ing that pharmaceutical companies shou ld 
employ quali fied finance personnel with the requisite project fi nance capabil ity as illustrated 
below: 
"You need a spec ialist person who would now be working with various projects, 
possibly a CA [chartered accountant] and pay hi m well so that he commits 
himself to whatever is happening. But if you pick someone from the road and 
say you are the accountant, yes he has got experience, but you are not taking 
what the business requ ires." (Senior Manager, International Bank D, 20 11). 
To reinforce the lack of project finance capability in the industry, a pharmaceutical consultant gave 
remarked as fo llows: 
"We have been working with a group right now, they want to do a 
recapitalisation and its now going 6 months and I have not seen any 
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documentation for that project feasibility that they want to do. So do you think 
competition waits for you or the financiers wait for you, saying this company 
will come, no they don't". (Consultant Pharmaceutical Industry, 2011). 
The above examples reveal the extent of lack of project finance capability, a key technological 
capability input for companies intending to synthesise robust project finance proposals that can be 
funded. The Zimbabwean Public Accounting and Auditing Board have identified the finance skills 
challenge. Sponsored by the local World Bank office, they brought together universities, 
professional accounting bodies, and senior finance executives in industry to map a way forward, to 
improve accounting and finance training in the country. What emerged in the meeting was that the 
quality of finance and accounting graduates was IOWI9• The graduates had to enrol with South 
African universities after completing their studies at Zimbabwean universities in order to be 
admitted into professional bodies, a situation that local professionals find untenable. 
, 
5.6 Markets for Drugs: Sales and Distribution 
Customers for ARVs are mainly the Government through the National Aids Council (NAC), local 
and international NGOs, mission hospitals and clinics, and for export customers such as CMS 
(Marketing Manager, 2011). The private sector customer base is made up of pharmacies, private 
hospitals, health insurance firms, corporate clinics, estates, plantations, and mines who buy on 
credit terms, further stretching pharmaceutical companies' cash flow (ibid). The customers are 
spread mainly in the following centres; Hwange, Victoria Falls, Mutare, Chirimuhanzu, Bulawayo, 
and Harare. Distribution is done through pharmacies and hospitals, and the company serves the 
markets through Sales Representatives, who look after retail pharmacies, dispensing doctors, 
hospitals, dispensing clinics, NGOs and industrial clinics. For tenders there is a Manager 
responsible for monitoring press adverts and international tenders, especially after they attained 
19 The meeting held in Harare in 2011, discussed the challenges faced by companies in accounting and 
finance skills and involved universities, professional accounting bodies and industry finance executives. The 
purpose was to develop a road map of building capacity in accounting and finance by involving qualified 
accountants and finance executives in the training programmes. 
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WHO prequalification. The company is registered with the UN agencies UNICEF, UNDP, and 
UNOPS that relay information on floated tenders (ibid). 
WHO pre-qualification began to payoff for the company almost one year after certification. In 
September 2011 there was a UNICEF order for 155 000 units ofStalanev for the local market and 6 
000 units of Lamuvidine/Zidovudine for South Sudan. All these orders at an ex-factory price of 
about US8 meant total sales estimates are approximately US$ 1.3 million. The company also won 
a 24 months contract to supply South Africa 125 000 units of Stavudine per month. However, the 
margins are thin signifying the commodity nature of generics compared to patented drugs, which 
bring in huge profits because of exclusivity. The company is moving towards a regional thrust and 
tapping into the international market leveraging their WHO prequalification. Currently the 
regional target countries are Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Cameroon, Tanzania, DR Congo and Kenya. The main customer for ARVs however, remains the 
National Aids Council which procures for the HIV/AIDS programme using the AIDS levy as a 
funding mechanism as captured in the remark below: 
"NAC [National Aids Council] take the biggest chunk of total ARV sales, about 
80 to 90%, because what goes into the private market if we are talking of 
private market we are talking about what goes into the pharmacies. Where you 
have to pay, and with the pharmacies the market is very small, one because 
Zimbabwe is already a very small country when we are talking about medicines 
and the capacity we have. And the volumes have to be on funding" 
(Procurement Manager, 2011). 
The government gives local pharmaceutical companies a price preference of 10% on tenders. The 
terms for payment are 30 days, however there are incentives such as a 12% discount if customers 
pays in 7 days. Those who purchase high volumes on account are eligible for a 5% discount. 
Although the sales terms are 30 days from date of invoice, customers sometimes stretch payment 
terms to 60 days (Marketing Manager, 2011). 
In terms of distribution, they use small vehicles (Mazda B 1800) and a 7 tonne lorry. The 7 tonne 
lorry is used for big orders for Natpharm (Government purchases). The company keeps its 
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distribution costs low that way by delivering to Harare and Bulawayo and charging for transport 
costs except for government which does not pay for out of town deliveries. (Marketing and Sales 
Manager, 2011) 
5.6.1 Competition 
Ranbaxy, Cipla, Hetero, and Jpca are the main competitors against locally manufactured ARVs 
(ibid). Their competitive advantage is driven by vertical integration, economies of scale and a 
wider product range and most importantly, they produce latter generation ARVs not manufactured 
in Zimbabwe (See Table 10). Their ability to manufacture latter generation ARVs explains why 
their products were prevalent on displays by NGOs supporting antiretroviral treatment at the AIDS 
conference in Zimbabwe. Local manufacturers' competitive advantage over the international 
companies is proximity to regional centres and a general preference for locally manufactured 
products especially by professionals such as pharmacists and doctors (Marketing and Sales 
Manager, 2011). However for the large tenders that really matter, it is price that drives the process 
and the local companies have not done well (ibid). WHO prequalification, low distribution costs, 
and regional strategic alliances give a competitive advantage to local manufacturers as evidenced 
by supply tenders won for the South African market (ibid). 
On local tenders though, the definition of local company, is a grey area that has caused controversy 
(ibid). The local companies, through the manufacturing association has lobbied for the definition 
to be clarified to mean a company locally manufacturing pharmaceutical products, domiciled and 
registered in Zimbabwe (ibid). This will help on who qualifies for the 10% price differential 
preference for local suppliers. Some international companies had taken advantage of the definition 
of local company loophole to register local representatives and then compete for tenders as local 
manufacturing entities; whilst importing finished products duty free (Marketing and Sales 
Manager, 2011; Marketing Director, 2011). 
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5.6.2 Prices and their determination 
The margins on ARVs are reportedly very low and lie in the range 7-10%, and the company said it 
viewed ARVs as part of their corporate social responsibility, unlike retail pharmacists whose mark-
ups are 50% or higher (Marketing and Sales Manager, 20 II). For example the ex-factory price of 
Stalanev (a bottle of 60 tablets) is US$ 7.60, while retail pharmacists charge US$ IS to US$ 20 plus 
a dispensing fee of US$l (Marketing and Sales Manager, 20 II). Table 24 shows some of the 
prices charged by retail pharmacies in Harare as at September 20 II compared to prices charged in 
2008 (Table 25) according to Osewe et al., (2008). 
Factors considered in pricing ARVs include cost of production and the thrust of viewing ARVs as 
part of corporate social responsibility and not wanting to profiteer from them (Marketing Manager, 
20 I I). The second aspect considered is affordability. The example of Stavudine given above 
where a margin of 7-10% is put on cost price is driven by the fact that the disposable income for 
Zimbabweans is very low and there is a need to make the medication affordable (ibid). 
Table 24: Retail pbarmacy prices for a select number of ARVs as at September 2011 
. Retail Pharmacy Price 
ARV Constituent Drugs 
Stalanev (60 tablets) 
Aluvar (120 tablets) 
Lamuvidine and Zidovudine (60 tablets) 
Tenolam (60 tablets) 
Nevirapine (60 tablets)· 
Efavirenz (30 tablets)· 
Stavudine + Lamuvidine + Nevirapine 
Lopinavir + Ritonavir 
Lamuvidine + Zidovudine 
Tenofovir + Lamuvidine 
USD (Sep 2011) 
13 
80 
20 
80 
12 
20 
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Table 25: Varichem ARV prices as at 2008. 
Product Pack Size Initial Unit Price (US$) Launch Date 
Varivar (lamuvidine 150mg + Zidovudine 300m g) 60 Tablets 15.35 Jul-03 
Stalanev (Stavudine 30/40mg + Nevirapine 200mg + Lamuvidine 150mg) 60 Tablets 12.80 Oct-03 
Stavudine 30mg 60 Capsules 2.60 Jun-04 
Stavudine 40mg 60 Capsules 3.10 Jun-04 
Lamuvidine 150mg 60 Tablets 4.85 Jun-04 
Nevirapine 200mg 60 Tablets 6.90 Sep-04 
Zidovudine 300mg 60 Tablets 9.90 Mar-05 
Indinavir 400mg 180 Tablets 69.10 Sep-05 
Source: Osewe et aI, 2008 
5.7 Conclusion 
, 
The objective of this chapter was to present empirical evidence addressing research questions I, 2 
and 3. The key findings in the chapter are summarised in Table 26. Evidence from the data shows 
that capital investment for R&D and manufacturing is from internal sources. Companies leveraged 
tenders and exports to save foreign currency to purchase equipment on standby from India and 
China. The determinant of where to source machinery and equipment from is cost. Companies 
have to balance capital equipment procurement with other requirements since they do not have 
access to finance. Research question 2 was concerned with the role played by banks. . 
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Tob/c26:- A S UrrlLrlor:r of,..,b o ' ,.,.,os d i s c u .!i>"Scd ir.l D~.lC c b n p'e r.. 
Formulation development, Bio API , Excipient and Consumables Machinery and Equipment for 
studies and Registration Factory and Laboratory into finished products . I collections 
Up to 90 Days Savings, up to 3 Years 30 Days 30 to 60 Days 
Own - internally generated Borrowings !Intemal Own - internally generated Borrowings !Internal Borrowings !Internal 
Forced to pay upfront to suppliers Forced to save funds and The market demands credit Forced to use internally I using borrowed or internally sometimes pay on lay bye Expensive short term finance terms. The companies generated funds because term generated funds. They finance 
finance not available. their suppliers using borrowed because term finance is not available. finance their buyer using 
funds. available. borrowed funds. 
Credit terms of up to 90 days. Term finance using Compare with India which Mixture of cash and terms Term finance or own internally I Supplier finance reduces the appropriate lending but prompt collection of 
generated funds if very profitable. amount of working capital technologies; asset backed gives concessionary finance debtors reducing working 
nt and interest costs. technologies. to pharmaceutical industry. capital requirements. 
Liqu idity crunch . Country and Liquidity crunch . Country and Liquidity crunch. Buyers Liquid ity crunch. Country risk. foreign currency risk; driven by foreign currency risk; driven by Liquidity crunch . Country stretching suppliers and Financial arch itecture. Low historical foreign currency risk. Financial architecture. being financed cheaply 
national savings. historical fore ign currency shortages and political Hot short term deposits. compared to borrowing from 
shortages and political instability. instability. banks. 
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It emerged that banks do not playa role in capital investment finance, but they finance working 
capital requirements, which phannaceutical companies claim is expensive (see chapter 6). Trade 
credit an external source of in-kind finance is not available for the importation of APIs. and 
excipients, key cost drivers in ARV manufacturing. Research question 3 sought to find out what 
the technological capabilities were for accessing finance at the pharmaceutical companies. 
Evidence shows that pharmaceutical companies have challenges in investment capability, 
especially the pre-investment capability and project finance capability. As a result they could not 
approach regional banks which other Zimbabwean enterprises did. Local pharmaceutical 
companies are failing to establish linkages with local research organisations to carry out bio-
equivalence tests, a situation that limits technological capability upgrading, and does not promote 
backward linkages that result in industrial deepening. The biggest buyer of ARVs is NAC which is 
funded by the AIDS levy. However with the high unemployment rates in Zimbabwe its resources 
are limited and the majority of patients on ART are supported by NGOs and global health donors. 
, 
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Chapter 6: Financing ARV Manufacture in Zimbabwe: The Role Played 
by Banks 
"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or baker, 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest" 
Adam Smith. Wealth of Nations, I, ii.2; 119 
6.0 Introduction 
The quotation above reflects and precipitates an interesting clash of motivations and objectives. 
Reflective of this conflict in motives is the situation between fmanciers and the financed 
enterprises. Financiers are motivated by minimising risk and ensuring repayment of loans issued. 
They do not engage in loan origination for the sake of it, but they anticipate adequate compensation 
for their endeavours. In chapter 5, I discussed sources of fmance for working capital and capital 
investment for ARV manufacture and the role played by banks. I also discussed firm level 
technological capabilities required by pharmaceutical to access finance. The focus in chapter 5 was 
to address research questions 1,2 and 3. In this chapter, I address research questions 1,2, 3and 4 
as detailed below to understand the role played by banks in availing working capital and capital 
investment fmance. I also cover institutional factors that drive bank strategy on revenue streams, 
who to lend to and at what cost, in addition to the technical expertise and knowledge involved in 
loan origination, disbursement, and monitoring and control to unravel the complexities surrounding 
fmancing ARV manufacture. 
Research question 1: How are capital investment and working capital requirements for 
ARV research and development, and manufacture financed? 
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Research question 2: As the most prevalent source of external finance for enterprises, 
what role do commercial banks play in fmancing ARV 
manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
Research question 3: At finn level, what technological capabilities are required for 
pharmaceutical companies to access fmance and expertise and 
lending technologies for banks to assess project proposals and 
advance loans? 
Research question 4: What institutional factors drive bank strategy on revenue streams, 
lending, who to lend to and at what price? 
In addressing the research questions above, I discuss long-term fmance, followed by working 
capital investment fmance and the role that banks played in availing it. I set up the rest of the 
chapter as follows: In section 6.1, I discuss fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacture, , 
splitting the types of fmance into long-term fmance for capital investment and short-term fmance 
for working capital requirements. In section 6.2, I discuss long-term fmance for capital investment 
critical for importing technology whilst in section 6.3; I discuss short-term fmancing of working 
capital requirements. In section 6.4, I discuss how Zimbabwean commercial banks manage lending 
technologies and expertise required for loan origination, documentation, disbursement and 
monitoring and control. I tum to the politics of lending in section 6.5, and conclude the chapter 
with section 6.5. 
6.1 Financing Local ARV Manufacture 
To enable a structured discussion, I split fmancing of ARV manufacture into long-term and short-
term fmance. Caprio and Dermiguc-Kunt (1998) assert that increasing supply of long-term fmance 
to industrial companies is a priority for developing countries as it can promote productivity and 
growth. I therefore focus on long-term fmance because it is critical for capital investment and can 
accelerate technological capability upgrading (ibid). Short-term finance funds working capital 
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requirements of a company and the debt characteristically matures within one year unlike long-
term fmance, which can have maturities of up to 10 or 25 years or more depending on the project 
financed (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). 
Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies did not access financing for ARV manufacturing as a 
special or separate project (pharmaceutical Industry Consultant, 2011; Production Manager, 2011). 
Machinery and equipment used for ARV manufacturing is of universal functionality and can be 
used for other product lines as reflected the quote below (production Manager, 2011): 
"For basic formulations they [machinery and equipment] are the same, but it 
depends on the, I mean with new ARVs like your new Calitra technology is 
totally different. It is going to depend on the drug". (phannaceutical Industry 
Consultant, 2011). 
As the above quote reflects, only ARVs such as Calitra require specialised technology for 
manufacture. Thus, fmance for ARV manufacturing was included in the fmancial package for the 
whole portfolio of drugs manufactured by the company. In the discussions that follow on financing 
of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe, especially capital investment, I take this aspect into 
cognisance. However, for working capital fmance for ARVs, it is possible to a certain extent to 
isolate raw materials and costing specific to ARV manufacture (see chapter 5) and thus tease out 
some aspects of working capital fmance and trade credit as was demonstrated in section 5.2. 
Commercial bankers also confirmed that they did not fmance ARV manufacture as a separate 
project as reflected in the two quotes below: 
"We didn't lend specifically for ARV projects. But we fmanced the companies' 
working capital requirements. However you never know whether during the 
Zimbabwe Dollar era whether the companies took working capital loans and 
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used them for recapitalisation of their operations" (Senior Manager, 
International Bank B, 2011). 
"We did not fund ARV manufacturing projects specifically, but fmanced general 
working capital requirements for the pharmaceutical companies. Companies 
have a tendency of taking loans for working capital and use them to recapitalise 
their operations resulting in mismatch of assets and liabilities." (Executive 
Director, Domestic Bank C, 2011). 
The allegation by the bankers that companies have a tendency to borrow for working capital and 
use the loans to capitalise their operations is difficult to test without access to pharmaceutical 
company fmancial statements, although it points to moral hazard. With access to fmancial 
statements" one can ascertain a financing mismatch by scrutinising the debt structure of the 
company. If long-term assets are fmanced by short-term fmance, there is a fmancing mismatch and 
the company will eventually run into cashflow problems. Long-term assets should be funded by 
long-term liabilities or loans, however the core working capital portion of working capital, should 
be fmanced by long-term liabilities2o• What the allegations by the bankers surface are that moral 
hazard could be pervasive amongst some Zimbabwean enterprises. If companies obtained short 
term fmance and used it for long term projects then this presents a mismatch and the risk proftles 
for which the funds were given and for which they were applied to are inherently different; a clear 
example of moral hazard manifesting in diversion of funds to a different project. 
The discussions in sections 6.2 and 6.3 therefore address specifically long term fmancing of capital 
investment and short term fmancing of working capital requirements respectively. A general 
analysis of the availability of short, medium and long-term fmance in Zimbabwe is represented in 
Table 27, which reveals that short-term fmance has been the dominant mode of finance available to 
the pharmaceutical sector from 2000 to date (see section 6.3). 
20 This knowledge emanates from the training of the researcher as a commercial lender. 
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Table 27: Availability of short, medium and long term finance between 2000 and 2011. 
( 'Olllllh: r.:ial f~allk I oalh 10 I'lialllla.:.:uli.:al ( Olllp.IIlIC" III llic' l'c'l iot! ~EFEFEF 10 I )ak 
2000 to 2005 2006 to 2009 2009 to 2010 Post 2011 
Short Tenn Finance Faci lity Availed Facility Availed Facility Availed Facility Availed 
Possible Facility Through 
Medium Tenn Finance No Facility No Facility No Facility 
ZETRAF, or Botswana-
Zimbabwe Government to 
Government Deal. 
Possible Facility Through 
Long Term Finance No Facility No Facility No Facility 
ZETRAF, or Botswana-
Zimbabwe Government to 
Government Deal. 
DyonJf ~ank Sour.:.:, 01 I oll g IC' llll I illallc'': I 0 1 1'liarlll.Jc'c'ulic'al ( o ilipanic" 
• Varichem got a loan of$ 2.1 mil lion from UNDP which they used to upgrade their factory in 2007. 
• CAPS Pharmaceuticals was reported to have used $12 million for retooling their factory, source of funds is not known to researcher. 
However in 2008 Fredex Financial Services, a company controlled by a major shareholder of the group advanced USD 4 milli 
• Another company spend USD 1.3 million from own resources upgrading their facilities , 
Source: Interviews with Pharmaceutical and Bank Directors, Credit Approvers, 2011; CAPS Financial 
Statements. 
In the next section, I tum to the issue of long-term finance and capital investment for importation of 
machinery and equipment (the hardware of technology). 
6.2 Long Term Finance for Capital Investment 
Pharmaceutical companies, as mentioned earlier, did not access medium or long-term finance from 
local , regional or international banks in the last decade (Managing Director 1, 20 II ; Managing 
Director 2, 20 II; Marketing Director, 20 II). Varichem and CAPS accessed finance from UNDP 
and Fredex Financial Services respectively (Consultant, Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 II ; CAPS 
Financial Statements, 2008, 2009, 2010; UNIDO 2011b). Varichem obtained a loan for US$ 2.1 
million from UNDP, which was used to upgrade their factory culminating in WHO pre-
qualification (Consultant Pharmaceutical Industry, 2011). UNDP stepped in as a broker to alleviate 
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shortage of foreign currency in Zimbabwe to increase the chances of technological capability 
upgrading to enable Varichem to compete in international tenders. CAPS on the other hand 
leveraged cross ownership of Fredex Financial Services by their Executive Chairman to. get 
shareholder loans to retool their factory (CAPS Financial Statements, 2008, 2009, 2010). Table 28 
shows CAPS loans and shareholder funds for the period 2004 to 2010. Shareholder loans peaked at 
USD 4.3 million in 2009. What is of concern with the financials is the sudden increase of short-
term debt in 2010 ofUSD 5.87 million when the market for drugs was subdued. I will discuss this 
in section 6.3, under short-term finance; suffice to say CAPS ran into challenges with this 
expensive short-term debt. 
An interesting source of long-term finance; venture capital was used to set up Plus 5 
Pharmaceuticals (UNIDO, 20 11 b). The Venture Capital Company of Zimbabwe funded the 
establishment of Plus 5 Pharmaceutical Company and sold off its stake after 5 years in 2001 to two 
directors (ibid). Venture capital, has however not been active for more than a decade for the same 
reasons advanced earlier in chapter 2 of an unstable and unpredictable macroeconomic and political 
environment accompanied by sudden policy changes (Managing Director, Project Finance 
Company for Mining Sector, 2011). 
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Table 28: Short term and long-term borrowings for CAPS Pharmaceuticals for the period 2004 
to 2010. 
2005 2007 2008 
40k 38k 214k 214k 5.9m 
9k 73k 27k 14k 93k 62k 
163k 2.9m 4.1m 4.3m 3.2m 
* Borrowings of$ 5.9 million in 2010, under short term loans are for 12 months and from 5 Commerc 
Banks at a wei Interest rate of 20-30% 
Source: CAPS Holdings Financial Statements; 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 20 I 0 
Table 29: Long-term loans sought by Pharmaceutical companies as at September 2011. 
I "":: Il' l'lII I illalll'l' I adlitil" I II oil' I' ( "'hicll' l'ati,," \, \t 'q,tl'lIIhl" ~tlil 
l'hanllal"l"lItil-al ( "lfflDall~ \ 1111111 lit '1II,::ht 1<",111,' Of I adlit, '1II1ITl' "I'I IIl1cl, Bur.,o\\ ill~ rail'''' 
Company A: Application Being Considered ZETRAF: Afrex imbank- Machinery and equipment $ 1 mill ion 5 Vear Facility Zimbabwe US$ 70m by Bank E facility purchase. 
Purchase of Specialised 
Co mpa ny B Appl ications Being Considered $ I million 5 Vear Facility Botswana-Zimbabwe $ Spraying Machine, R&D Small-by Bank E 70m facility scale production equipment and 
Laboratory equipment. 
Co mpa ny B Applications Being Considered $ 150K 2 Vear Facility Local Facility Laboratory and R&D by Bank E and F equipment. 
. 
Co mpa ny 0 : New Factory Construction, Factory construction and re-
fac il ity sought $ 5 - 15 mil lion Up to 15 Vears Not Vet ldentilied tooling as per WHO cGMP 
standards. 
Factory Upgrade to WHO 
cGMP standards, and upgrade 
Compa ny C: Facility sought $ 5 million Upt060r 7Vem Not Vet Identified dormant manufacturing line 
which needs technology 
uPDade. 
Source UNIDO 2011 b and field work in Zimbabwe. 
The pharmaceutical companies could not access long term loans to import plant, equipment and 
machinery. They depended on internally generated fund s to procure the required capital goods (see 
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chapter 5). Pharmaceutical company executives acknowledged that this is a slow way to encourage 
technological effort. Table 29 above shows long-term loan requirements for pharmaceutical 
companies in Zimbabwe. The reality on the ground though is that Zimbabwe does not have long-
term savings, to finance these long-term loans. A corporate banker raised this issue in the remark 
below: 
" ... you need to understand the Zimbabwean economy as it stands now, the 
problem in the economy is that there is no long-term money. In other words what 
this economy needs are credit lines [offshore] which are long term and reasonably 
priced." (Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank C, 2011). 
This makes the maturity and liquidity transformation functions of financial intermediaries difficult 
if there are no deposits to support the lending. Another banking executive emphasised the link 
between long-term loans, long-term savings and a vibrant domestic savings market as follows: 
.,. 
"I am participating in this vision 2040 and this US$ 100 billion economy and I 
sing the same song. You cannot grow; no nation has ever grown without its own 
domestic savings. I keep saying those things. So 25% must be saved. To me 
whether it is forced saving or natural savings on the part of individuals or 
companies, we really need to plough back a lot of money into our businesses. So 
savings: 25% of GDP. Once we save, only then can we invest." (Group CEO, 
Domestic Bank E, 2011). 
The two quotes surface an interim and long-term solution to long-term loans. The first quotation 
talks of the establishment of offshore loans, acknowledging the lack of domestic savings and 
foreign currency reserves to support importation of technology. In the current macroeconomic 
environment characterised by limited international capital inflows and little national savings, 
regional banks remain the most probable source of finance for industrial growth as reiterated 
repeatedly by bankers. There is however, a risk premium that money coming into Zimbabwe 
attracts ''the Zimbabwe risk premium" as described by one banker as the risk emanating from 
politics (Group CEO, Domestic Bank F, 2011). The same politics drives sentiment that repels FDI, 
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and with the current furore around indigenisation, FDI will to continue to be a difficult proposal for 
technology transfer and technological capability upgrading (see chapter 7). 
The second quote focuses on national savings of 25% of GDP, but this is a long term objective, that 
does not escape the critique of Dailami and Walton (1989) that what Zimbabwe needs are foreign 
currency loans as saving domestic resources do not help with importation of capital goods which the 
country does not manufacture21 • The situation may be clouded now after adoption of the 
multi currency regime. However Zimbabwe needs to earn foreign currency to build up its reserves 
to enable the importation of plant, equipment and machinery. This challenge will inevitably 
resurface when the country reverts to a local currency. 
6.2.1 Why no long term fmance? 
Turning to why there are no long-term loans, commercial banks argue that it is difficult to advance 
long-term loans in Zimbabwe under the current unpredictable political and macroeconomic 
environment. A Chief Risk officer with an international bank explained why they are not lending 
long term as follows: 
"With us it's not lack of liquidity but the country risk. Would you want to lock 
yourself for 2 to 3 years when you don't know what will happen tomorrow? I 
think that is the issue, so it is not liquidity per se." (Chief Risk Officer, 
International Bank, May 2011). 
This quote reinforces the politics argument advanced by one banker, and points to the need for a 
stable macroeconomic and political environment in the country for long term lending to occur. 
However, this outlook is flawed in that this bank has not attracted long term deposits to be able to 
lend long term. The magnitude of risk, maturity and liquidity transformation they would need to 
engage in would not be possible especially considering that they are currently attracting hot 
21 I am aware that macroeconomists argue that a rise in domestic savings all things being equal will lead to 
an increase in the chances of accessing foreign currency. However, the local currencies are not freely 
convertible either regionally or internationally and as such trade plays a key role in generating sources of 
foreign currency. 
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deposits. However, to underscore the requirement for long-term political and macroeconomic 
stability and predictability as a trigger for long term loans an Executive Director with an 
international bank remarked as follows: 
"Maybe the other problem also which could be there is some measure of 
uncertainty this side of the globe, .... when you say to yourself what will the 
situation be like in the next 6 months, you don't know. And if you are asked to 
put probabilities to it, then a lot of things lie between 0 and 1 and you don't want 
a situation where you won't be able to put a marker because decision making 
requires you being able to put a marker on the probability of an event happening. 
The risk is on the high side." (Executive Director, International Bank C, 2011). 
Policy predictability and long-term policy announcement giving industry and commerce adequate 
time to plan prepare and execute strategies that ensure viability thus emerges as one of the 
" 
arguments why commercial banks are not lending long term. This, however is a secondary issue as 
the primary driving force is the availability of the right type of savings for importing capital goods 
(Dailami and Walton, 1989). I return to the discussion of external factors in Chapter 7 when I 
focus on the business and operating environment. 
An executive director with an international bank argued that for as long as country risk, 
macroeconomic stability, political stability and policy predictability are not addressed, they run a 
real risk when politics changes as reflected in the quote below: 
"So in the event that argument [country risk, policy, macroeconomic and 
political stability and predictability] is accepted then we can start raising 
deposits on a medium term and long term basis, so that we can start lending to 
clients, but in the meantime most of these clients will have to rely on regional 
banks, African Development Bank, PTA Bank, Afreximbank and DBSA. Those 
have been coming to the party." (Executive Director, International Bank A, 
2011) 
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This quote confmns a general reluctance to lend long term by foreign owned Zimbabwean banks 
(international banks) for as long as macroeconomic and political stability and predictability are not 
restored. The argument I advanced earlier that this assertion that when the macroeconomics are 
right they can lend is not solid. The country or the banks do not have the long term savings that the 
fmancial intermediaries can subject to maturity and liquidity transformation. The question that 
arises then is, are the bankers conversant with the underlying principles of fmancial intermediation 
or they are just seeing the immediate problem of unstable macroeconomics without giving due 
regard to the fundamentals of the role of fmancial intermediaries (see section 3.5). If the country 
does not have the medium and long term deposits, it raises the question; which resources will they 
mediate? One possible explanation especially for the international banks could be that they depend 
on their extensive network to raise term fmance, but this would be subject to country, credit and 
foreign currency risk when the country reverts to local currency. What is paradoxical though is 
that they point to regional developmental fmandal institutions such as AfDB, PTA Bank and 
DBSA as the fmancial institutions that Zimbabwean industry can rely on for long-term finance, 
without considering that these institutions take care to match the maturity of their liabilities 
(deposits) and assets (loans advanced). 
Domestic banks argue that liquidity and non-availability of funds was the major drawback on their 
ability to issue long-term loans (Group Chief Executive, Domestic Bank P, 2011; Executive 
Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). Domestic banks thus have a different perspective to 
international banks on reasons for not lending long term. The argument of domestic banks seems 
to be more in line with fmancial intermediation theory. Domestic banks also argue that their 
perception of risk is different to international banks as they are on the ground and know the 
Zimbabwe risk better (Head of Corporate Bank, Domestic Bank C, 2011). They therefore do not 
shy away from raising long term deposits as evidenced by a domestic bank that tried twice to raise 
funds on the local market with poor results though. Asked how much they had raised, an executive 
responded thus: 
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"We floated a US$ 7 million paper and the second one we went for US$30 
million. Oh it's very little [what we have managed to raise], when we went for· 
US$30 million, it's not so long, we are still in the market for it, I think between 
the two papers we have got about US$5.6 million. The second one I think we 
are just over US$3.6 million I think. That's how low it is." (Head of Corporate 
Banking, Domestic Bank A, 2011) 
In as much as domestic banks may have a different perspective on their understanding of risk 
compared to the international banks, the perception and response from the general investing public 
seems to reflect the international banks' perspective on an unstable macroeconomic environment 
driving a tempered appetite for long term risk. 
The absenQe of long-term loans, according to the evidence, is caused by lack of domestic savings, 
the inability to set up offshore lines of credit by banks and the unstable macroeconomic and 
political environment. The regional banks, which seem to have a different perception of the 
Zimbabwe risk, are the ones, which have been providing long-term loans (foreign currency) to the 
local industry. 
I now turn to the loss of skills in long term fmance due to the demise of merchant banks. 
6.2.2 The disappearing merchant banks, loss of skills and technological capability 
The demise of merchant banks was fmgered in the loss of skills in long term finance and project 
proposal appraisal capabilities. As the fmancial architecture morphed, there was an exodus of 
skilled personnel to other countries combined with attrition of skilled resources in project fmance 
and long term lending. One Senior Manager expressed frustration at challenges they faced with 
any form of medium or long-term project fmance skills as follows: 
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"It was a huge challenge [long term fmance skills] in fact in the bank 1 worked 
for there was no skills at all for project appraisal; big projects - there was none." 
(Senior Manager, Domestic Bank E, with over 25 years' experience in an 
International Bank A April 2011) 
A group CEO of a domestic bank acknowledged the attrition and scarcity of skills on project 
fmance and long term lending skills but expressed hope that people can be found and attracted back 
to Zimbabwe or trained as reflected in the remark below: 
"I think the people [merchant bankers, finance house and discount house 
professionals] are dead, the people are overseas, people come back, you know 
people can be found, people can be trained." (Group CEO, Domestic Bank D, 
2011). 
Currently the challenge of lack of experienced bankers with long term fmancing skills is being felt 
as banks appraise project finance proposals for recapitalisation using the Zimbabwe Economic 
Trade and Revival Fund (ZETRAF) (see section 6.2.3 below). In a discussion, one executive for a 
domestic bank said he was looking for "old-time bankers" who knew how to structure long-term 
facilities and monitor and control them, but was having a hard time locating them. This brings out 
Ernst and Lundvall's (1997) know-how, know-what and know-why aspect of innovation and 
technological capability. The term "old timers" brings to mind Lave and Wenger's (1991) 
argument on the need for old timers to teach youngsters through an apprenticeship type of 
knowledge transfer because of tacitness of certain aspects of knowledge and learning cognisant of 
Polanyi's (1966) 'we know more than we can tell' aspect of knowledge and how important it is to 
learn by doing. Reflecting this analysis, the Head of Corporate banking for one bank, said skills 
were scarce on the market and trying to train young recruits was difficult, as they had never lived in 
an environment of long-term fmance (Head of Corporate Bank, Domestic Bank D, 2011). Thus the 
looking for old time bankers quote reflects loss of old timers working as apprentice trainers passing 
on knowledge by doing; loss of tacit knowledge, and institutional memory, know-how, know-who 
and know-why all key elements to fostering and improving technological capabilities in fmancing 
long term finance projects based on the argument that we know more than we can tell (Lave and 
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Wenger, 1991; Ernst and Lundvall, 1998; Polanyi, 1966). The international banks however, 
claimed that they had an advantage as they can seek assistance from regional project fmance teams 
anywhere in their group (Executive Director, International Bank A. 2011; Senior Manager, 
Organisational Learning, International Bank A. 2011). 
The learning and knowledge aspects described above exacerbate the lack of flrm level 
technological capabilities of project fmance and complexities surrounding fmancing ARV 
manufacture. Zimbabwe thus faces an uphill task in generating the momentum and experience to 
fmance technological capability, industrial development and innovation if efforts are not made to 
bring back the skills and knowledge required for long-term fmance. 
6.2.3 Current long-term f"mance initiatives in Zimbabwe 
It is estimated that Zimbabwe needs USD 5 billion to recapitalise industry (MTDP, 2010). The 
Industrial Development Policy (2010) mulled the setting up of an Industrial Development Bank to 
fmance industrial development, however this seems like a long term project that economists in the 
country feel is misplaced at this juncture (Development Economist, Economic Think Tank, 2011). 
In as much as the setting up of an Industrial Development Bank (IDB) is a noble idea, the 
preceding discussions point to lack of fmancial resources to lend and also lack of knowledge and 
skills. One key issue then for the IDB is who will capitalise it to such an extent that it can make a 
signiflcant impact on long term fmancing of industry. Currently, government is failing to capitalise 
the Infrastructure development bank. If the local fmancial institutions are struggling in attracting 
the right skills with the know-how, know-what and know-why, where will the IDB get its human 
capital from and how will they manage to retain them where other fmancial institutions have 
failed? 
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The facilities that are accessible to the pharmaceutical industry and manufacturing industry at large 
are the ZETRAF and Zimbabwe-Botswana loan facility. ZETRAF is an institutional arrangement 
innovation between the regional bank Afreximbank and Ministry of Finance which on-lends funds 
to participating local commercial banks. The local banks analyse risk, disburse the funds, monitor 
and control the loans for recapitalisation (Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). 
Afreximbank put forward USD 50 million and the Ministry of Finance usn 20 million (ibid). In 
the first tranche, four banks; BancABC, FBC, NMB and TN Bank are participating, and the second 
tranche will be announced in the future and banks in the fIrst tranche can participate in the second 
tranche (Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). Average loan sizes range from USD 75 000 
to USD 2 million depending on the local bank disbursing the facility (ibid). One condition for the 
facility is that the local company should demonstrate 40% value addition to products manufactured 
(ibid). Interest rates for ZETRAF range from 13.3% p.a. to 15%, broken down as follows: cost of 
funds to the commercial banks is 8.3%, and the commercial banks load an interest margin of5% to 
6.7% making the total cost 13.3% to 15% per annum to the borrowing customer (ibid). 
Afreximbank, aside from the ZETRAF fund, can also directly fund green fIeld projects with a 
minimum loan amount of US$ 3 million and maximum US$ 80 million and tenor of 5 to 7 years 
(Senior Manager, Regional Bank, 2011). Generally. Afreximbank offers lines of trading to banks 
on the back of debt (bonds) raised on the international market. Afreximbank thus acts as an 
integrator linking two markets that ordinarily would not connect; international capital markets and 
local enterprises (ibid). Afreximbank takes country risk, credit risk and foreign currency risks 
inherent in Africa and assuages the discomfort with "Africa" risk by international investors (ibid). 
The phenomenon of regional banks acting as a broker and integrator in allocating resources 
acquired elsewhere that the country could not ordinarily access, brings to the fore the issue of 
institutional innovation at play reminiscent of product development partnerships in global health 
technologies (Chataway et al.,201O). 
185 
A second facility is the Botswana-Zimbabwe government-to-government deal for US$ 70 million 
with interest rates of 10% per annum although Botswana banks were hinting at 15% per annum 
(Managing Director 1, 2011). The facility has not been taken up and the problem with the facility 
is that Zimbabwean enterprises have to deal through Botswana companies, so that Botswana 
benefits too (ibid). 
On seeking to understand why ZETRAF was sponsored by African regional banks and not local or 
international banks, an executive director with an international bank said African regional banks 
looked at the Zimbabwe risk differently compared to international banks because of their 
shareholding structure: 
"If you look at PTA and Afreximbank, you need to ask: who are the owners of 
those banks?"(Executive Director, International Bank B, August 2011). 
An analysis of the shareholding of Afeximbank showed that nineteen State members own it. 
Seventeen are members from the Eastern and Southern Africa region with the non-regional 
member being China and an Institutional member the African Development Bank (AfDB). 
Regional members' shareholding is cumulatively 87.71 % and the non-regional shareholders have 
6.53% shareholding whilst AfDB has 5.76% shareholding (ibid). African country membership 
comprises of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (ibid). The 
shareholding of Afreximbank (Table 30) bears testimony to the assertion by the Executive Director 
and Senior Manager of a regional bank (see quote below) that they support African enterprises 
because their shareholding and genesis was based on Africa needing fmanciers who would support 
enterprises when other fmanciers pulled out. 
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Table 30: The shareholding structure of Afreximbank 
Type of Shares Shareholders In the Class % Shareholdlng Shareholdlng Amount 
African Governments, Central Banks, 
Class A African Regional and Sub-regional 35 US$ 262.5 m 
Institutions 
Class B African Private Investors and Financial 40 US$ 300 m Institutions. 
Non-African Financial Institutions, 
Class C Export Credit Agencies and Private 25 US$ 187.5 m 
Investors. 
Source:http://arreximbank.com/arrexim/en/OurProfile/ShareholdingStructureShareholders.aspx 
(accessed 8 /02/20 12). 
The different perspective to regional banks' appetite for Africa risk is reflected in the remark 
below: 
"As a regional multilateral bank owned predominantly by member states we 
were formed to fill the gap that arises when international banks move out of 
Africa. So we are essentially fu lfilling our mandate [when we finance 
Zimbabwean industry]. The bank was formed during the 80s, I mean the 
concept during the financia l crises of the 80s and what was discovered then is 
that whenever there is a financial crisis the international banks will go back to 
the ir jurisdictions to sort out thei r balance sheets in their countries, and they 
leave Africa with no money. Why? Because Africa is considered to be a high 
risk place" (Senior Manager, Regional Bank, 20 II). 
This assertion gives credence to the argument that for now companies should go to regional 
development financial institutions in section 6.2.1 , and also that they support African enterprises 
because the shareholders are African governments, with central governors sitting on the boards. 
This find ing is important as it points to an inst itutional innovation approach to financing African 
trade and industrial development being spearheaded by Afreximbank in Zimbabwe. A question for 
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future research is; can this approach provide a viable and sustainable option for accelerating 
technological capability upgrading? 
6.3 Short Term Financing of Working Capital Requirements 
As mentioned earlier, working capital finance for ARV manufacture was included in general 
working capital requirements (section 6.1). In this chapter, I discuss access to working capital 
finance for pharmaceutical companies in general and for the company manufacturing ARV s 
specifically. The short-term finance market is characterised by illiquidity, hot deposits and 
minimal savings as the country recovers from hyperinflation, as national savings were wiped away 
by hyperinflation (Executive Director, International Bank A, 2011; Head of Corporate Banking, 
Domestic Bank D, 2011; Senior Manager, International Bank B, 2011). Lending in short-term 
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finance market is through overdrafts, guarantees, short-term loans, bankers' acceptances, letters of 
credit, order finance, and structured trade finance (Executive Director, International Bank A, 2011; 
Executive Director, International Bank B, 2011). Of these products, overdrafts and short-term loans 
are the most dominant (Executive Director, International Bank A, 2011; Executive Director, 
International Bank B, 2011). 
The Central Bank is not acting as lender of last resort to the banking sector and consequently 
because of liquidity problems, and to avoid liquidity issues, banks structure lending deals backed 
by specific deposits or lend on core current account balances as illustrated below: 
"What we are doing is two pronged; one we have some core deposit [current 
account deposits] where we know that at anyone time the minimum it has ever 
been is this. Of that core, we can lend maybe say 60% of that then you use the 
other 40% to cater for cash, payments and withdrawals and so on. Then over 
and above that, we then have back to back. A client comes in and wants to 
invest for 90 days we match them with a client who wants to borrow for 90 days. 
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So we match the borrower and the investor, and we take a margin." (Executive 
Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). 
Consequently, interest rates for short-term finance as at September 2011, ranged from 10 to 30% 
per annum depending on the commercial bank (ibid). High interest rates are driven by an illiquid 
market characterised by low savings (ibid). One banker remarked that interest rates were high 
because it was a sellers' market (Senior Manager, International Bank B, 2011). Other banks bundle 
the cost of finance as one charge, which includes management fees, drawdown fees and interest 
rate of 2% per month, implying an annual interest rate of 24% (assuming there is no compounding 
effect). 
Explaining some of the determinants of cost of finance, an executive director with a domestic bank 
remarked as follows: 
"Local financing, if we are doing on our books, will depend on the prevailing 
market conditions. I will give you a range and you may be shocked. The 
pricing can range from, the lowest I have on my books is 17% and the highest 
can even be 26% or so, and these are corporates hey. Some clients who bring a 
deposit will be looking at an interest rate [deposit interest rate] of 11 % or 12 % 
[per annum] and then you add the 5% to cover for risk [to make the loan interest 
rate to the borrower 16 or 17% per annum]" (Executive Director, Domestic 
Bank A, 2011). 
Table 31 shows bank lines for two pharmaceutical companies. Interest rates on overdrafts and 
short-term loan ranged from 14 to 18% per annum depending on the bank. Establishment fees 
were 1.25%, payable for every new facility. For letters of credit, establishment fee is 1.25% of the 
value of the letter of credit and a monthly charge of 0.40%. An interesting phenomenon is multi-
banking (see Table 31). Pharmaceutical company A accesses facilities from four different banks, 
which could indicate capping of lending lines by banks or a strategic decision by the 
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pharmaceutical company to shop around for better prices. One pharmaceutical executive argued 
that it was more to do with shopping around for better prices (Managing Director 1, 2011). 
Bankers on the other hand argued that companies resort to multi-banking, and picking up facilities 
from many financial institutions because of limitations on the size of borrowing facilities from a 
single bank (Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D, 2011). 
Table 31: Working capital finance facility from commercial banks for two 
pharmaceutical companies in Zimbabwe. 
ClIlTl'nt ('UlIlllll' ITial Banli Facilitics FIll" Phannacclltical COlllpanics 
Bank A Bank B 
Company A $ 2.2 m $ 2 m 
Company B 
Company C, D and E Data not Available. 
BankC Bank D 
$ I m* $ 1.5 m* 
Bank E 
$ 500K 
Curent 
Outstandin 
$ 2.3 m** 
* Includes Letter of Credit Facility utilisation for $ 973K to suppliers of APls. ** Facility Pending Security 
I}prt;'l'lriA". Tenor 90 to 180 Days Renewable 
Source: Managing Director Pharmaceutical Company B (20 II) and Finance Manager, Pharmaceutical 
Company A (20 I I) . 
CAPS pharmaceuticals accessed short-term loans from five commercial banks at a weighted 
average of 20-30% per annum, which rose to USD 5.87 million in 20 I 0, causing challenges for the 
company when it did not operate profitably consequently the loans went bad and were called up 
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(Table 27). CAPS blamed their woes on exorbitant interest rates charged by commercial banks, 
which had given them notice to auction their fixed assets (Press reports22). 
High interest rates are symptomatic of African lending. Nissanke (2001) and Andrianova (2010; 
2011 a; 20 11 b) pointed out that lending in Africa is characterised by high interest rates and high 
interest spreads. Chigumira and Masiyandima (2003) found evidence of high lending rates in 
Zimbabwe' caused by an oligopolistic banking structure and conventional lending that rationed 
credit to small and medium enterprises. Chigumira and Masiyandima's (2003) findings are 
confirmed by this study and the situation has become even more acute because of lack of savings. 
Carmody (1998) also reported incidence of high interest rates in Zimbabwe after financial 
liberalisation, accompanied by a tight credit policy. The high interest rates affect access to finance, 
investment strategies and productive capacity expansion in Zimbabwe (Zwizwai et al., 2004, 
Stoneman, 1990). 
In addition to exorbitant interest rates, some banks short-date credit facilities in order to collect 
management and arrangement fees frequently. Management fees or arrangement fees (also referred 
to as non-funded income) are supposed to cover the cost of arranging bank loans. Banks truncate 
the bank loan facility; instead of offering a renewable I-year facility, they offer 3 month or 6 month 
facilities and collect management fees at each renewal as reflected in the remark below: 
"It's a way of improving the return [profit]. Instead of recovering [management 
fees] once a year, you get it twice, and getting it up front, accelerating revenue 
collection and revenue" (Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). 
With the reduced volumes of lending, commercial banks drive hard this non-funded income 
(Executive Director, International Bank A, 2011; Executive Director, International Bank B, 2011; 
Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). This institutional behaviour increases cost of funds 
22 http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/commentlI2393-the-toxic-debt-overhang.html; accessed 28 April 2012, 
and http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/companies-a-markets/10129-drugs-giant-on-health-alert.html; 
accessed 9 October 2012. 
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for phannaceutical companies and I discuss this further under the politics of lending (see section 
6.S). In the next section, I discuss how banks do lending in Zimbabwe, addressing research 
question 4. 
6.4 How do Zimbabwean Commercial Banks do Lending? 
One of the key arguments of this study is that there are complexities and technological capabilities 
surrounding financing of local phannaceutical manufacture in Africa that have been ignored. In 
this section, I seek to unearth the skills and expertise at banks involved in lending, linking them to 
Lall's (1992) technological framework originally developed for the productive sector and not 
financial services. Table 32 below represents my approach to addressing research question 3. I 
discuss how banks do lending focusing on the complexities surrounding loan origination covering 
prospecting, risk analysis, approval, disbursement and monitoring and control. I discuss the 
equivalent capabilities used at each stage and link them to Lall's (1992) finn level technological 
capability framework. I set up the rest of this section as follows: section 6.4.1 explore the 
prospecting process by Relationship Managers, followed by section 6.4.2 where I discuss the risk 
analysis done by the risk professionals, the Credit Managers. In section 6.4.3 I discuss the approval 
process and loan disbursement. I conclude the section by discussing monitoring and control of 
disbursed loans in section 6.4.4. 
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Table 32: A summary of how banks do lending and technological capabilities involved. 
Bank lending Function What They Do In lending 
Fit with lall (1992) Firm level 
Technological Capability Framework 
Prospecti ng: Relationship 
• Scan the economy for potential profitable borrowers. 
• Networks and connections in va rious economic sectors. 
Managers. These are the sales and 
• Boundaries are defined by Credit Policy and Underwriting Standards. Investment Capabili ty: Pre-investm ent 
marketing professionals and they 
• Key attributes: Knowing the economy, knowing industry, and knowing Capability and Project Finance Appraissal; 
are supposed to possess credit business. Linkages wi thin Economy 
qual ities for preliminary prospect 
• Reliance on codified and tacit knowledge, hence the need for "old t imers" 
analysis and further risk analysis . for institutional memory and tacit knowledge. 
• They analyse financial and other pertinent information about the 
borrower. 
Risk Analysi s: Cred it Managers. • Some processes such as financial ratio calculations are routinised and Investment Cap abi l i ty : Project 
These are the risk professionals some banks use specific credit analysis software linked to databases to Execution Capability and Project Finance 
who work in conjuction with the compare business and industry metrics. Appraissal 
sales and marketing professionals • Both tacit and codified knowledge are key attributes. 
• They prepare the internal project proposal document for approval 
according to internal policies. 
• Based on project matrics, credit policies, underwriting standards and 
Loan Approval : Credit Approvers . appetite for credit bUSiness they approve, sent back for ammendments or 
Inves tment Capabi lity: Project 
There are se nior risk profe ssionals, and decline loan applications. Execution and Project Finance Appra issa l; 
It is not uncommon to have former • They usually are highly connected (linkages) within banking and Process Engi neer ing; Product 
credit Managers or Re lationship econom ie sectors. Engineeri ng and Li nkages w ithin 
Managers manning this function • Codified knowledge and tacit knowledge, "gut feel" used In appraissing Economy: 
project proposals. 
• They are the "gatekeepers" of the credit process. 
• They ensure all documentary and policy requirements are satisfied 
Loan Disbursement : Credit before transfer of funds into the borrower's account. 
Administration • Highly routinised operations with go or no go decisions at each stage, 
Process Engineer i ng 
accompanied by sign-off at the right authority level. They are a 
Relationship Manager's worst nightmare. 
• Constantly assessing the credit "health" of the borrower using triggers 
and covenants set in he loan approval document. 
• Ultimate responsibility lies with the Relationship Manager although Product Engi neering; Process 
Monitoring and Control : Credit Manager and Credit Approvers all assist in monitoring and control. Engi neer i ng and Linkages wi thin 
Relationsh ip Managers; Credit • Highly routinised operations where the staff, frequently check bank Economy; e ven Investment 
Managers; Credit Approvers reports, press reports and news in the grapevine; leveraging linkages in the Capabi l ity 
economy. 
• This process is also used to scan for new opportunities to lend or cross-
sell other bank products. 
Source: Developed by author from experience and interviews with lending and risk executives in banking. 
6.4.1 Prospecting process 
The Relationship Manager (RM) (see Table 32) initiates the loan origination process, as the 
primary contact with the customer (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 20 11 ; Executive 
Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011 ). The RM is embedded in the credit process; from prospecting, 
to risk analys is, loan approval, disbursement, and monitoring and control of the account until 
repayment of the loan (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 2011 ). The RM is the nucleus of 
the loan origination process as he/she initiates and manages the process through the various stages 
193 
(see Table 32). The RM should possess a high knowledge of the economy, different industries and 
businesses to know which sectors are performing well (ibid). The RM requires a generalist but in-
depth knowledge of the economy, credit skills to make preliminary analysis of the project and at 
the same time must have linkages both within the bank and within the economy to be able to get 
information that helps in the prospecting process. RMs rely on codified and tacit knowledge and 
also depend on old timers for tacit knowledge and institutional memory (see section 6.2.2). The 
productive firm level technological capabilities exhibited by the RM are project finance and 
investment capabilities (see Table 33). The RM is bounded by credit policy and underwriting 
standards as reflected below: 
"These are the ones [credit policy] that give overriding direction, be it strategy, 
or the underwriting standards themselves; to say how do you process an 
application. So these [credit] policies range from giving you guidance on the 
processes and also approval levels" (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 
2011). 
To reiterate the importance of credit policies in defining the boundaries within which the RMs 
operates, a Senior Manager described their credit policy as follows: 
"In our [credit] policy we have got companies that we don't want to lend to or 
industries that we are not happy to lend to, which industry we should approach 
with a lot of caution and why". (Senior Manager, International Bank C, 2011) 
The Chief Risk Officer of an international bank defined underwriting standards as follows: 
"Underwriting standards basically, what we are looking at, it's a strategy, credit 
strategy for our country. So we say which sectors do we want to go into, and 
which ones are prohibited totally, and this is where sometimes we would have 
burnt our fingers. But it depends with the dynamics. I can give you an example, 
we never used to touch flowers (horticulture) but with the developments that 
happened, it has become a lucrative industry. People had a learning curve both 
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for the farmers and the banks. So we are now into horticulture as well" (Chief 
Risk Officer, International Bank A, 2011). 
The quote above reveals the leaming process essential for process and product innovation in the 
financial services industry. The "leaming curve process" implies modification of credit policies 
and underwriting standards when fundamentals change. These are the complexities are ignored by 
the current discussions and analyses of the financing of local African phannaceutical manufacture 
(see chapter 1). These technical competencies cannot be assumed to exist and be efficient in 
African financial systems. 
In the prospecting process, Credit Policy and Underwriting Standards are used in conjunction with 
customer segmentation matrices (Table 33). Market segmentation can be based on turnover, 
number of employees, ownership structure, domicile of ownership and type of company, among 
other traits (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 2011; Executive Director Domestic Bank, B, 
2011; Executive Director, International Bank A, 2011). Locally owned phannaceutical companies 
used to fall into the small to medium segment, and for a number of banks this sector falls under 
Retail Banking (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A). The implications of this classification 
are that a company is managed on a portfolio basis where it is not uncommon to have as many as 
40 or more companies under the management of one portfolio manager, who is not as experienced 
and senior (ibid). Retail Banking is not a specialist-lending centre, has low lending limits and is 
not geared for the relationship management model. Resultantly segmentation can work against 
local manufacturing companies (ibid). The situation in Zimbabwe though, because of the 
economic downturn has changed and the pharmaceutical sector is now handled in the corporate 
banking division (ibid). 
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Table 33: An example of a customer segmentation matrix based on annual sales and number of 
employees employed by a company. 
Type of Enterprise Number of Employees Annual Sales (US$) 
Micro Enterprise 1 to 10 Less than 200 000 
Small Enterprise Up to 20 200 000 to 4 Million 
Medium Enterprise 20 to 99 4 Million to 16 Million 
Large Enterprise More than 100 More than 16 Million 
Medium Enterprise 20 to 99 4 Million to 16 Million 
Multinational Corporates 
Large Enterprise More than 100 More than 16 Million 
Source: Beck el aI. , 2009, practice and fieldwork, 2011 
The Relationship Manager collects information from key financial executives at the borrowing 
company (ibid). The banking relationship is multi-tiered; linking executives at the bank and 
borrowing company and operational staff especially in the borrowing company 's finance 
department. An executive with an international bank pointed out the importance of knowing key 
contacts: 
"Knowing who the finance director is key, who is the marketing director, who is 
the CEO, who is the operations manager? Is the company in good hands, 
especially the top management and those were the people you mostly relied on, 
their credibility. Otherwise if you didn 't know them then it would be difficult to 
assess the company" (Senior Manager, Domestic Bank D, 20 11). 
This quote is key in Lall's (1992) technological framework as it reflects the importance of linkages 
between pharmaceutical companies and banks (see section 3.6). Linkages are critical for the bank 
as they depend on both codified and tacit knowledge and information to analyse credit applications. 
It also cements the importance of thinking of project finance capabilities as a new capability that 
straddles different types or levels of capability. 
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In the next section I turn to risk analysis. 
6.4.2 Risk analysis 
RMs request audited financial accounts, management accounts and memorandum of articles of 
association to check for borrowing powers, mandates and borrowing limits imposed by boards (see 
Tables 34;35) (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 2011; Head of Corporate Banking, 
Domestic Bank D, 2011). Other documents requested include debtors and creditors aged analysis, 
cashflow projections and budgets. An organisational learning manager with an international bank 
described the process as follows: 
"We always wanted audited accounts from our clients and for those that were 
not strong we wanted them 3 months after the year end. Because when some 
companies are not doing well they can drag the audit process they will try and 
avoid the audit process as much as possible and delay. So that means we won't 
know the exact position of the company, so that becomes more important for us 
to know it sooner rather than later" (Senior Manager, Organisational Learning 
International Bank, 2011). 
The above quote reflects getting historic and interim information to avoid adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Allen and Santomero, 1997, 2001; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Scholtens and 
van Wensveen, 2000, 2003). 
Table 34 shows documentary requirements from the borrower and the metrics measured from each 
class of information, and Table 35 describes qualitative information analysed by Credit Managers 
in conjunction with Relationship Managers (Executive Director, International Bank A, 2011; Head 
of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D, 2011). They analyse operations management, asset and 
liability management, industry risk, business risk , management risk, market risk, country risk, 
sovereign risk and shareholder analysis amongst other risks (see Fig 22;23). Under business risk 
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analysis (see Fig 22), they analyse general characteristics of the business; covering company size, 
maturity and how diversified it is (Executive Director, International Bank A, 2011; Head of 
Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D, 2011). For the operating cycle, the analysis covers supply 
risk; production risk; demand risk; delivery risk; and collection risk (see Fig 23). The analysis also 
covers the following; product-market match, production, demand and supply dynamics, sales and 
distribution and management experience, depth and integrity (Executive Director, International 
Bank A, 2011; Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D, 2011). Relating these operations to 
theory, it is apparent that all these operations are geared to handle asymmetric information and 
unearth the risks that the financial intermediary is underwriting (see section 3.5). As argued in 
section 3.5 some of the operations of financial intermediaries include risk transformation and 
ameliorating information asymmetries between investors and savers. 
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Table 34: Fina ncial informa tion collected from potentia l bor rowers and used ill the credit process. 
3 Year Audited Financials: 
Integrity of the financials depend 
on the reputation of the auditors. 
If International affiliated then a 
higher score is given. 
Latest management accounts: 
Short term analysis of company 
performance, rather than wait 
for interim 6 month or yearly 
accounts to discover 
deterioration of business 
cond itions. 
Debtors and Creditors lists: 
Ability of the company to collect 
money from debtors efficiently 
and pay their creditors on time. 
Budgets: What are the plans 
for expenditure and where will 
revenue come from? 
Cash flows and Projections: 
Does the business have the 
capacity to generate enough 
cash to pay back the loan on 
schedule? 
Security Values of pledged 
assets from reputable valuers, 
approved by the bank. 
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Operations Management 
Asset Management 
Liability Management 
Sales, Cost and Prnfit"hilitv l 
Quality and Liquidity of 
Assets , and Asset Mix 
(Stock and Fixed Assets) 
Matching liabilities to asset 
conversion cycle 
Profitability Ratios: Gross 
Margin, Operating profit 
Margin 
Efficiency Ratios: Sales to 
Assets, Stock Days on Hand, 
Creditors Days on Hand, 
Debtors Days on Hand, Sales 
to Net Fixed Assets, Return 
Assets (ROA), Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
Leverage: Debt to Assets, 
Debt to Networth, Debt to 
Tangible Networth, Interest 
Coverage Ratio 
Liquidity: Current Ratio, 
Quick Ratio (Acid Test) 
Value of assets to be pledged as security, which can act as a secondary form of repayment in 
the failure of primary repayment sources. 
Source: Omega Perfonnance 1996; Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 2011 ; Executive Director Domestic Bank A , 20 I I ; Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D ; 
20 II and researcher' s experience. 
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Table 35: Qualita tive information obta ined from borrowers for use in risk a nalysis. 
Soft (Qualitative) Information Metric Under Consideration 
Industry Risk Ana lysis Trends and dynamics that affect a" companies operating in that sector, including 
threats from substitute products . 
Management's ability and strategies to deal with product-market mix, supply and 
Business Risk Analysis suppl ier risk, production , competition , distribution , sales processes and customer 
concentration risk. Issues of succession planning, and training are also considered . 
Shareholder risk, and their commitment to the project. Is there reasonable autonomity 
Shareholders Analysis and independence of the board for effective corporate governance. Can the board 
res ist moral hazard risk taking by management? 
Key Management Analysis The key considerations are breadth and depth of experience, qualifications, integrity , 
vision and strategy. 
Country Risk Risk of macro and micro dynamics that determine the competitiveness of a country for 
business operation and profitability as well as value of assets. 
Currency or Exchange Risk The risk of change of exchange rates for business that operate cross border or for 
companies that borrow in foreign currency denominated loans. 
Source: Omega Performance 1996; Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 20 I I; Executive Director 
Domestic Bank A, 20 II ; Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D; 20 I I and researcher's experience. 
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Figure 22: Business risk a nalysis elements during the credit process 
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Collection Risk 
Cash / Capital ~ Supply Risk 
Receivables Raw Materials 
Delivery Risk t 
Demand Risk 
Leakage or Shrinkage 
1 ProducUon Risk 
Work in Progress 
Finished Goods 
J Production Risk 
Process change or C<rmingling 
Source: Omega Performance 1996; Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 20 II ; Executive Director 
Domestic Bank A, 20 II ; Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D; 20 II and researcher 's experience 
Figure 23: The operating cycle and risks analysed 
Each borrower is allocated a credit grade (see Table 36), and the loan is structured checking for 
alignment between borrowing cause and the type of loan offered (Chief Risk Officer, International 
Bank A, 2011; Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011; Senior Manager, International Bank C, 
2012). The allocation of credit grades is part of the efforts to deal with information asymmetry 
between the bank and the borrower (Gowland, 1998). 
201 
Table 36: Credit rating matrix and level of monitoring for borrowers. 
Financial Institution Credit Rating Grading Monitoring 
A-C Investment Grade Normal Monitoring 
Stanbic D Sub-Investment Grade Close Monitoring 
E Default Default 
1-3 Investment Grade 
Normal Monitori ng 
4-7 Standard Monitoring 
Barclays Bank 8 Substandard 
Close Monitoring 
9 Doubtful 
10 Loss Default 
High Grade 
Normal Monitoring 
Standard Grade 
CBZ 
Sub-Standard Grade Close Monitoring 
Past Due or Individually Impaired Default 
1 - 9 The lower the number, the 
higherthe quality of the Normal Monitoring 
10 credit. Standard Chartered 
11 - 12 Doubtful Close Monitoring 
13 - 14 Impaired Default 
Source: Audited Financial Statements for commercial banks published in the local press according to 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe regulations (Accessed April to May 20 II); Chief Risk Officer, International 
Bank A, 20 II ; and researcher's experience. 
The process then moves to the approval process that I discuss below. 
6.4.3 Loan approval process and disbursement 
After risk analysis and loan structuring, the process moves to approval, a stepped process moving 
to higher committees depending on the size of the loan and the approval limits of approvers 
(Executive Director, International Bank A, 20 II; Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D, 
20 I I). Senior Credit Managers or in other institutions Chief Risk Officers can approve loans 
(Chief Ri sk Officer, International Bank A, 20 11). For loans above their discretionary limits, the 
loan application moves to higher approvers (ibid). For domestic banks, the credit committee is 
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usually made up of the heads of divisions; retail banking, treasury, risk, finance and corporate 
banking (Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011; Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank 
D, 2011). The committee sits on pre-determined days or on an ad hoc basis depending on the 
urgency. The RM can make an oral presentation, and the result can be approval, amendments 
needed after addressing questions raised or decline (Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). 
Some international banks in addition to local approvers have regional approvers with higher 
discretionary approval limits. The regional approvers work closely with the local approvers (Chief 
Risk Officer, International Bank A, 2011; Senior Manager, International Bank C, 2011). When the 
regional approver's approval limit is exceeded, a credit committee composed of risk officers and 
senior approvers in different countries convene a meeting (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank 
A, 2011; Senior Manager, International Bank C, 2011). What is interesting in international banks 
is the non-involvement of local business line executive management in credit approval (see Fig 24). 
The ultimate approval level for domestic banks is the Board Credit Committee (see Fig 24) 
(Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, May, 2011; Executive Director, Domestic Bank B, 2011; 
Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D, 2011). 
The approval function is the one that seems to use the most of the firm level technological 
capabilities (see Table 32) as they have to be conversant with investment capability, productive 
capabilities and linkage capabilities. This exposes the complexities and technological capabilities 
at banks surrounding the approval process which needs to be discussed and analysed, as argued in 
chapter 1. 
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Figure 24: 
Activity 
Final Approval Stage: 
Approve, am mend or 
reject. 
Stage 3: Approve, 
reject, ammend or send 
to final approval stage. 
Seniors Executives 
Stage 2: Approve, 
ammend or reject. 
Otherwise send to 
Higher Committees. 
Stage 1: Approve, 
ammend or send to 
Senior Credit Manager 
Credit proposal 
preparation. Project 
metrics appraissal 
Different approval processes between domestic and international banks. 
On approva l, the bank generates a contractual document common ly called the facility letter. The 
borrowing company' s authorised officials according to a Board resolution sign on behalf of the 
company (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 20 II). If there are conditions precedents, the 
loan does not become effective until the bank is satisfied that all conditions precedent have been 
met (ibid). The credit administration department handles document perfection and transfer of funds 
into the borrower's account (ibid). Their operations are highly routinised with go or no go 
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decisions requiring sign-off at each stage by authorised bank officers (ibid). Process engineering is 
the capability of concern in credit administration. 
6.4.4 Loan monitoring and control 
RMs monitor the account performance with frequency and intensity of monitoring depending on 
borrower quality. The better the borrower quality, the less stringent the monitoring requirements 
(see Table 36). Consequently, MNCs and their subsidiaries with better credit grades tend to have 
less covenants and triggers compared to smaller domestic companies (Executive Director, 
Domestic Bank A, May, 2011; Executive Director, Domestic Bank B, 2011; Head of Corporate 
Banking, Domestic Bank D, 2011). Press reports, networks, economic linkages and interaction 
with the customer generate information used for monitoring. If there is adverse information, the 
account can be placed on an early warning system for close monitoring by senior bank 
management (Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, May, 2011; Executive Director, Domestic 
Bank B, 2011; Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D, 2011). Triggers of adverse 
conditions can include non-payment of interest, violating certain financial ratios or deterioration in 
financial performance or departure of key executives. 
If a loan on the early warning system deteriorates, it is downgraded to a lower credit grade , and 
depending on the magnitude of downgrade, the account could become sub-standard and the bank 
provides for the loan and assume that it will not be paid (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 
2011). Provisioning levels are scalable upwards depending on probability of non-performance of 
the loan (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank A, 2011). In some institutions, management of the 
account is passed on to collection specialists, more experienced with recovery of non-performing 
loans (Former Sub-Standards Manager, International Bank A, 2011). 
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In section 6.5, I explore the politics of lending as an additional explanation on why African banks 
lend so little at high interests and high interest spreads. 
6.5 The Politics of Lending 
Institutional behavioural factors, credit policies, underwriting standards and revenue generating 
stream strategies affect how banks make decisions and use credit risk analysis decision-making 
tools. The first institutional factor is bank ownership. The choice of type of customer to lend to, 
the economic sector to be involved in and interest spreads can be driven by bank ownership. In this 
section I set out to address research question 4, to understand the institutional factors that drive 
bank strategy on revenue streams, lending, who to lend to and at what price 
6.5.1 Bank Ownership 
International banks prefer to lend to larger, older and more transparent companies which usually 
are multinational corporates (MNCs), and locally they cherry pick good large local corporates 
(Senior Manager Domestic Bank D, with 25 years' experience with an International Bank A, 2011; 
see also De Haas et ai, 2010). MNCs and large local corporates are allocated senior relationship 
managers and are more likely to get better representation at credit committee level compared to 
companies deemed smaller (Organisational Learning Manager, International Bank, 20 11). 
International banks also prefer to lend to subsidiaries of international companies because of their 
global account management strategies (ibid). Subsidiaries are tentatively allocated a line of credit 
within the global credit limit for the parent international company (Senior Business Development 
Manager, International Bank B, 2011; Senior Manager Domestic Bank D, 2011). International 
banks are forced to align their local strategies to the parent's global strategies. This ultimately 
drives underwriting standards, credit policy, profit strategies and institutional behaviour (Chief 
Risk Officer, International Bank A, 20 I 1; Executive Director, International Bank A, 20 II; Senior 
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Manager, Business Development, International Bank B, 2011). This is what I term the politics of 
lending. Local banks may exercise freedom in setting strategies and credit policies on preferred 
sectors of the economy to be involved in; however they are limited in their operations by a smaller 
deposit base (Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011; Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic 
Bank D, 2011). 
As mentioned earlier the credit grade determines the premium charged on interest, and as a result, 
the locally owned companies are likely to pay higher interest charges, management fees, and 
transactional fees compared to subsidiaries of multinational corporations because of better credit 
scoring by MNCs and their subsidiaries (Organisational Learning Manager, International Bank, 
2011). Considering that the pharmaceutical companies are locally owned, credit policy may be a 
hurdle to accessing financing from foreign owned institutions (Berger et ai, 2008). The 
international banks rationalise their preference for MNCs and subsidiaries because they claim the 
international parent company can transfer technology, and management expertise. In the event the 
local subsidiary is financially threatened, the parent can meet the financial obligations to avert 
reputational risk (Senior Manager, Business Development, International Bank, B, 2011). 
That international banks prefer multinationals and their subsidiaries is reflected in the remark by a 
Senior Manager with an International Bank below: 
"You will find that dealing with multinationals to us is easy as an international 
organisation. Our life becomes easy because we are connected internationally" 
(Senior Manager, International Bank A, 2011). 
Local pharmaceutical companies can be disadvantaged by an institutional policy that favours 
MNCs and their subsidiaries and penalised in terms of credit costs for being locally owned. I 
continue the discussion on the politics of lending by discussing the preference of international 
banks for transactional banking over traditional lending in section 6.5.2. 
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6.5.2 Transactional banking versus traditional lending 
In this section, I discuss the effect of the dichotomy in ownership of financial institutions and their 
approach to traditional lending business versus a new strategy emphasising transactional banking 
revenues; a strategy emanating from international banks because of competition from other 
institutions that have broken into lending in their home countries. 
Commercial banks have two major revenue streams; funded income or risk income from lending 
activities and non-funded income from fees and commissions (Executive Director, International 
Bank A, 20 II). With risk income, banks earn profits from the interest spread between the deposit 
rate and lending rate (ibid). In literature, banks earn this revenue or premium for engaging in 
liquidity, maturity and risk transformation activities (see section 3.5.1). Non-funded income is 
derived from transactional charges, management fees, arrangement fees, account maintenance fees 
and commissions (ibid). The bank benefits from its intermediary functions by charging fees and 
commissions (see section 3.5.1). Revenue stream strategies are critical to understanding the lack of 
appetite by banks for lending to enterprises compared to non-risk revenue generation activities 
from carrying out transactional services. 
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Table 37: Commercial banks full year profit and loss accounts as at December 2010 showing profitability and revenue streams. 
9. 13 1 6.33 
- 3.29 - 3.87 
:]I: 1Jf!1: ':r. 
4.
64
1 3.42 1 
1.06 - - -
1.1-3 1 
-
9.45 1 45.80 I 9.65 12.62 9.37 - - 15.89 7.88 
0.72 0.23 - 2.29 11 .33 - 1.52 
!;1I!1 I ' il.1t: • a:t 
Total Income 19.091 32.141 42.051 43.02 I 15.06 1 10.61 I 72.22 1 25.69 1 30.91 I 17.30 1 1.81 1 14.92 1 27.11 1 8.49 1 10.34 
Working Profit 4.86 - 1.85 10.78 12.22 3.00 - 7.57 31.14 5.49 6.68 1.94 - 7.51 3.91 2.87 2.24 2.51 
Net Bad Debt Charge - 0.32 - 0.89 - 1.07 - 0.66 - 0.64 - 1.59 - 0.44 0.64 0.97 - 0.08 - 0.48 - 0.74 - 0.84 0.45 
Trading Profit 4.54 - 1.85 9.90 11 .15 2.34 - 8.20 29.55 5.04 6.04 0.96 - 7.59 3.43 2.13 1.40 2.07 
Taxation - 1.15 0.58 - 2.13 - 2.77 - 0.74 - 8.60 - 1.31 - 1.96 0.25 2.03 - 0.71 - 0.27 0.16 
1.61 - 8.20 20.95 3.73 4.09 0.71 - 5.56 3.43 1.41 1.13 1.91 
Source: Bank financial statements published in various Zimbabwean newspapers between April and May 20 II as per Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe regulations. 
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Table 38: Short-term loan to deposit ratios for commercial banks as at December 2010. 
Source: Financial statements published in local press April to May 2011 as per RBZ regulations. 
International banks tend to use transactional banking revenue as the main source of revenue to 
finance their bank operations (see Table 37). This strategy is reflected in the quote below: 
"At the moment the bank is not driven by lending it is driven by transactional 
revenue. I think where we are go ing it' s not the interest [risk income from 
lending], I think if you look at the funding costs and interest margins of 5%, for 
the size of lending that we do it cannot sustain our operations [because lending 
is currently very subdued] Transactional banking, NFl (non-funded income) is 
the income to worry about. Lending consumes the balance sheet, it consumes 
share capital. So no institution is keen in pushing its balance sheet. RIW AC 
[Risk weight adjusted capital] issues". (Executive, Director, International Bank 
A, 20) I). 
Bank ownership seems to drive the strategy for transactional banking revenue streams preference 
for foreign owned banks in Zimbabwe. Non-funded income is taking prominence over risk income 
(net interest income) for international banks (see Table 37) as they prefer transactional banking 
over traditional banking as shown in Table 38. International banks because of their dominance in 
the deposit market and higher numbers of endowed customers, prefer to generate revenue through 
transactional banking rather than lending as reflected in the quote above. The strategy of preferring 
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transactional banking to traditional lending is prevalent amongst the international banks, as analysis 
of their fmancial statements shows (Table 37). Non-funded income covers or just about covers 
their total operating costs, compared to domestic banks. This is one of the strategic differences in 
appetite to lending (risk income) in the politics of lending. Domestic banks are adopting the 
preference for transactional banking revenues as this quote suggests: 
"We do have the same [focus on non-funded income and transactional banking]. 
If you look at our fmancial you will also see the same trend in there but for us 
we cannot run away from direct products like lending. We are a local bank fully 
committed to local development so we do go into that [lending] but we balance 
the act. We also go into the direct [lending] products and like I said before we 
are onshore and in terms of risk assessment we have a better appreciation., and 
also we have robust credit granting processes, our systems are robust" (Head of 
Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank B, 2011). 
Thus, a hybridisation of strategy because of executive staff movement between banks seems to be 
trending for revenue generation. However, international banks show a higher capability of non-
funded income covering operational costs than domestic banks (see Table 37). In general, local 
commercial banks do not seem to exhibit this business model of non-funded income covering 
operational costs to the same extent as international banks, as they are not able to generate the 
magnitude of transactions that can support this strategic thrust (see Table 37). International banks 
hold high levels of deposits because of flight to safety by depositors who prefer international banks 
to domestic banks as they feel their money will be safer (Group Chief Executive, Domestic bank, 
2011). An executive who used to work for an international bank and now works for a domestic 
bank echoed the hybridisation of strategy set by the international banks as follows: 
"Our philosophy is a bit different [to other domestic banks], our model is that 
transaction based fees [such as service fees and commissions] all that non-
funded [income] must pay for all our operational costs and interest income [risk 
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income from lending] is our cream" (Executive Directo?3, Domestic Bank A, 
2011). 
Hybridisation of ideas and strategy was also evident in lending policies (ibid). As executives and 
managers move from international banks to domestic banks, they migrate with what they call "best 
practice" from international banks whether it is lending matrix templates or strategic thrusts 
(Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011; Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank B, 
2011). Making transactional banking revenue the main income has serious implications for lending 
in an economy that requires lending because local industry is not cash rich and has few sources of 
external finance. 
Another source of non-funded income are management fees (arrangement fees) which are meant to 
cover the cost of putting together the facility; prospecting, screening, credit risk analysis, loan 
structuring and documentation as well as monitoring and control (Chief Risk Officer, International 
Bank A, 2011). Management fees range from 1 % to 2.5% of the loan facility (ibid). If a 
commercial bank arranges a facility for US$ 10 million, when the borrowing company accepts the 
terms and conditions; I % of US$ 10 million is charged to their account and the bank collects US$ 
100 000 up front. For the not so good companies, management fees can be as high as 2.5% of 
facility. In the case of a US$ 10 million loan facility, this equates to US$ 250 000 up front charges 
(Executive Director, Domestic Bank D, 2011; Head of Corporate Banking Banks B, 2011; Senior 
Organisational Manager, International Bank A, 2011). A senior manager illustrated how they 
charge management fees in the quote below: 
"For some corporates I think 2.5%, you can get away with but on average for top 
end its 1 %, gravitating towards 2% depending on how desperate the client is. 
Because there are no volumes the fees charged are now higher." (Senior 
Manager, International Bank B, 2011). 
23 The Executive Director acknowledged that strategies are basically copied from international banks, 
whether credit risk analysis or running the bank. He said when people move to domestic banks they import 
policies, systems and standards from the international banks whom they consider to be at the cutting age 
because of global presence and resources focused on formulating strategy at group level. 
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With current reduced volumes of lending in Zimbabwe, commercial banks drive hard non-funded 
income. The guiding philosophy as mentioned earlier is that non-funded revenue must pay for all 
the bank's operational costs and interest income is the 'cream on the cake' (Executive Director, 
Domestic Bank A, 2011). The Director said ifbanks stopped lending, they should break even from 
transactional banking revenues only (ibid). This partly explains the shift to and dominance of 
transactional banking over traditional lending products in Zimbabwe and is part of the politics of 
lending, explaining why lending is low in Zimbabwe. The pharmaceutical companies have 
recognised this bank strategy as one executive lamented: 
"What we have realised as well is that the banks are capitalising on short term 
facilities where they can give you a facility for 3 months and then they charge 
you a facility arrangement fee. It can range from 3 to 10% [total cost to the 
company per month]. So you can see a situation where every 3 months you are 
being charged 5%." (Managing Director, Pharmaceutical Company B, 2011) 
Domestic banks justified short-dating short-term finance facilities by explaining that unlike 
international banks, they are constrained by the current liquidity crunch in lending to enterprises 
and that forces them to shorten the tenor of the loans as reflected in the quote below: 
"We don't have liquidity, whereas we are short term fmanciers that should give 
money up to 12 months, it has not been the case, we started something like 30 
days, we went to 3 months, then 6 months now for some but its largely 90 days 
for most" (Head of Corporate Banking, Domestic Bank D, 2011). 
This quote reveals that other than a strategic thrust to prefer transactional banking to traditional 
lending by international banks and the gravitation of other domestic banks towards that, other 
domestic banks may be charging high transactional fees as a way to survive and generate revenues 
because of liquidity challenges. This transactional banking versus traditional lending thrust by 
commercial banks, especially the well-endowed international banks is part of the politics of lending 
explanation for subdued lending in an African context, high interest rates and high interest spreads; 
at least this in the case in Zimbabwe. 
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From a flnancial intermediation theory perspective, the preference for transactional services over 
traditional lending reveals that the local financial institutions are choosing to limit themselves to 
the brokerage services function of flnancial institutions whilst clearly steering clear of risk, 
liquidity and maturity transformation activities that are argued to add value to the economy. In a 
sense, the banks are taking the narrow operational approach to the function of a fmancial 
intermediary by not delving into the riskier aspects offmancial intermediation (see section 3.5.1). 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to address research questions 1, 2, 3 and 4. It emerged that banks do not 
playa role in capital investment because of lack of domestic savings and foreign currency to import 
plant, equipment and machinery. This is a historical situation as industry was set up using FDI and 
foreign loans. Internal funds made up of retained earnings and proflts were used to fmance 
enterprises as capital was locked up in the country from the UDI era in 1965 up to independence 
and afterwards (Bond, 1993, 2000; Phimister, 2000). Merchant banks and commercial banks were 
active in lending long term; however, they mediated only domestic savings whereas foreign 
currency is what is needed to import technology as was argued by Dailami and Walton (1989). 
This finding is critical for many African countries because they do not fabricate or manufacture 
capital equipment locally, so the source of technology is only imports and this necessitates foreign 
currency long term loans. In as much as African countries can save long term deposits, the issue of 
foreign currency is critical. For a country like Zimbabwe FDI at the moment is a tall order because 
of macroeconomic instability and the indigenisation drive. Regional fmancial institutions have 
exhibited an institutional arrangement innovation to avail long term fmance for recapitalisation. 
It emerged that banks are active in the short term fmance arena, unsurprisingly so because 
historically this has been their forte. The above flndings address research questions 1 and 2 (see 
sections 6.1; 6.2; 6.3). In addressing research questions 3 and 4, it emerged that there are 
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technological capabilities and complexities involved in lending (see section 6.4) that contemporary 
discourses on fmancing local pharmaceutical manufacture ignore and assume they exist. The 
technological capabilities of project fmance, investment product and process engineering are both 
codified and tacit. What is interesting is the application of Lall's (1992) technological capability 
framework to a fmancial services firm, in this case to the fmancial services industry. From this 
basis it can be argued that in as much as there are technological capabilities in the productive firm, 
there are also technological capabilities in the fmancial services sector even though they do not 
produce tangible products. Thus the aspects of investment, productive and linkage capabilities can 
be traced in the fmancial services sector. 
From knowledge and learning perspective, the fmancial services sector has suffered from loss of 
institutions such as merchant banks and human capital as old timers left the industry without 
training the next round of apprentices in the intricacies of long term fmancing of industry. The last 
section addressed research question 4, to surface an additional explanation to why African banks 
lend so little at high interest rates and high interest spreads. I proposed the politics of lending 
driven by institutional behaviour on the back of credit policies, underwriting standards and revenue 
generation strategies. International banks endowed with high deposits lend little as they prefer 
transactional banking to traditional lending. Their strategy is that non-funded income from 
transactional banking must cover all bank operational costs, and in the event they stop lending, the 
bank must still be operational. These strategies are driven by international banks based on the 
competition they face in their home countries, and migrate this strategy to Africa, which has a very 
different fmancial institutional architecture. Domestic banks because of hybridisation of ideas and 
strategies as executives and managers move from international banks to domestic banks are also 
adopting this strategy, which clearly makes lending a business that banks can do without because 
they can generate revenue from transactional banking. With this thrust, African banks thus deviate 
from literature that claims banks can be catalysts in industrial development. The banks prefer to 
carry out the narrow function of brokerage services and omit the riskier liquidity and maturity 
transformation activities (see chapter 8). 
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Chapter 7: Paddling Furiously in a Bog; the Business and Operating 
Environment 
7.0 Introduction 
In chapter 5; the fIrst of the three empirical chapters, I addressed research questions 1, 2 and 3. 
With research question 1, I sought to understand how capital investment and working capital 
requirements for ARV research and development, and manufacture are fInanced. It emerged that 
pharmaceutical companies fmanced capital investment from internal resources, and working capital 
requirements from both internal resources and expensive bank fmance. Trade fmance from 
suppliers of APls and excipients is non-existent, thus starving the industry of a vital short-term in-
kind fmancing source for working capital requirements. With research question 2, I sought to 
understand the role commercial banks played in fmancing ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe since 
literature points to banks as the most prevalent source of external fmance for enterprises. 
Zimbabwean banks played no role in capital investment. However, because of the ZETRAF fund, 
an institutional arrangement innovation between Afreximbank and the Ministry of Finance, 
Zimbabwean banks will on-lend ZETRAF long term funds (USD 70 million) for recapitalisation of 
industry. They will analyse risk, disburse the funds, and monitor and control the project fmance 
deals. Zimbabwean banks however played a role in working capital fInance that pharmaceutical 
companies argued was expensive. With research question 3, I sought to understand fIrm level 
technological capabilities required by pharmaceutical companies to access fInance. It emerged that 
the critical f1l1ll level technological capabilities of investment, project fmance, and linkages within 
the economy were vital to accessing project fmance for technological capability upgrading. Local 
pharmaceutical companies however lack project fmance skills, which explains why they failed to 
access offshore loans unlike other Zimbabwean enterprises and African pharmaceutical 
manufacturing companies. 
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In chapter 6, the second of the three empirical chapters, I addressed research questions 1, 2, 3 and 
4. The results for research questions 1 and 2 confIrm the results in chapter 5. With research 
question 3, I sought to understand the complexities and lending technologies surrounding loan 
origination. The results point to a complex process involving Relationship Managers, Credit 
Managers, Approvers, Credit Committees, and Credit Administrators in the bank. External 
relationships involved linkages with the whole economy and regulators. The bank firm level 
technological capabilities equivalent to the ones in the productive firm at play included investment, 
product engineering, process engineering, and linkages within the economy. The banking sector is 
knowledge intensive, using extensively both codifIed and tacit knowledge as well as institutional 
memory. With research question 4, I sought to unravel institutional factors that drive bank strategy 
on revenue streams, lending, who to lend to and at what price. I developed the politics of lending 
thesis as an additional explanation as to why Zimbabwean banks lend so little at high interest rates 
and high interest spreads. Banks prefer transactional banking to traditional lending. Banks are also 
pre-disposed to prefer MNCs and their subsidiaries to local corporates based on moral hazard and 
adverse selection issues. 
In this chapter the last of the three empirical chapters, I address research question 5, detailed below: 
• Research question 5: What are the key business and operating environmental factors that 
influence fInancing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
I focus on how the business and operating environment drive investors' (venture capital, FDI, or 
fmancial institutions) perceptions and confidence on Zimbabwe, and influence provision of project 
fmance for technological capability upgrading. Using Lall's (1992) technological capabilities 
framework, and concentrating on national level technological capabilities, I discuss how failure at 
this national level forces firm level compensatory investment in alternative infrastructure. This 
leads to policy and practice gridlocks, making the Zimbabwean business, and operating 
environment hostile to manufacturing and financing of ARV manufacture. My focus is on factors 
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that drive financiers' perceptions and appetite for ARV manufacture credit. I therefore consider 
LaIrs (1992) national technological capabilities that emerged in interviews with Zimbabwean 
bankers, policy makers, and pharmaceutical industry players. 
7.1 National Technological Capabilities 
There are factors external to pharmaceutical companies that have a profound effect on investor 
sentiment, confidence, and appetite for risk irrespective of who they are; a bank, FDI, venture 
capitalist, sovereign fund managers or institutional investors (Chief Risk Officer, International 
Bank A, 2011; Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). These external factors drive political 
risk, country risk, sovereign risk, business risk, industry risk, social environmental and ethical 
risks, the ease of doing business, and cost competitiveness (Chief Risk Officer, International Bank 
A, 2011; Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). LaB (1992) classifies most of these drivers 
of business and operating environment under national technological capabilities. Under 
capabilities (see section 3.6), Lall (1992) discussed physical infrastructure, human capital, and 
macroeconomic incentives (interest rates, foreign exchange rates, credit availability and political 
stability). He also discussed incentives emanating from internal and external competition and 
finally incentives from factor markets (ibid). He touched on institutions external to the firm but 
which directly affected the capabilities of industry and these could be driven by markets or non-
market set-ups and covered legal frameworks, property rights, industrial institutions, training 
institutions, and technology institutions. I use this framework for the rest of this chapter to discuss 
the business and operating environment in Zimbabwe that causes pharmaceutical companies and 
banks to 'paddle furiously in a bog,24 in their efforts for financing technological capability 
upgrading. 
24 I use this tenn to refer to the myriads of hurdles that companies face in their effort to upgrade their 
technological capability. The hurdles that make company and industrial growth emanate from micro and 
macro failures as discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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I set up the rest of the chapter as follows; in section 7.2, I discuss national level technological 
capabilities focusing on physical infrastructure, efficient financial systems, and human capital. In 
section 7.3, I analyse incentives focusing more on macroeconomic incentives and policy 
inconsistencies that have characterised the Zimbabwean economy for decades. I also discuss 
incentives or rather disincentives emanating from international competition in the market for 
ARVs. I conclude the chapter with section 7.4. 
7.2 Capabilities 
In section 3.6, I discussed national technological capabilities (Lall, 1992); in this section, I focus 
specifically on the national technological capabilities of physical infrastructure, and human capital. 
I also discuss efficient financial systems which LaB (1992) did not discuss in detail. These factors 
contribute to ease and cost of doing business as well as creating the space for innovation to thrive. 
I discuss physical infrastructure in section 7.2.1, efficient financial systems in section 7.2.2 and 
finally human capital in section 7.2.3. 
7.2.1 Physical Infrastructure 
Electricity supply in Zimbabwe is intermittent and pharmaceutical companies have resorted to 
purchasing standby generators (see Fig 25) to ensure consistent electricity supply for operations 
(Production Manager, 2011). Investment in alternative infrastructure diverts funds from operations 
whilst increasing production costs (ibid). Thus failure at national technological capability level in a 
key infrastructural input of electricity forced firm level compensatory investment in alternative 
infrastructure. Provision of alternative infrastructure by private companies instead of dependence 
on public infrastructure is termed complementary capital and diverts scarce funds from critical 
productive capital (Reinikka and Svenson, 1999). 
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One Zimbabwean pharmaceutical company purchased a 500KvA generator to ensure continuance 
of operations for the heating vacuum and air conditioning system (HV AC system) critical to 
maintaining the World Health Organisation (WHO) pre-qualification certification. The generator 
consumes II OL of diesel per hour; which at USD 1.45 per litre (September 20 II) equates to an 
hourly cost of US$ 160. This increases production costs and reduces profitability (see section 
5.2 .1). Power outages can last between 3 to 5 hours and if there is a significant grid fault then it 
can be 12 to 24 hours (Production Manager, 20 II). Power loss in the middle of a production run is 
costly if there is no back-up generator as all the work in progress has to be discarded (Managing 
Director I, 20 II; Production Manager, 20 II). Intermittent supply of electricity imposes a difficult 
operating environmental challenge, forcing dependence on expensive backup generators 
(Maintenance Manager, 20 I I). 
Figure 25: A 500KvA standby generator to compensate for intermittent electricity supply 
220 
Estimated running costs for different power outage time periods are shown in Table 39. 
Intermittent supply of electricity is disruptive to continuous pharmaceutical manufacturing 
operations and imposes additional energy costs ranging from USD 30 000 to USD 250 000 per 
annum . Currently there are plans to increase power generation but in the short term, the country 
requires supplementary regional imports from Mozambique and South Africa, which can be cut off 
if debt is not serviced timeously (Managing Director I, 20 II). The plans include a joint power 
scheme with Zambia on the Batoka gorge and private power generation schemes in Gokwe 
(thermal power station) and Chiredzi (ibid). Financiers consider stability and consistence of 
industrial inputs in their business and industry risk analysis (see section 6.4.2). 
Table 39: Estimated running fuel cost for a 500KvA generator. 
Hourly Consumption I Powe' °''''9' ~ (Lltres) Hours per Day 
110 8 880 5,280 21,120 253,440 
110 7 770 4,620 18,480 221 ,760 
110 6 660 3,960 15,840 190,080 
110 5 550 3,300 13,200 158,400 
110 4 440 2,640 10,560 126,720 
110 3 330 1,980 7,920 95,040 
110 2 220 1,320 5,280 63,360 
110 1 110 660 2,640 31 ,680 
Source: Production Manager and Maintenance Engineer, Pharmaceutical Company A, 20 II and calculations 
by the researcher (based on diesel costs in Zimbabwe in September 20 II). Assuming a 6 day production week. 
Turning to water, strict adherence to water quality standards and water pressure thresholds in drug 
manufacture is essential (Production Manager, 20 II). However, water supplies are frequently 
interrupted by pipe bursts and pump station breakdowns because of aged water supply 
infrastructure (ibid). Pharmaceutical companies were forced to invest in boreholes; another 
alternative infrastructure investment, diverting financial resources from operations to infrastrllctural 
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provision (ibid). As a result of poor quality of water, companies have to frequently change 
imported filters for water treatment. These filters are subject to duty and VAT and therefore 
increase operational costs (ibid). The additional cost in assuring water quality is reflected in the 
remark below: 
"The water has to go through the RO [reverse osmosis water treatment] plant. I 
actually have some invoices on the filters and they have to be changed every 2 
or 3 days. That's how bad our water is. That's not healthy especially if you are 
getting them from South Africa and you still have to pay duty for them, and the 
clearing agents and the transportation costs" (Procurement Manager, 2011). 
Failure to provide basic infrastructural support to the pharmaceutical industry forced a 
compensatory firm level investment in alternative (complementary) infrastructure (Reinikka and 
Svenson, 1999) because of an ageing water supply infrastructure. Instead of concentrating on the 
business of innovating and producing ARVs, the companies are forced to provide alternative 
infrastructure. This operating environmental challenge does not paint the local pharmaceutical 
industry in good light with any financier (Senior Manager, International Bank B, 2011; Senior 
Manager, Business Development, International Bank, C, 2011). Consequently in the matrix of key 
attributes considered in risk analysis, provision of electricity and water (infrastructure) score lowly. 
In the next section I tum to financial systems. 
7.2.2 Efficient financial systems 
Lall (1992) in passing discussed the necessity for efficient financials systems and ability to gamer 
financial resources and physical investment as a requirement for technological capability building. 
This assumption does not hold for Zimbabwe, as the financial system is anything but efficient. 
Financing the pharmaceutical industry in Zimbabwe has been an uphill task especially in the last 
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decade (see chapter 6). Companies were forced to used internally generated funds saved over long 
periods as illustrated in the remark below: 
"To get to that stage [WHO pre-qualification] we would need a lot of upgrades, 
which we have since started and the only thing that has stopped us from going the 
full works is because we have not been able to get the total finance, so we are 
doing it in stages [using internally generated funds]. We have done the first stage, 
we have done the second stage and we think we should be going to the third stage. 
It's a gradual process as and when the fmances [internally generated] become 
available" (Marketing Director, 2011) 
Internally fmanced capital projects are a slow process, as the companies progress as and when they 
save enough to move their projects to the next stage, with serious consequences for technological 
capability upgrading. Dailami and Walton (1989) had praised the Zimbabwean financial system as 
one of the most sophisticated in Africa, with different financial institutions such as commercial 
banks, development fmancial institutions, merchant banks, fmance houses, and discount houses. 
These fmancial institutions were important for raising domestic resources for industry. However, 
with economic structural adjustment programmes came the demise of merchant banks, fmance 
houses and discount houses. The IMF as illustrated in the remark below is blamed for causing the 
decline of merchant banks: 
"Specialist institutions with limited activities within themselves [merchant banks, 
fmance houses, and discount houses] from an IMF perspective, that era is gone. It 
is the IMF influence that destroyed that segmentation of the market, but in my 
mind, it makes markets more fluid. It allowed commercial banks to settle with 
discount houses, discount houses in turn to settle with central bank. What you did 
is create paper and allow tradability to take place." (Group CEO, Domestic Bank 
F,2011). 
The Group CEO further explained the dismantling of the old fmancial architecture precipitated and 
accelerated by the IMF led structural adjustment programme in the early 1990s as follows: 
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"The IMF thinking was that why maintain that British-type of architecture, its old 
fashioned, it's out of sync. So it's a different architecture, but why destroy 
something good that's working?" (Group CEO, Domestic Bank F, 2011). 
Consequently, there was a shift and commercial banks became even more dominant, reducing the 
number of different fInancial institutions pointed out by Dailami and Walton (1989) as constituting 
a deep and sophisticated fmancial system. Consequently, the merchant banks' influence in long-
term lending and their lending technologies dwindled. The lack of an effIcient fInancial system 
lessens even the structuring of offshore deals as commercial banks preferred to fmance trade and 
commerce; the short-term fInance market (see chapter 6). These occurrences and the low key 
impact of capital markets (see section 2.6) point to lack of an efficient system and makes garnering 
resources for physical investment an uphill task, creating a 'bog' that pharmaceutical companies 
have to 'paddle' in. Pharmaceutical companies cannot access long term fmance, firstly because of 
lack of local savings (see chapter 6), secondly lack of foreign currency and thirdly because the 
fmancial institutional architecture is not conducive to lending long term for acquisition of plant, 
equipment and machinery. The neglect in contemporary discourse of these factors reinforces my 
argument that fmancing of technological capability upgrading and innovation is important when 
considering African local pharmaceutical manufacture. 
I now turn to the issue of human capital. 
7.2.3 Human capital 
Both fInancial institutions and pharmaceutical players face skills and knowledge challenges. They 
attributed this to the decade long economic meltdown, which caused mass emigration of skilled 
work force to South Africa, Europe and North America (Director, Research and Development, 
2011; Executive Director, International Bank A. 2011; Managing Director 1, 2011). For 
pharmaceutical companies the affected skills base includes; pharmacists, analytical chemists, and 
microbiologists (Marketing Director, 2011; Production Manager, 2011). Exodus of qualified 
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research and development personnel resulted in one company's R&D department shrinking by 50% 
and another company shutting down R&D activities altogether (Director, Research and 
Development, 2011; Marketing Director, 2011). Experienced pharmacists and chemists have 
settled elsewhere, and attracting them back is proving a huge challenge. Some pharmaceutical 
manufacturing professionals in the diaspora have however expressed an interest in returning if 
there are openings at local companies (Managing Director 1, 2011; Marketing Director, 2011). 
On the back of skills emigration, technological effort becomes a tough challenge due to scarcity of 
qualified and experienced technocrats critical for process engineering, product engineering and 
industrial engineering functions. The Research and Development Director surfaced some of these 
issues in the remark below: 
"So you fmd if you go into a pharmaceutical company in India they have PhD 
and Masters Degrees, and they are working in the lab. So they are 
knowledgeable people, they have been trained and they are capable. So if they 
decide to work on things they get results. But for us here we are compromised, 
our education system being good, but having been affected by our conditions we 
don't have as many and as capable and as innovative and motivated people as 
we used to have in the past. There are some people who just want to do R&D, 
but I don't think we still have those kind of people around". (Director Research 
and Development, 2011). 
Lack of qualified and experienced pharmaceutical teclmocrats hampers technological effort with 
serious implications for product and process innovation as evidenced by stagnation on old first line 
ARVs (see chapter 5). When it comes to fmancing, the situation is compounded by the lack of 
knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry by bankers. This is illustrated in the remark below 
where a respondent from the pharmaceutical industry argued that the bankers lacked knowledge not 
only of the pharmaceutical industry but all industry in Zimbabwe: 
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"I have never respected fInancial industry in Zimbabwe, because they don't 
understand. If you were going to be a banker or fInancier of any industry, you 
need to understand it. You need to understand the basics of the pharmaceuticals, 
but they don't. Not only the pharmaceuticals but all the industries, you must 
understand that you must have the abc's of the industry. If you are going to raise 
funds [long-term project fmance] you will need to understand the business. For 
example if you talk to everybody right now thy will say you will never go wrong 
[with pharmaceuticals]. But no! If you look at the basic fundamentals they are 
lacking. From the economic fundamentals to the company, they are not there to 
support the pharma business so how does it flourish?" (Consultant, 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 2011) 
This damning remark, in essence summarises the challenges in knowledge and learning; the know-
how, know-what and know-who of fmancing the pharmaceutical industry. In addressing research 
question 5, these are the key business and operating environmental factors that influence the 
fInancing oflocal ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. This raises a pertinent question which is, if the 
fInanciers do not know the pharmaceutical industry, how can they profIciently analyse risks 
involved in fInancing ARV manufacture or local production of drugs for that matter? The quote 
above reinforces the discussion in section 6.4 and table 31 on the lending technologies and 
expertise required by bankers in loan origination. These challenges constitute some of the 
complexities surrounding fmancing local pharmaceutical manufacture that have been ignored in 
contemporary debates. 
The pharmaceutical consultant was the fIrst respondent I interacted with in my fIeldwork in 
Zimbabwe, and as a former banker with a technical background in manufacturing, his remark 
caught me off guard. Subsequently, I incorporated his response into my questionnaire and asked 
the bankers directly thereafter if they understood the pharmaceutical business, especially the 
business of ARV manufacturing in Zimbabwe. All the responses from the bankers confIrmed the 
pharmaceutical consultant's allegations, and a typical response from the bankers was they did not 
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know or understand the phannaceutical industry especially ARV manufacturing as illustrated 
below: 
"Like if you ask me right now who is manufacturing ARVs in Zim [Zimbabwe] 
at the moment that information is not readily available." (Executive Director, 
Corporate Banking, April 2011). 
Some bankers were not even aware that ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe commenced in 2003. As 
mentioned earlier, all the bankers interviewed acknowledged they did not understand the science 
behind phannaceutical manufacturing and they did not have personnel with an engineering, 
scientific, or technical background in their institutions in lending hence the limitation. This is in 
contrast to a short-lived Mid-Careers programme run by Standard Chartered Bank that saw entry 
of non-traditional banking recruits from engineering, science and other technical fields into 
banking to solve this problem. Barclays Bank Zimbabwe and Standard Chartered Bank also ran 
graduate entry programmes where they recruited skills from science, technology and engineering 
backgrounds. The programmes' purpose was to enhance understanding, analysis and management 
of risk. However, it seems the programmes' benefits have not trickled through to an understanding 
of manufacturing in Zimbabwe. 
This fmding poses two questions: first, as phannaceutical companies have clearly demonstrated the 
replication model of innovation by locally producing ARVs in Zimbabwe, what efforts have they 
made to make bankers appreciate their capabilities and hence attractiveness as credit candidates? 
This is one of Lall's (1992) firm level technological capabilities of linkages within the economy, 
where management establishes linkages that are beneficial for improving technological effort. The 
second question directed at the bankers is; if they acknowledge that they do not understand (do not 
25 The mid-career programme run by Standard Chartered Africa for about 3 years, saw the recruitment of 
people from diverse technical backgrounds such as engineering, science, mining and other non-traditional 
banking backgrounds. The logic was they needed to infuse the skills in the bank with non-traditional 
banking skills that would add value to credit risk analysis, credit risk management and improve credit metrics 
relying on their technical background. The researcher joined the bank on this programme coming from a 
science, technical and quality assurance background in the food manufacturing business as well as airline 
catering industry. As a result of my biotechnology, microbiology and quality assurance knowledge I ended 
up training graduate entrees on risk analysis and management. 
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know) the phannaceutical industry, how much do they know of the structure of the manufacturing 
sector and what drives the economy? In their defence, the bankers argued that their doors were 
always open and the phannaceutical sector had not approached them and tried to explain their 
operations (Executive Director, International Bank C, 2011; Executive Director, International Bank 
A, 2011; Executive Director, Domestic Bank A, 2011). This response surfaces an attitude of non-
aggressive lending by bankers who expect borrowing companies to pursue them, which points to 
lack of competition for the lending business (credit rationing) or an entrenched culture amongst 
bankers that companies must come to them and argue their case out. Either way the prognosis for 
financing technological capability upgrading and innovation in this culture and environment is dim. 
What is apparent is that executives in banks and phannaceutical companies, have failed in 
establishing linkages that alleviate information asymmetry and promote knowledge transfer and 
sharing as discussed by Wade (2009) in his analysis of Taiwan's 1980s industrial development 
bureau (IDB) approach. Wade described how the IDB was composed of seasoned professionals in 
industrial engineering, corporate accounting and marketing whose mandate was to keep a close 
watch on productive capacities. In addition there was a dedicated group that was responsible for 
coordinating banks to ensure availability of fmancial resources and tax authorities to synchronise 
tax and customs incentives and barriers to protect local industry against imports (ibid). 
The findings in Zimbabwe clearly exhibit a lack of coordination between banks (fmancial 
resources) and the pharmaceutical industry. Strategic management failure was fingered as the main 
cause of lack of linkages in the economy and with foreign suppliers which slowed technology 
transfer and human capital up-skilling as reflected in the remark below: 
"And the issue of strategic management is lacking. And people lack an 
appreciation of what you mean when we say technology transfer. There are 
various ways and one of them like I was saying is patenting which is easy and 
free. But we are not making use of that. Then we were talking of some of those 
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other relationships where you have a parent company seconding people to come 
and work in Zimbabwe or the local guys can go and work outside the country 
on secondment. These guys have big suppliers like Aurobindo and they can 
send their staff on secondment, so that they can learn what's happening in the 
industry but this isn't happening". (Consultant, Pharmaceutical Industry, 2011) 
In the absence of national training institutions (Lall, 1992), fInns can engage in training activities. 
However, currently this is not happening in Zimbabwe, as the local companies are not taking 
advantage of linkages with their foreign suppliers to pick low hanging fruit in their technological 
effort. The challenges with skills are not only peculiar to the pharmaceutical companies; even the 
banks have their fair share of problems (see section 6.2.2). In terms of other local linkages, there is 
lack of coordination between universities, research organisations, and industry as illustrated in the 
quote below: 
"If you look at SIRDC [Scientific and Industrial Research and Development 
Centre], there are no linkages between what they are doing and policies and 
what private sector is doing. Private sector does not even utilise SIRDC. So 
what's the purpose of having them, in South Mrica they call them Science 
Research Councils. And even collaboration with the universities is not taking 
place" (Consultant, Pharmaceutical Consultant, 2011). 
The issue of human capital is therefore an inherent structural defect as it permeates all sectors of 
the economy. This was also brought out in the calibre of accounting and finance graduates from 
the local tertiary institutions. I sat in on a consultative meeting between universities, accounting 
professional bodies, industry finance experts and the local accounting and auditing board, where 
there was consensus that the quality of the local accounting and finance graduate was not fit for 
purpose for the requirements of industry. Many of them after qualifying in Zimbabwe have to sit 
for South African qualifying exams to be competent as accountants and fmance managers (P AAB 
meeting, 2011). The remark below exposes the calibre of accounting and fmancial skills: 
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"I will tell you I have seen fmancials and 1 laugh, and say are these audited 
fmancials, and these are the fmancials that your bank looks at? They don't 
know how to do fmancial analysis. Just basic things such as your 
comprehensive income, fmancial position and cashflow, you see things are not 
tallying. Such small things show you there is a problem". (Consultant 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 2011) 
This quote by a person who was not privy to the World Bank sponsored initiative to improve 
accounting and fmance skills mentioned above reveals how rampant the financial and accounting 
skills challenge is. This gives some insight into why the pharmaceutical companies may have 
difficulties in investment and project fmance capability (see section 5.5). The issue of skills, 
knowledge and learning reinforces the discussion in section 6.2.2. The country evidently lost "old-
timers" endowed with the know-how, know-what, know-whom and know-why (Ernst and 
Lundvall, 1997) essential for learning and innovation to occur. These skills affected both the 
financial institutions and the pharmaceutical fmance departments. 
In the next section 1 turn to the policy terrain related to incentives 
7.3 Incentives 
Lall (1992) argued that incentives constituting institutional functioning and government policies 
influence the development of productive capacities. He characterised the incentives as 
macroeconomic incentives, incentives from competition, and incentives from factor markets. In 
this section driven by data from the field, I focus on competition incentives and government policy 
as incentives or disincentives that affect the business and operating environment for ARV 
manufacturing and fmancing in Zimbabwe. 
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7.3.1 Competition incentives from local markets for ARV drugs 
Generic ARVs are highly commoditised products, and access to big markets and economies of 
scale are key competitive advantages (UNIDO, 201 Ob, 20 11 b). Local pharmaceutical companies 
need to increase their productive capacity and sell to a captive market, and this is where the 
challenge for the Zimbabwean ARV manufacturer starts, as illustrated in the remark below: 
"You will find that one of the biggest problems we have right now is 
capacity. Because having produced for Zimbabwe, the volumes are just too 
low, but if you are going to produce for WHO pre-qualification projects and 
PEPF AR you will have huge volumes. Right now we don't have the 
capacity to handle that, [that is] the equipment, because we are producing at 
a small scale. Our productive capacity is limited because we did not have 
the capacity to finance manufacturing capability, so obviously our 
productive capacity is limited to the size of our plants. So when it comes to 
those serious tenders you need capacity because they need high volumes and 
so people need to increase their capacity". (Consultant, Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 2011). 
The quote above brings to the surface the challenge of capacity that the local pharmaceutical industry 
faces in trying to fulfil local and international tenders. Local competition does not exist for them but 
they face stiff competition on local tenders from Indian pharmaceutical companies, some of whom 
have set up agencies in Zimbabwe (Marketing Manager, 2011). The local market is small, and as 
mentioned earlier, government support for public health ARV drug procurement is low (see Fig 27; 
Table 38). 
To compound the issue of capacity, local manufacture of ARVs had stopped for some time during the 
hyperinflationary era as reflected in the following remark: 
"Looking at just ARVs specifically, we haven't been doing much on 
production until mid-last year [2010] when we started supplying the National 
Aids Council (NAC). I think it was because of the economic situation, but 
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when we started to supply, when we got tenders for ARVs that's when we 
started manufacturing ARVs on a higher capacity. We had been 
manufacturing but at a very small capacity" . (Procurement Manager, 20 I 1). 
Th is quote brings out the importance of loca l public health procurement as an 
incentive to manufacture especially when public health resources are limited. [t also 
explains why the company did not make much progress to the second line treatment 
ARVs. When they started manufacturing, they had to fight with international 
supp liers who had establi shed linkages with donor funded procurement agencies, and 
government support was essential for the loca l company. As mentioned earl ier 
government promised to procure 75% of all ARVs manufactured locally, however 
during the econom ic downturn, thi s promise cou ld not be fulfilled. Table 40 below 
shows the proportiona l support of patients on antiretrovira l treatment in Zimbabwe by 
different funders. The government currently on ly supports 24% of all ART patients 
and thus public health procurement use as an industrial po licy tool can only be 
effected with these resources and on ly on first line treatment ARVs as other regimens 
are not locally being produced. 
Table 40: Proportion of patients on antiretroviral treatment (ART) funded by different 
players in Zimbabwe 
Institution Support For Patients on ART 
Global Fund To Fight TB AIDS and Malaria 35% 
US Government 18% 
Extended Support Programme Led By DFID 22% 
National Aids Council (AIDS Levy) 24% 
Source: National Aids Counci l 20 I 0 Financial Statements 
The HIV/AIDS commodity supply chain diagram (Fig 26) reveals the multiplicity of actors involved in 
the supply of ARVs and other HIY/AIDS related commodities to the Zimbabwean market. Public 
funding for Malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS is limited as reflected by a budgetary allocation of only USD 2 
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million (2010/11) for ARV procurement when the country has an estimated 640 000 people who need 
antiretroviral treatment, which even at the lowest cost of USD 10 per month translates to a monthly 
requirement ofUSD 6.4 million. 
Donor driven programmes mainly procure their medicines outside Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe the 
principal purchaser of antiretroviral drugs for Global Fund is UNDP, which purchases drugs through 
their pooled procurement base in Amsterdam. This effectively removes public purchase of medicines 
as an industrial policy tool. In such an environment, the market is unreachable for local pharmaceutical 
manufacturers unless there is purposive support for local manufacturing industry as was done under the 
Extended Support Programme that saw local manufacturers like CAPS and Varichem participating in 
the supply of medicines to the local health system (Table 41). This unprecedented move by the 
Extended Support Programme which was an EU and DFID funded project contracted local companies 
to manufacture drugs for the public health system. This move shows that donor driven programmes 
can be used to support local industry and work as an industrial policy tool. Table 41 shows that two 
local companies; CAPS and Varichem were contracted to supply over USD 4 million worth of drugs to 
the programme. The contract value shows the values of drugs that were supposed to be delivered and 
value delivered shows what the companies actually delivered by the time the report was compiled. 
This raises a question of why African governments cannot compel the donor community to purchase 
locally manufactured pharmaceutical products? As Mackintosh (Personal Communication, 2012) 
argues no one is forcing the governments not to do that. The South African government insists on local 
supplies and where foreign companies win tenders they have to go into an agency arrangement with a 
local South African pharmaceutical company, as was the case when a local company won a tender to 
supply ARVs to the South African public health system (Marketing Manager, 2011). The South 
African government does not insist on WHO-prequalification; however one can always argue that 
South Africa has a stronger bargaining power with donors because it has significant local resources 
(ibid). 
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Figure 26: HIV/AIDS commodity supply chains (2008) showing the prominent involvement of the donor community in the supply chain. 
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Table 41: Donor support to local industry through contracting for local health supplies. 
Contracts for drug supply by some pharmaceutical manufacturing importing companies 
Supp lier Contract Value : Euro Value Delivered' Euro % Completion of Supply 
Varichem Lot 2 1, 788800 , 1,522,404 85 .11 
Varichem Lot 4 198,500 198,500 100 
CAPS Lot 1 2,289,784 961,139 41 .98 
I""" PCD Lot 2 433,967 433,967 100 
PCD Lot 3 570,235 570,235 100 
r-PCD Lot 4 198,500 198,500 100 
GHC 1,585,464 1,585,379 99 .99 
Mission Pharma Lot 1 986,615 981,044 99.44 
M ission Pharma Lot 5 63,000 63,000 100 
SJV 253,280 253,280 100 
-Total 8,368,145 6,767,488 80.87 
Source: EU,2010. 
7.3.2 International competition 
In terms of international competition, Zimbabwean exports of ARVs into South Africa face non-tari ff 
barriers instituted by the South African government under the guise of fi ghting counterfe it drugs 
(Marketing Manager, 2011). Exports of pharmaceutical products into South Afr ica must be airfreighted 
through Oliver Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg, as legislated by the South African 
government (ibid). Thi s forces all exporters of pharmaceutical s to use expensive airfreight; a non-tari ff 
barrier South Africa has imposed on regional competitors (ibid). South Afri ca argues as mentioned 
earlier for a single entry point for medical drugs to fi ght counterfeits however, the consequence of the 
strategy loads additional transport costs making imports less competitive compared to South African 
manufactures (ibid). A development economist commented on the issue of non-tari ff barriers and argued 
that Zimbabwe could reciprocate and bar unwanted products using quality standards as the cri teri a for 
protecting local industry: 
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"There is the issue of WTO that you raised, the issues of technical barriers to trade; there 
is nothing that can preclude Zimbabwe from utilising the issues of standards to block 
unwanted goods coming in, because we don't want to be a dumping ground." 
(Development Economist, Government Think Tank, May 2011) 
Whether these strategies will be implemented to support growth oflocal ARV manufacture remains to be 
seen. However, the fact that local companies face stiff international competition is reflected in the 
perception held by local bankers. An Executive Director with an international bank that had tried to 
finance local pharmaceutical manufacture in conjunction with a Germany Bank brought out the challenge 
of capability and international competitiveness for the local pharmaceutical manufacturing industry in the 
following remark: 
"We had one Germany bank at one point coming to us and wanting to finance the 
manufacturing sector. The pharmaceuticals would also have been a portion of 
manufacturing, and their major problem was the ability of the local manufacturers here 
to stand against global competitors. Do they have the ability and capability to do so? 
But their assessment last year [2010] was that we are not ready yet to stand to 
international competition and they gave us time and said later we will see what we can 
do." (Executive Director, International Bank C, 2011). 
Efforts to export into the region leveraging the WHO-prequalification status were frustrating for almost a 
year (Procurement Manager, 2011). The manager lamented the cost implications of having an expensive 
(WHO-prequalified) plant to run that depended on local sales yet was designed for international sales as 
reflected in the quote below: 
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"Unfortunately the challenge that we have is that we have got this pre-qualified plant 
which is expensive to maintain, and the maintenance of the plant is being met by local 
sales." (Marketing Manager, 2011). 
The company reported that international tenders are cut throat business based on prices and as a result, 
they had gone for a year after WHO-prequalification without winning a tender (ibid). This raised the 
question of whether WHO-prequalification is necessary for African pharmaceutical manufacturers (ibid). 
Some pharmaceutical players are now calling for strengthening of local regulatory authorities instead on 
increasing certifications by imposing WHO-prequalification on the local companies (ibid). As discussed 
earlier, because generic ARVs are a commodity product, investments in alternative infrastructure and 
high manufacturing costs militate against local production especially when they compete with finished 
imports of ARVs. 
In the next section, I tum to industrial and development policy incentives. 
7.3.3 Industrial and development policy incentives 
A Zimbabwean development economist, argued for industrial policy in Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector 
and remarked; 
"If nothing is done in Zimbabwe to safeguard and promote manufacturing then 
Zimbabwe will become a nation of traders" (Executive Secretary, Economic Think 
Tank, August, 2011). 
This was a very revealing statement considering Zimbabwe was hailed as the next industrialising country 
in the 1990s (Phimister, 2000; Stoneman, 1990). 
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Challenges to phannaceutical manufacturing are myriad for an industry producing a commoditised 
product that can be imported faster and cheaper than the local industry can manufacture it (Marketing 
Director, 201 1). The local manufacturer has to contend with direct costs, indirect costs and invisible costs 
as well as policy, practice, and business environmental factors (ibid) (see chapter 5). Industrial policy 
was the key issue raised by the pharmaceutical players as an area that government should use to push for 
industrialisation as illustrated in the remark below: 
"Right now companies like Ranbaxy have no intention of producing here, this is a 
destination of finished products. It is only in South Africa where Ranbaxy and CIPLA 
have now started doing deals. Here there is no reason for them to do that because the 
industrial policy and all the other policies don't support that [manufacturing]." 
(Consultant, Phannaceutical Industry, 2011). 
Zimbabwe had no clearly enunciated and publicised industrial policy from 1980 until 2010. Industrial 
policies were embedded in national development policies (Director, Policy Studies, 2011). To their 
credit, the Zimbabwean Ministry of Industry and Trade in the 2010 Industrial Development Policy, 
identified phannaceuticals as one of the key industries that can quickly tum around and contribute to 
economic growth (ZIDP, 2010). The policy was however criticised by some industrialists for setting 
unrealistic targets, such as establishing an Industrial Development Bank (Executive Secretary, Economic 
Think-tank, 2011). On the way forward, there was unanimity in the need for protection of nascent 
industry in Zimbabwe to encourage development of the phannaceutical industry (Executive Secretary, 
Economic Think-tank, 2011; Managing Director 1,2011; Marketing Director, 2011). A pharmaceutical 
industry executive remarked as follows on the need for intervention and protection by government 
through policy: 
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"I think there needs to be a deliberate policy by government to say for the next 5 years 
we will give some; 1 know protectionism is a dirty word now, but we need to get some 
form of protection because of where we have come from. So that we can catch up with 
the rest of the world and compete with everybody." (Marketing Director, 2011). 
What is interesting in the quote above was attributing the "dirty word" status to industrial policy in 
developing countries, reflecting the non-interventionist approach from the liberalisation of economic 
structural adjustment era in the 1990s. A development economist was more direct in his approach and 
argued for protection for developing countries as illustrated below: 
"When it comes to issues of development and opening up of the economy you have to be 
very careful. You have to analyse the state of your own development and your 
economy, particularly your industry. You cannot just open up overnight, you end up 
being a market for others, a country of traders." (Executive Secretary, Economic Think 
Tank,2011). 
The challenge in protecting nascent industry in Zimbabwe is a fragmentation of policy and a silo 
approach to development (Managing Director 1,2011). Policies that should be coherent and augmenting 
often conflict because ministries have competing priorities and agendas (ibid). An example is policy 
conflict and fragmented approaches between the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of 
Health and Child Welfare as reflected in the remark below: 
"But you know every time that you go, you talk to different people. If you talk to the 
guys in Industry [Ministry of Industry and Trade] they will be sympathetic. But if you 
talk to the guys in Health [Ministry of Health and Child Welfare] they will tell you, look 
1 have a budget of a few millions and 1 have so many people with HIV I AIDS who would 
want HIV/AIDS drugs. So why should 1 buy from you when 1 am going to end up with 
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less dosages available for the population that I want to save?" (Managing Director 1, 
2011). 
The quote reveals that health policy is geared to procuring cheaper drugs for as many patients as possible 
in a resource-limited environment even if it means undermining the local pharmaceutical industry. 
Policy conflict is thus a major drawback for the pharmaceutical industry in Zimbabwe as further 
illustrated in the following remark by a pharmaceutical industry executive: 
"Yes it is [policy] an area of major weakness, and we have been trying to lobby [as the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers association] so that can be sorted out. One thing is that 
there is inherent conflict between industrial policy and health policy." (Managing 
Director 1, 2011). 
What exacerbates the policy conflict is lack of budgetary support for public health systems; especially 
public health drug procurement (ibid). This partly explains why public health procurement policy is 
driven mainly by price considerations and not supporting local pharmaceutical manufacturing capability 
as illustrated below: 
"The other major hindrance has been our national drug procurement system. It is solely 
driven by price. What that entails is you will find that a local company having invested 
so much into coming up with such a formulation you might not get the business." 
(Marketing Manager, 2011) 
Until such a time that resources for the health system are home-raised and accompanied by local 
procurement preference policies, then it seems impossible for public health drug procurement to be 
leveraged as an industrial policy tool to support local pharmaceutical manufacture of ARVs (ibid). This 
is in contrast to the promises by government that 75% of all ARV production would be bought by 
government for the public health system and 25% reserved for export when government resources were 
not limited (Osewe et al., 2008; UNIDO, 2011 b). 
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What emerges from this discussion is that there are few policy incentives for local manufacturing of 
drugs (except for the 10% local preference on tenders). One of the major challenges is policy conflict 
and a fragmented approach to supporting local pharmaceutical manufacture. This does not augur well 
for pharmaceutical companies as attractive credit candidates. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to address research question 5: What are the key business and operating 
environmental factors that influence financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? The focus was to 
elucidate some of the business and operating environmental factors that affect the perception and appetite 
of fmanciers to invest in local ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. I used Lall's (1992) technological 
capability framework, concentrating on the national technological capabilities to discuss issues around 
physical infrastructure, human capital, incentives, and policy terrain. It emerged that pharmaceutical 
companies are forced at firm level to compensate for national level capability failure by investing in 
alternative (complementary) infrastructure such as standby generators and boreholes. On human capital 
both pharmaceutical companies and banks face serious challenges because of the economic melt 
downturn that caused skills attrition. Banks they lost the "old-timers" and other financial institutions such 
as merchant banks, finance houses and discount houses that were critical for financial systems efficiency. 
Pharmaceutical companies lost experienced pharmacists, analytical chemists, and microbiologists; skills 
critical for product and process innovation. Pharmaceutical companies also failed to access offshore 
long-term loans, because of lack of project finance skills. Consequently, their capability to synthesise 
robust project finance proposals is compromised. The local accounting and audit board acknowledged the 
decline of accounting and finance skills. The implication for access to finance of lack of accounting and 
finance skills is enormous. On competition, the local ARV manufacturing company does not currently 
have local competitors but it is severely incapacitated because the promised off take of 75% of ARV 
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manufacture by government is not forthcoming because of limited public health resources. In terms of 
international competition, even with a WHO-prequalified status, the tendering process has not been as 
successful as initially intended because for a commodity type product like generics the competition is 
based on prices. In the region South Africa has imposed a non-tariff barrier by insisting that imports into 
the country come in by air. If the company needs to export into South Africa, it has to pair-up with a 
South African pharmaceutical company. Lastly, it emerged that there is policy conflict as different 
ministries have competing goals. The above situation demonstrated practice and policy gridlocks as 
national level technological capabilities force firm level compensatory intervention. All these factors 
when combined project a complex picture that makes it difficult for financiers or investors to look 
favourably at local ARV manufacture as the companies are paddling furiously in a bog. 
242 
Chapter 8: Analysis: What do we know now, and what does it mean? 
8.0 Introduction 
In chapter 1, I argued that financing of local pharmaceutical manufacture in Africa is the elephant in the 
room that debates on local drug manufacturing ignore or skirt over. I argued that it is not just about 
getting money, but there are technological capabilities and complexities surrounding access to finance by 
pharmaceutical companies. I also argued that at financial institutions there are capabilities and expertise 
involved in loan origination. I followed Lall (1992) who posited that technological capability 
improvements need efficient financial systems to gamer financial resources for physical investment. On 
this basis, finance, especially long-term finance is critical for technological capability upgrading and 
innovation take-off. However, very few African studies have focused on the link between finance and 
technological capability upgrading that fosters innovation take-off especially in African pharmaceutical 
manufacture. 
In chapter 2; the first portion of literature survey, I presented a brief background on African financial 
systems and pharmaceutical manufacturing, and discussed challenges to financing technological 
capability upgrading caused by relatively underdeveloped financial systems and over-reliance on FDI and 
foreign loans for industrial development. I discussed Zimbabwe's political economy, the rise of 
manufacturing, financial systems, financing of enterprises, local pharmaceutical manufacturing, and the 
story of ARV manufacture. In chapter 3; the second portion of literature survey, I built the theoretical 
framework for the study, using economic, social, and financial history literature to understand sources of 
finance for industry historically. This set of literature revealed that internal finance was used to set up 
enterprises, and banks were the most prevalent source of external finance for growth in addition to 
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retained earnings. I discussed the pecking order theory to explain how companies choose external sources 
of finance, when internal funds are limited. I also discussed trade credit as a key source of external in-
kind short-term finance from goods suppliers. To explain what banks do and how they do it, I used 
contemporary banking and financial intermediation theory. The final strand of literature I used from 
innovation studies was Lall's (1992) technological capability framework. This eclectic collection of 
literature reflects the complexity of this study which sits at the interface of finance and innovation, 
focusing specifically on external finance from banks and firm level technological capability upgrading 
that fosters innovation take-off. I argued that using a finance lens within an innovation (technological 
capability upgrading) framework could better unravel the complexities surrounding financing of ARY 
manufacture in Zimbabwe. 
In chapter 4, I discussed the methodology; how I designed the study, collected data, and analysed the 
data. I also discussed why I decided to use the case study and multiple methods to collect data, and how I 
leveraged my knowledge of Zimbabwe, the banking sector and the manufacturing sector to gain access to 
the pharmaceutical and banking sector. In chapter 5, I presented empirical evidence from pharmaceutical 
companies' perspective on financing ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. I addressed research questions 1,2 
and 3, which sought to unravel sources of fmance for capital investment and working capital finance for 
ARV manufacture and the technological capabilities at pharmaceutical companies critical for accessing 
finance for technological capability upgrading and innovation. In chapter 6, I presented empirical 
evidence from the banks' perspective addressing research questions 1, 2, 3 and 4, which specifically 
sought to unearth the capabilities and expertise involved in loan origination and the politics of lending as 
an additional explanation for African financial institutions' low lending rates, high interest charges, and 
high interest spreads. In chapter 7, I presented empirical evidence addressing research question 5. I 
discussed how failure of national level technological capabilities covering capabilities, incentives, and 
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human capital influenced the business and operating environment that determine financiers' perception 
and appetite for local pharmaceutical manufacture risk. 
In this chapter, I consolidate the in-situ analyses in chapters 5, 6 and 7. I answer the why questions on the 
empirical findings to bring light to what we know now about the technological capabilities and 
complexities surrounding financing of local pharmaceutical manufacture and what it means for local drug 
production. I also discuss what is new that this study contributes to knowledge. Finally, I discuss the 
implications for technological capability and innovation take-off for pharmaceutical companies in 
Zimbabwe and African local pharmaceutical manufacturing. 
8.1 Unravelling Complexities Surrounding Financing of ARV Manufacture 
This study on financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe is pioneering work at the interface of finance 
and innovation, focusing on complexities and technological capabilities surrounding financing of ARV 
manufacture in Zimbabwe. The work provides new empirical data on the link between finance and the 
slow technological capability upgrading in local manufacture of ARVs in Zimbabwe. The purpose is to 
broaden debates on African local pharmaceutical manufacture and innovation take-off. The focus is on 
current sources of finance for working capital and capital investment and possible future sources of 
finance for the pharmaceutical industry in Zimbabwe. In addition to shedding light on sources of finance 
for working capital and capital investment finance, the study contributes empirical data on the politics of 
lending thesis, offering additional explanations to moral hazard and adverse selection on why 
Zimbabwean banks lend so little at high interest rates and high interest spreads. The last contribution 
pertains to policy and practice gridlocks that complicate business and operating environments that affect 
ARV manufacture and consequently their financing. I arranged the analytical chapter as follows (see 
245 
Table 42): In section 8.2, I analyse capital investment financing for acquisition of machinery and 
equipment (the hardware of technology) in an integrated manner looking at sources and cost of finance. I 
also explore why long term finance is scarce in Zimbabwe. In section 8.3, I analyse working capital 
finance in the same integrated manner. 
In section 8.4, I discuss the politics of lending and propose it as an additional explanation to Zimbabwe's 
low bank lending to enterprises and why there are high interest rates, and high interest spreads. I propose 
the politics of lending as an additional explanation to the traditional adverse selection and moral hazard 
theses. In section 8.5, I analyse project finance capability at pharmaceutical companies critical for 
accessing long-term finance to import plant, equipment, and machinery from regional banks. I also 
analyse the expertise and skills at banks required for loan origination and map them to Lall's (1992) firm 
level technological capabilities that were originally proposed for the productive firm. In section 8.6, I 
focus on policy and practice gridlocks and in section 8.7 I discuss the implications for technological 
capability upgrading and innovation take-off and conclude the chapter with section 8.8. 
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Table 42: Setup of the analytical chapter, research questions addressed, areas of analysis and chapters from which empirical data is 
drawn. 
How is local manufacture of 
ARVs in Zimbabwe fmanced? 
1. How is capital investment and working capital 
requirements for ARV research and development, and 
manufacture financed? 
2. As the most prevalent source of external finance for 
enterprises, what role did commercial banks play in 
financing ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
8.2 Capital Investment Financing and 
8.3 Working Capital Financing: 
The role played by Commercial Banks 
integrated in both 8.2 and 8.3 
3. At firm level, what technological capabilities are reqUiredl 8.5 Firm level Technologica l 
for pharmaceutical companies to apply (access??) for Capabilities Surrounding Financing of 
finance and for banks to assess and advance loans? local Pharmaceutical Manufacture . 
4. What institutional factors drive bank strategy on revenue 
streams, lending, who to lend to and at what price? 
5. What are the key business and operating environmental 
factors that influence financing of ARV manufacture in 
Zimbabwe? 
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8.4 The Politics of lendi ng. 
8.6 Policy and Practice Gridlocks 
Chapters 5 and 6 
Chapters 5 and 6 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
Chapter 6 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
8.2 Capital Investment for ARV Manufacturing in Zimbabwe 
Companies saved foreign currency earnings from donor-funded tenders, sometimes over periods as 
long as three years, to purchase production machinery and equipment from Indian and Chinese 
suppliers (see chapter 5). Analytical equipment was procured from Japan and Germany suppliers 
(Managing Director I, 2011). Thus, pharmaceutical companies relied on internally generated funds 
for capital investment as banks played no role in capital investment financing for ARV and other 
drug manufacturing operations (see chapter 5 and 6). 
The use of internal finance for capital investment by pharmaceutical companies is a perverse fit 
with the pecking order theory. As discussed in section 3.4, companies prefer to use internal finance 
first, and in the event that internal funds are limited; the first choice of external finance is debt-
finance followed by hybrid bonds with the last resort being equity finance (Myers, 1984; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). The perverse fit with theory for the pharmaceutical companies is driven by 
scarcity of long-term finance; whether debt-finance from banks, hybrid bonds or equity finance in 
Zimbabwe. This brings to the fore the earlier argument in section 3.6 that Lall (1992) omitted 
project finance capability when he in a sense assumed the existence of efficient financial systems 
for garnering financial resources for physical investment. Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies 
however, used internal finance for capital investment because of an inefficient financial system and 
an inability to garner external financial resources for physical investment locally. The financial 
system inefficiency could, however, be argued to have been exacerbated by the unstable 
macroeconomic environment that persisted over the last decade. What is indisputable though is 
that even though Zimbabwe was reported to have a developed financial system, it did not 
historically finance industrial development (see chapter 2). Industrial development was funded by 
FDI and foreign loans when British and South African multinational corporates set up operations in 
Zimbabwe (see chapter 2). Enterprise growth was financed by locked up capital due to the 
sanctions and capital and foreign currency controls instituted by the government post the 1965 
unilateral declaration of independence according to Bond's (1993, 2000) capital lock-up thesis. 
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There is a critical dichotomy in capital for industrial development that was identified by Dailami 
and Walton (1989). This dichotomy exposes the shortcomings in current arguments for why banks 
are not lending long tenn. As discussed in chapters 6 and 7, some banking executives argue that 
they do not lend long term because they do not have savings. Consequently, some bankers are 
calling for national savings in the magnitude of 25% of GDP to fmance industrial development. 
Dailami and Walton (1989) complemented the Zimbabwean fmancial system for having elevated 
levels of domestic savings. The African Development Bank (AfDB, 1998) also confmned the 
vibrancy of the Zimbabwean commercial banks and merchant banks in raising domestic resources, 
and competing in the short and long-tenn arena (see section 2.6 and 2.7). Dailami and Walton 
(1989) however, argued that it was not the domestic savings that limited financing of industrial 
development, but lack of foreign currency to import plant, equipment and machinery (ibid). This 
raises a critical issue that many African countries face; access to foreign currency long-tenn loans 
to import technology. Domestic savings are important; however, for importation of capital 
equipment, foreign currency is required which leads to the need for the country to generate foreign 
currency. This situation persists today and even though Zimbabwe is using a basket of foreign 
currencies, the country still needs to export, and earn foreign currency to enable importation of 
technology. Even where financial institutions can structure offshore finance loans for local 
companies, they still need foreign currency to repay the loans. The argument of lack of savings to 
finance long-term industrial requirements only stands for local needs; however, when it comes to 
importation of plant, equipment, and machinery foreign currency savings are more critical than 
domestic savings. This is caused by the required technology (equipment and machinery) not being 
fabricated locally with the only sources of the equipment and machinery being outside the country. 
If local fabricators and toolmakers could reverse engineer or manufacture under license 
manufacturing and analytical machinery and equipment, then reliance on foreign currency for 
technology imports could be reduced. 
For as long as the pharmaceutical companies need to import plant, equipment, and machinery; 
project fmance capability is a critical requirement for technological capability upgrading. It 
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assumes even greater importance when pharmaceutical companies have to rely on regional banks 
that possess little local knowledge. Zimbabwe's support for long-term foreign currency loans 
currently is from the African regional banks, Afreximbank, PTA Bank and possibly the African 
Development Bank. The Afreximbank-Government of Zimbabwe ZETRAF facility (see chapter 6) 
is an institutional arrangement innovation that provides a window into understanding possible 
sources and forms of industrial development fInance for Zimbabwe and African in general, where 
local foreign currency savings are limited. The institutional arrangement innovation leverages 
resources from wealthier geographies as African regional and development banks with good credit 
ratings borrow from for example, the Eurobond market and on-lend funds through local 
commercial banks for industrial recapitalisation (ibid). The African regional fInancial institutions 
shoulder the "Africa risk" by taking on foreign currency risk, country risk, political risk and credit 
risk amongst other risks (ibid). 
Zimbabwe's fInancial system does not currently have the foreign currency resources to fInance 
capital investment through debt fInance, bonds or hybrid bonds even equity fmance (see chapter 6 
and 7). This presents key challenges to financing technological capability upgrading through 
importation of plant, equipment, and machinery. Thus, the calls for increasing local savings by 
banking executives and policy makers are legitimate; however, there is a need to realise that local 
savings will only support local long-term requirements. Where the pharmaceutical sector needs to 
import plant, equipment, and machinery, they need long-term foreign currency loans. The local 
fInancial system is unable to provide these long-term foreign currency resources. A possible 
window of opportunity has been availed by an institutional arrangement innovation. Afreximbank 
in partnership with the Ministry of Finance has provided the 'patient capital' for industrial 
recapitalisation. This window of opportunity and also if the pharmaceutical companies need to 
deal directly with offshore financiers, makes project finance capability key for technological 
capability upgrading and innovation take-off. 
I now turn to short term fInancing of day-to-day operations. 
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8.3 Working Capital Finance for ARV Manufacturing in Zimbabwe 
Working capital requirements for ARV manufacture were fmanced by bank fmance and internal 
fmance. The cost of bank fmance was very high; on average interest rates range from 16% to 30% 
per annum for industry although one company is paying between 14 and 18% (see section 6.3). 
The banks charge high interest rates, whilst they pay no interest for deposits, save for a few 
companies that negotiate for deposit interest rates. This explains the high interest spreads observed 
in African fmancial institutions lending to enterprises. The banks win both ways; they pay little 
deposit interest and charge high lending interest rates. In addition, banks short-date lending 
facilities and collect management fees more frequently on renewal of the credit facility (see section 
6.3). Pharmaceutical companies, wherever possible, would rather use internal funds for working 
capital to minimise expensive bank charges and onerous security requirements. 
These fmdings confonn to other African bank lending to enterprises studies which show that 
generally commercial banks are dominant, prefer to lend short tenn fmance, charge high interest 
rates, and enjoy huge interest spreads (Andrianova et al" 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Allen et aI., 2011; 
Beck and Hesse, 2009; Beck et aI., 2009, 2011; Mugizi et aI., 2009; Nissanke, 2001). The 
phenomenon is also not new to Zimbabwe as the study confirms Chigumira and Masiyandima's 
(2003) fmdings. The situation though has become acute on the back of low savings mobilisation 
and banks preferring transactional banking to traditional lending (see section 6.5.2). Carmody 
(1998) argued that financial liberalisation in Zimbabwe resulted in tight credit policy, higher 
interest rates, devaluation, and higher inflation. These findings are reflected in my study as 
persisting to date with a negative effect on access to fmance, investment strategies, and productive 
capacity expansion. 
Hyperinflation wiped away generations of savings, consequently dominant deposits are now of a 
short-tenn nature, and medium and long-term deposits are non-existent; at least since the advent of 
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hyperinflation. Consequently, in the current scenario characterised by macroeconomic and 
political instability and unpredictability, banks are holding hot deposits (transitory short-tenn 
deposits), and risk, liquidity and maturity transfonnation activities are problematic as banks juggle 
liquidity and lending (see section 6.5.2). This pushes up the cost of money or the deemed cost of 
money. Savers hold back from entrusting their savings to fmancial institutions and would rather 
transact on cash basis because of high bank charges (dis-intennediation) and risk of their money 
being locked up in the event of a policy change. The currency in circulation through fonnal 
financial institutions is estimated to be as low as one third with savers prefering to play it safe and 
keep their money (see chapter 6). 
Working capital financing by local fmancial institutions has historically not been as problematic as 
capital investment. However, the issue of foreign currency is also prevalent in working capital 
fmancing. This is especially so for phannaceutical manufacturing companies that import all their 
APIs, excipients and certain packaging material. The imported components require access to 
foreign currency, and with Zimbabwe's low import cover, foreign currency is a persistent 
challenge. In the past, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe allowed exporters to retain certain portions 
of their exports for own use, provided they used the foreign currency within a certain period (see 
chapter 5). However, this had its own bureaucracy problems. Domestic savings can cover 
financing of local requirements such as wages, utilities, and raw materials available locally; 
however, key drug ingredients such as APIs and excipients require foreign currency. In the current 
multi-currency regime, this issue has been temporarily masked, but it will eventually resurface if or 
when Zimbabwe reverts to a local currency. The fact that foreign currency is required for working 
capital and capital investments, inevitably leads to a fight for resources between the two fmancing 
requirements. Companies have to balance acquisition of equipment and machinery with day-to-day 
operations, with the inevitable consequence that there is no fmancial breathing space to effectively 
fund technological effort and innovation. An inability by the companies to leverage trade credit 
terms from suppliers makes the situation more acute. I now turn to lack of trade credit in the next 
section. 
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8.3.1 Trade credit: the missing link 
Trade credit is not available from API and excipient suppliers; key raw materials that constitute the 
bulk of manufacturing costs (70 to 80%) for ARV manufacture (see section 5.2.1). The companies 
fmance Indian and Chinese suppliers because they do not have bargaining power with suppliers as 
they purchase small quantities of APls and excipients. Financing Indian and Chinese suppliers by 
Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies is similar to a perverse subsidy discussed by Mackintosh 
(2009), where the developed world benefits from the developing world. By financing their 
suppliers and buyers, the resultant cashflow squeeze forces local pharmaceutical companies to 
resort to expensive bank fmance characterised by high interest rates, multiple management fees, 
drawdown fees per year and onerous security requirements (see chapter 5). Both legs of buyer 
fmance and supplier finance are a financial drain on the companies, contributing to higher 
manufacturing costs and ultimately uncompetitiveness of locally manufactured products. It has not 
always been like this in Zimbabwe. Enterprise fmance studies by Dailami and Walton (1989), 
Carmody (1998), Fafchamps et a/., (1995), Chigumira, and Masiyandima (2003) reveal that trade 
credit was a significant source of external in-kind fmance to enterprises. Macroeconomic and 
political instability; key environmental determinants of foreign currency risk, interest rate risk and 
country risk amongst others are acting as disincentives for technological capability upgrading. 
Trade credit, according to trade credit theory, is a critical source of funds for small to medium 
enterprises that do not have access to vast bank finance, but benefit from suppliers with access to 
bank fmance that in turn advance them credit in the form of goods (see section 3.2.4). Dearth of 
trade credit from API and excipient suppliers seems peculiar to Zimbabwe only, as East Africa 
pharmaceutical companies access and leverage trade credit from their suppliers (see chapter 5). If 
it is a transitory phase, no doubt the local pharmaceutical companies will leverage the return of 
trade credit in addition to the in-country bonded warehouse being pursued (see chapter 5). 
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In the next section, I turn to the politics of lending as an additional explanation for why 
Zimbabwean banks lend so little at high interest rates and huge interest spreads. 
8.4 The Politics of Lending 
Financial institutions' credit policies, underwriting standards, capital utilisation strategies and risk-
reward remuneration policies affect the availability of credit to the pharmaceutical industry (see 
chapter 6). Credit policies and underwriting standards which favour short-term working capital 
fmancing, and revenue strategies that prefer non-interest incomes to interest (risk) incomes affect 
access to credit for local pharmaceutical companies (see section 6.5). For banks, these policies at 
micro level caused the gradual de-emphasis of merchant banks and the rise to dominance of 
commercial banks; shrinking a critical development space for capital investment financing as the 
fmancial system became short-termist, preferring to fmance trade and commerce at the expense of 
capital investment. Building in the politics of lending; institutional policies and behaviour with 
respect to credit policies, underwriting standards and revenue stream strategies, one gets to 
understand why banks lend less and emphasise transactional banking (non-risk revenue stream) 
over traditional banking (risk income stream) (see section 6.5). 
The theory of financial intermediation (see section 3.5) proffered asymmetric information, 
brokerage services, qualitative asset transformation and risk, maturity and liquidity transformation 
as the key functions of fmancial intermediaries. In Zimbabwe, banks are holding hot deposits 
(transitory short-tennldemand deposits) that can be claimed at any time. Consequently, liquidity, 
maturity, and risk transformation assumes a higher risk profile. There is therefore reluctance by 
banks to engage in unrestricted qualitative asset transformation activities and lend generously to 
enterprises. The scarcity of local savings drives tight credit policies as banks worry about the 
liquidity of their operations. The focus is on preserving liquidity to safeguard against a run on the 
bank and reputational risk in the event all depositors claim their liquid deposits when the banks 
254 
have transfonned then into illiquid loans (see section 3.5). Some international banks take a 
tempered approach to lending while some local banks do back-to-back deals where they match the 
tenor a specific deposit (liability) to a specific loan (asset). By matching the maturity profiles, they 
minimise maturity and liquidity risk. However, this approach even when added to using a certain 
core balance of deposits by local banks, results in a form of credit rationing as the financial system 
is not functioning efficiently. International banks though (see chapter 6) are clearly steering away 
from lending, preferring transactional banking instead. 
Bank ownership seems to drive revenue strategy, especially for foreign-owned banks. Non-funded 
income is taking prominence over risk income (lending income) for international banks. They 
prefer that non-funded income from non-risk based activities cover operational costs. This 
promotes transactional-based banking activities and relegates lending business to a lower rank (see 
section 6.5). The bankers argue that lending activities, considering risk weight adjusted capital 
measures consumes capital, and are too risky in the current macroeconomic environment. The 
theoretical underpinnings for preference of transactional banking over traditional lending is driven 
by a preference for brokerage functions whilst shying away from qualitative asset transfonnation 
that involves risk, maturity and liquidity transformation (see section 3.5). This revenue model that 
favours transactional banking over direct lending, driven by institutional policy, is implicit credit 
rationing. It encourages managers to prefer transactional services to lending as performance 
appraisals and hence bonus and remuneration are linked to how they conform to policy. 
illtimately, these policies affect allocation of credit to pharmaceutical companies, which in most 
countries fall in the locally owned, small to medium enterprises spectrum and require heavily 
weighted lending products (overdrafts and loans). An institutional policy at a micro level rations 
credit via capital utilisation strategy and risk-reward metrics. This may be one of the explanations 
for Allen et aI's., (2011) fmdings, that average credit extended to the private sector in Africa was 
15% of GDP compared to 28 to 45% for other developing regions, in addition to the classical moral 
hazard and adverse selection explanations for low lending in Africa. 
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The second issue on politics of lending relates to borrower company ownership. Foreign owned 
banks are inclined to favourably consider subsidiaries of multinational companies (MNCs) 
compared to local companies. This is especially so for globally relationship managed subsidiaries 
of MNCS.26 Subsidiaries of multinational corporates, have greater chances to access credit 
compared to locally owned companies because of credit assessment tools setup in banks which give 
better credit rating grades to subsidiaries of MNCs with support from the parent company (see 
section 6.5). This assessment and analytical bias debilitates locally owned companies in 
competition for fInancial resources. The credit score or credit grade determines the premium 
charged on interest, consequently locally owned companies are likely to pay higher interest 
premiums, management fees, and transactional fees compared to subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations (see section 6.5). Considering that pharmaceutical companies in Zimbabwe are 
locally owned, credit policy might be a hurdle to access to financing. As discussed earlier, credit 
scoring is skewed in favour of foreign owned companies with a letter of comfort, letter of support 
or guarantee from the parent company (see section 6.5). Bankers argue that this covers settlement 
risk, country risk, currency risk and to a certain extent credit risk. Banks further argue that the 
parent company could easily second both technological and management expertise in the event the 
local subsidiary is threatened, and meet fmancial obligations to avert reputational risk. 
Long-term policy predictability considerations by banks are some of the major hurdles to the long-
term perspective required for long-term fmancing. The lack of macroeconomic and political 
stability and predictability backed by long-term policy announcement giving industry adequate 
time to plan, prepare, and execute strategies are challenges faced by industry in Zimbabwe. 
Combining macroeconomic and political instability with policy unpredictability in an environment 
exhibiting elevated country risk, and reputational risk, it becomes clear why there is hesitancy to 
lend long-term. 
Another fmancial institutional policy that affects access to fmance for local pharmaceutical 
companies is market segmentation (see section 6.4.1). Locally owned pharmaceutical companies 
26 Interviews held in Zimbabwe and practice as a banker with an International bank working in both 
corporate and retail banking units. 
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usually fall into the small to medium enterprises (SME) segment, and for a number of banks this 
sector is managed in retail banking divisions and not corporate banking units. This results in 
allocation of less experienced Relationship Managers and lower credit lines; an implicit credit 
ration approach. 
Preference for transactional banking over traditional lending, MNCs over local companies, and 
commission and fee incomes over risk income also offer an additional explanation to why African 
countries lend so little. The politics of lending thesis augments the moral hazard and adverse 
selection of why African banks lend so little at high interest rates and exhibiting high interest 
spreads (see for example Andrianova et aI" 2010, 20lla, 20llb; Allen et al., 2011; Beck and 
Hesse, 2009; Beck et al., 2009, 2011; Mugizi et al., 2009; Nissanke, 2001). This is one of the 
theoretical contributions of this thesis to knowledge. 
I now turn to technological capabilities and complexities surrounding fmancing of ARV 
manufacture in Zimbabwe. 
8.5 Technological Capabilities Surrounding Financing of Local 
Pharmaceutical Manufacture 
In this section, I analyse empirical fmdings from chapters 5, 6 and 7 that address research question 
3 where I sought to unravel the technological capabilities at pharmaceutical companies surrounding 
fmancing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. I also sought to understand the expertise and 
capabilities involved in loan origination at banks. These technological capabilities and expertise 
constitute some of the complexities surrounding fmancing of local drug production that I argued 
have been neglected in debates on Mrican local pharmaceutical manufacture. There are 
technological capabilities at pharmaceutical companies required to access financial resources and 
there is expertise and knowledge involved in loan origination at banks. In section 8.5.1, I focus on 
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technological capabilities at phannaceutical companies required to access fmancial resources for 
physical investment and day-to-day operations. In section 8.5.2, I turn to the expertise and 
capabilities required for loan origination at banks. 
8.5.1 Technological capabilities for accessing project fmance by pharmaceutical 
companies 
For the pharmaceutical sector, I focused on project fmance capability critical for accessing 
fmancial resources for physical investment. In section 3.6, I argued that Lall (1992) by indirectly 
assuming the existence of efficient fmancial systems omitted project fmance capability, which is 
required by the productive firm to access fmancial resources for technological capability upgrading 
and innovation. Project fmance capability as I argued in section 3.6, is the operative link between 
banks or other sources of fmance and firm level investment capability. Project fmance capability is 
important as it pervades all the technological capabilities of investment, productive and linkages, 
and it also relates to national level capabilities. Project finance capability is an on-going 
requirement for the productive firm and the services firm. All the other technological capabilities; 
investment, productive and linkages, require fmancial resources for their operation and 
improvement, making project finance capability a key issue for non-cash rich pharmaceutical 
companies in developing country contexts. 
Without access to foreign currency long-term loans, Zimbabwean pharmaceutical companies 
depended on internally generated funds to fmance capital investment. This is a very slow process 
as it depends on how long it takes to accrue savings to purchase a piece of equipment (see chapter 
5). They could not access offshore fmance because they lacked of project fmance capability (see 
chapters 5,6 and 7). Finance personnel and executive management need project finance capability 
and internal linkages with production, quality control, and research and development personnel to 
be able to develop a robust and fundable project finance proposal (see section 5.5). Addressing the 
project fmance capability deficiencies requires concerted effort by pharmaceutical companies and 
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national training institutions, and should not be viewed from a silo approach but a systems 
approach. At national level, the Public Accounting and Auditing Board acknowledged that fmance 
and accounting skills have declined in Zimbabwe (see section 5.5). This recognition at national 
level may imply that accounting and fmance skills challenges pervade the whole economy and 
hence my argument for a systems approach in redressing the accounting skills, fmance skills, and 
project fmance capability. Skills scarcity also affected research and development, and production 
functions, retarding technological effort and innovation (see chapters 5 and 7). 
Lack of project fmance capability hampers access to capital investment fmancing from offshore 
sources. Capital investment funding from own resources is not sustainable and does not build the 
critical mass to effect meaningful technological capability upgrading. This obviously has serious 
implications for technological capability upgrading and innovation for the pharmaceutical sector. 
Purchasing affordable, and not state of the art machinery and equipment, delays the build-up of 
efficiencies and economies of scale (see chapter 5). 
In addition to project finance capability, pharmaceutical companies failed to leverage linkage 
capabilities for technology transfer from Indian and Chinese suppliers through staff exchanges (see 
chapter 5). They are failing to exploit a cheap way to effect technology transfer. The second 
evidence of failure to use linkage capability is not trying out a local company AIDST for bio-
equivalence studies as it claims to be cheaper than Indian CROs. This has monetary consequences 
and also retards the deepening of local industry structure through backward linkages. The third 
evidence of lack of linkage capability is failure by pharmaceutical executives to establish 
professional and personal links with executives in the fmancial services sector; however, for the 
same reason, fmancial services executives have also failed in their linkage capabilities. Executives 
in the financial institutions openly acknowledged their lack of knowledge of the pharmaceutical 
sector. Exploitation of linkage capabilities by both sectors could reduce the current acute 
information asymmetry, and improve business and industry risk analysis during the loan 
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origination process at banks, and also improve project fmance capabilities at pharmaceutical 
companies. 
In order to access fmancial resources for physical investment, pharmaceutical companies need to 
upgrade their project fmance and linkage capabilities. Lall (1992) recommends fIrm level 
investment in training if national technological and training institutions are not producing the skills 
required. Pharmaceutical companies may therefore need to invest in training of their finance and 
other executives in project finance and project management. 
8.5.2 Capabilities and skills surrounding loan origination at banks 
In chapter I, I argued that it is not just about money but there are complexities and technological 
capabilities surrounding fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacture. I also argued that there 
has been a tendency to keep fmance literature separate from innovation literature, and consequently 
I positioned this study at the interface of fmance and innovation. I argue that Lall's (1992) 
technological capability framework could be mapped across to the services fIrm. In section 6.4 and 
Table 6.6, I proceeded to do this and demonstrated that Lall's (1992) firm level technological 
capability framework can be mapped across to a fmancial services organisation instead of 
confining the framework to the productive sectors only. This supports the argument that there are 
complexities and technological capabilities surrounding fmancing of local manufacture at the bank 
(see chapter 1). This is a contribution to knowledge that this study brings, by working at the 
interface of fmance and innovation. 
Skills in project fmance appraisal for long-term projects have diminished significantly in banks 
because of the de-emphasis of merchant banks, hyperinflation, and economic collapse, which 
caused skills flight (see section 7.2.2). There was loss of tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) that 
leverages transfer of knowledge between old timers and younger generations through social 
260 
interaction and apprenticeship (Lave and Wenger 1991). Thus the unintended consequence of the 
de-emphasis of merchant banking was a loss of skills and tacit knowledge; the know-why, know-
how, know-what and know-whom in project finance capability as commercial banks preferred to 
finance trade and commerce activities at the expense of capital investment. Some of the skills lost 
include the appreciation of the operation and application of lending technologies for financing 
technological capability upgrading in industry (see chapter 2 and 6). 
To reiterate the impact of loss of skills, bankers, from executive level to analysts admitted that they 
did not understand the pharmaceutical industry, especially ARV manufacture (see section 7.2.3). 
This poses a serious challenge for local financing of pharmaceuticals by local financiers both from 
a risk assessment perspective and from risk pricing (interest margin). Some of the senior banking 
executives were not even aware that ARVs have been manufactured in Zimbabwe since 2003. If 
they do not understand the industry, how then do they fairly price their risk? Industry knowledge; 
know-who, know-what and know-why (Ernst and Lundvall, 1997), project finance capability and 
linkage capability are key issues that need to be addressed by financial institutions. The risk, if 
they do not understand the industry, is they could classify everything as high risk and steer clear of 
financing the industry. 
I now turn to policy and practice gridlocks. The policy and practice grid locks discussed are 
different from the policy gridlocks discussed by for example Skolnikoff (1990), Peake (2002) or 
Feldman et al., (1994) which deal with the process of instituting policy through government. The 
perspective taken on gridlocks in this discussion is from an engineering point of view of traffic 
grid locks (Mugwagwa et al., 2013). Gridlocks thus occur due to policies opposing each other, or in 
other instances national policy failure causing a compensatory reaction at micro policy level. 
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8.6 Policy and Practice Gridlocks 
Research question 5 was concerned with the key business and operating factors that influenced 
financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe. I followed Lall's (1992) national level technological 
capabilities framework to discuss these factors under capabilities, and incentives (see chapter 7). 
Policy and practice grid locks emerge as failure at national technological capability level elicits a 
compensatory response at firm level, congesting the policy and practice space. In this section, I 
discuss some of the hindrances to funding ARV manufacturing emanating from policy conflict, 
policy misalignment and in some instance absence of an enabling policy framework. Gridlocks can 
be caused by policy and practice failures at national level, forcing firm level compensation. These 
dynamics affect the appetite of local and international financiers to fund local pharmaceutical 
manufacture in Africa. Table 43 shows the key policy and practice grid locks that affect the 
business and operating environment for pharmaceutical companies and banks in Zimbabwe. 
8.6.1 Politics of lending 
Financial institutions' credit policies, underwriting standards, capital utilisation strategies, and risk-
reward remuneration policies affect the availability of credit to the pharmaceutical industry through 
the politics of lending (see section 6.5). Credit policies and underwriting standards which prefer 
working capital finance over capital investment finance as well as a preference for transactional 
banking over traditional lending playa critical role in rationing credit to pharmaceutical companies. 
Bank policies at micro level gradually de-emphasised merchant banks and led to the over-
dominance of commercial banks and this shrunk a critical development space for capital 
investment through skills and lending technology losses (see chapters 6 and 7). 
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Table 43: Policy and practice grid locks faced by Zimbabwean pharmaceutical 
companies. 
I>nlcticc Gridlock Polic}' (;ridlock 
Politics of lending: Preference fo r transactional 
banking over traditional lending. Preference fo r 
commission and fee income over risk 
income.Preference fo r MN Cs over local companies. 
Technological capability : Limited skills in Proj ect 
Finance Capability and Linkages Capability 
hampering access to financial resources required to 
gamer financial resources fo r phsical investment that 
encourages technological capability upgrading. 
Phys ical Infrastructure : Intermittent supply o f 
electric ity and water forced pharmaceutical 
companies to invest in standby generators and 
boreholes which result in higher manufacturing costs. 
Markets for drugs: Loss ofpublic heahh 
procurement as an industrial development policy tool 
as public health funding is limited . South Africa 
insists on drugs being airfreighted into the country 
through 0 R Tambo International Airport. 
M icro level financial institutions' revenue and business 
mode l preference po licies work against industrial 
develo pment policy. 
N ational level po licies on training resulting in deficient 
products (finance and accounting skills) and firms have 
to invest their resources in further tra ining sta ff. Micro 
level training policy compensation fo r national leve l 
tra ining policy fa ilure. 
N ational level po licy fa ilure in provision of infrastructure 
(electricity and water) fo r industry is compensated fo r 
by micro level investment policy resulting in alternative 
investment in infrastructure sueh as standby generators 
and bo reholes. 
Heahh po licy prefers to procure more ARVs fro m 
outside the country because oflimited re ourccs. Thus 
health po licy conflicts with industrial development 
po licy. South Africa by insisting on airfre ighting of 
drugs is imposing a no n- tariff barrier on a rcgiona l 
member o f ADC. 
Source: Developed by author with input from pharmaceutical and banking executives, 20 II . 
Using the politics of lending lens and considering institutional policies and behaviours with respect 
to credit policies, underwriting standards and revenue stream strategies, it becomes apparent why 
banks hold back from lending and emphasise transactional banking (non-risk revenue stream) over 
traditional banking (risk income stream). The implication of the politics of lending is an implicit 
credit rationing as banks prefer to be active only in the brokerage and transactional services and 
reducing qualitative asset transformation that involves liquidity, maturity and risk transformation. 
The local pharmaceutical companies, classified as SMEs, fall into a non-priority sector for the well-
endowed fore ign banks, and firm level underwriting policies implic itly rations credit to the sector 
(see section 6.5). The dearth of trade credit makes the business and operating environment fo r 
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financing ARV manufacture very challenging and can dissuade investors from supporting 
investment in pharmaceutical manufacture. 
8.6.2 Technological capabilities 
Lack of project finance capability hampers access to financial resources for capital investment (see 
chapters 5 and 6). This key technological capability points to failure of national training 
institutions to produce graduates with the requisite accounting and financial skills. To remedy the 
situation, firms have to invest in training. Thus failure at national policy and practice levels is 
being mitigated at firm level policy and practice arenas. Project finance capabilities are also a 
challenge in the financial sector, which prefers financing trade and commerce as opposed to long 
term industrial finance. The gridlock comes from all the players congesting the financing of trade 
and commerce (short-term financing) and no players interested in financing industrial development. 
The second practice gridlock comes from bankers and pharmaceutical executives not getting out of 
their offices to establish key linkages in the economy that would result in the reduction of 
information asymmetry. This is a practice gridlock caused by a non-aggressive approach to 
financing local pharmaceutical manufacture. For as long as the executives in the pharmaceutical 
companies and banks do not aggressively establish linkages in the economy and outside the country 
for access toforeign currency resources for physical investment, then their lethargy is a practice 
gridlock that negatively impacts technological effort and technological capability upgrading. 
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8.6.3 Physical infrastructure 
Physical infrastructure provision failure through intermittent supply of electricity and water 
increases cost of manufacturing. Companies are forced to divert scarce fmancial resources for 
capital investment by investing in alternative infrastructure (see section 7.2.1). The cost increases 
come from fuel and maintenance costs for the alternative infrastructure. A failure at macro policy 
and practice levels on energy and utilities, elicits a firm level (micro policy) investment in 
alternative infrastructure such as generators and boreholes. This builds inefficiencies and 
unnecessary costs for local industry and ultimately leads to failure to compete effectively on 
tenders. This business and operating environment works against the local pharmaceutical company 
in business and industry risk analysis, especially on infrastructural input costs and stability. These 
practice and policy gridlocks work against local manufacturing of ARVs in Zimbabwe. 
8.6.4 Markets for ARV drugs 
Markets for ARVs are critical as they represent the demand side of the fmancing equation. When 
the compulsory license was granted, the company was guaranteed 75% uptake by government for 
the public health sector (see chapter 2). When the country went through the economic twmoil, this 
guarantee could not be fulfilled and resultantly ART (antiretroviral treatment) depends on donor 
financing with local resources spend on ART accounting for only 24%. The donor funded 
programmes are not obliged to procure their ARVs locally. In most cases they procure through 
their in-house procurement vehicles from mainly India (see chapters 5 and 7). As argued in chapter 
5, the loss of public procurement as an industrial policy tool had serious consequences on 
technological effort and as a result, the industry lagged behind as it is generally manufacturing fIrst 
line treatment drugs and has not moved to recent second line ARVs which command more returns 
and are in demand by global health funded programmes. 
265 
Policy conflict is also affecting technological effort. Health policy is price driven and prefers to 
put as many people as possible on ART. As a result they purchase the cheapest drugs on the 
market. This conflicts with industrial development policy. What causes the high cost of 
manufacturing are the fmance policies that detennine customs and duty rates, and taxes as well as 
investment in alternative infrastructure due to infrastructural failure. It appears the policy 
framework is uncoordinated, conflicts and results in a practice and policy gridlock that works 
against technological capability upgrading. 
Physical infrastructure failure, lack of supporting strategies for local production, low fmancial 
deepening and policy conflict and misalignment have contributed to the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing sector struggling to access fmancial resources for physical investment (see section 
7.3.3). In terms of business and operating environments, the lack of a coordinated approach to 
national technological capabilities of institutions and incentives have resulted in local 
manufacturing being a very costly business through policy and practice gridlocks. 
8.7 Implications for Technological Capability Upgrading and Innovation 
This study revealed that fmancial resources for importing plant, equipment and machinery are not 
available. Historically the country depended on FDI and foreign loans. In the current scenario 
where FDI has dried up and foreign loans are not available from international banks, industry has 
been left in a lurch and has to depend on internal funds for capital investment. As discussed in 
chapter 5, cost of machinery and equipment determines what they buy as they battle to balance 
working capital requirements and capital investment. Consequently they do not purchase state of 
the art but cheap machinery, according to the magnitude of their savings. Lall (1992) posited that 
efficient fmancial systems to garner fmancial resources for physical investment are critical for 
building technological capabilities. However, as demonstrated in this study, the fmancial systems 
are not efficient and the requisite fmancial resources for capital investment are not available. 
Technological effort is hampered by lack of the research and development equipment, and in 
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production local reverse engineering is not available. The absence of the equipment retards 
product and process engineering efforts. 
The use of savings, as argued earlier, is a slow process to import technology and it also starves 
operations of working capital fmance and sends the sector into a vicious cycle of basic survival, 
putting innovation and technological capability upgrading on the back burner. The pharmaceutical 
companies cannot build economies of scale if they are constantly in a survival mode and juggling 
allocation of resources between working capital and capital investment as they do not have access 
to patient capital. The lack of project fmance capability forces the company to resort to using 
internal finance when they could access fmancial resources offshore. 
The politics of lending exacerbates the situation as banks prefer non-lending activities to lending, 
and charge high interest for loans. This makes working capital fmance expensive for the 
pharmaceutical company, further increasing manufacturing costs. In the event that there is a 
reversion to local currency, since the companies import all APls and excipients, they will be 
exposed to foreign currency risk. Working capital finance is a challenge for the companies as they 
are unable to access trade credit, a cheap source of external in-kind finance. This further squeezes 
the company's cashflows and reduces allocation of resources to technological capability upgrading 
and innovation activities. 
Lack of linkages with a local research organisation for bio-equivalence tests as discussed in chapter 
5 reduces the chance of deepening local industry through backward linkages, which can be 
beneficial in building local capabilities. Lack of linkages between pharmaceutical and banking 
executives has resulted in high information asymmetry between the two sectors. This has resulted 
in the pharmaceutical sector not accessing information on external source of financial resources for 
physical investment and knowledge exchange with their financiers to improve on project fmance 
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capabilities. This lack of knowledge exchange retarded technological capability upgrading and 
innovation. 
8.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to analyse the empirical fmdings in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In addressing 
research question 1 on sources of capital for capital investment and research question 2 on the role 
played by banks, it emerged that capital investment for ARV manufacturing was funded by internal 
fmance, not because the pharmaceutical companies are cash rich but because they could not access 
external sources of finance. Use of internal finance for capital investment was a perverse fit with 
the pecking order theory. The commercial banks did not playa role in capital investment, and have 
not done so historically in Zimbabwe as FDI and foreign loans from British and South African 
MNCs were used to establish industry in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean fmancial system, however 
was active in domestic currency long term lending, as argued by Dailami and Walton (1989), but 
what was lacking was foreign currency to import technology. This situation persists to date. 
Working capital fmance was provided by banks and through internal flnance. Commercial banks 
played a role in working capital fmance. However, consistent with Zimbabwean and African 
fmance literature, they charge high interest rates, enjoy huge interest spreads and do not lend much 
to local enterprises. The politics of lending provided an additional explanation to adverse selection 
and moral hazard arguments on why banks lend so little at high interest rates. The politics of 
lending thesis addressed research question 4. 
I unravelled the technological capabilities and complexities surrounding manufacture of ARVs in 
Zimbabwe. Project fmance and linkage capabilities are critical requirements that the 
pharmaceutical companies require to access fmancial resources for physical investment. At banks, 
expertise and knowledge required for long-term flnance have been affected by the demise of the 
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merchant banks and loss of old-timers. Using Lall's (1992) national level technological capability 
framework, I discussed how policy and practice gridlocks emanate from national level 
technological capability failure that elicits a compensatory fInn level response. I lastly discussed 
the implications for technological capability and innovation for the pharmaceutical sector. The 
current trajectory of using savings for capital investment does not promote rapid technological 
capability upgrading and innovation. There is a tussle for fInancial resources between working 
capital requirements and capital investments. This leaves no space for allocating patient capital to 
technological capability upgrading and innovation activities as the companies are in survival mode. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions 
9.0 Introduction 
In chapter 1, I argued that contemporary discourses on African local pharmaceutical manufacture 
revolved around economies of scale, technology, technology transfer, and human capital, 
neglecting a critical component; fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacture; the fIrst gap in 
knowledge. Where literature does address fmancing of African local pharmaceutical manufacture, 
it is cursory and scratches the surface. This is especially so for long-term fmance which is 
identifIed as a major hurdle to increasing local productive capacity. Contemporary discourses 
make it just about getting money from the bank ignoring the complexities surrounding fInancing 
local pharmaceutical manufacture. From an innovation and fmance interface perspective, there are 
complexities and technological capabilities as well as expertise and knowledge surrounding 
fmancing of African local pharmaceutical manufacturing. Pharmaceutical companies require 
project fmance capability to access fmancial resources for physical investment. Financial 
institutions also require expertise and knowledge to assess, approve, disburse, monitor, and control 
loans disbursed to borrowers. The lack of focus on the complexities, expertise, knowledge and 
technological capabilities surrounding fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacture is the second 
gap in knowledge that I identifIed (see chapter 1). 
In this chapter, I bring it all together, looking at what I set out to study, what I found, what it means 
and what the implications for technological capability upgrading and innovation for African local 
pharmaceutical production are. I discuss the gaps in knowledge I identifIed in chapter 1, how I set 
to fInd out empirical information to fIll those gaps, what I found, and how it fIlls the gap. I also 
discuss contributions to knowledge that this study makes and conclude by offering opportunities 
for further research and the limitations that I faced. I set up the rest of the chapter as follows: in 
section 9.1 I recap the research and in section 9.2 I discuss the key fmdings by research question. 
In section 9.3 I discuss the limitations faced in this study and in section 9.4 I discuss the 
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implications for policy. I turn to implications for theory in section 9.5, followed by opportunities 
for future research in section 9.6 and conclude the chapter with section 9.7. 
9.1 Recap of Research 
As mentioned earlier the two main gaps in knowledge that I identified were: 
(i) Neglect of financing of local pharmaceutical manufacture in contemporary academic and 
professional discourses on African local pharmaceutical manufacture (see chapter 1) 
(ii) The assumption in contemporary discourses on fmancing of local pharmaceutical 
manufacture that is just about getting money, neglecting the complexities and 
technological capabilities surrounding fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacture. 
To study the fmancing of African local pharmaceutical manufacture, I chose to focus on the 
fmancing of antiretroviral drug (ARV) manufacture in Zimbabwe. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
Zimbabwean pharmaceutical sector was set up as early as 1953 and the fmancial architecture dates 
back to the early 1890s. From a policy perspective, ARV manufacture commenced on the back of 
a compulsory license from the government with a guarantee for 75% procurement of all production 
for the public health system. 
9.1.1 The research questions 
The main research question for the study was: How is local manufacture of ARVs in Zimbabwe 
financed and what are the complexities and technological capabilities surrounding its 
financing? 
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In order to unravel the complexity surrounding financing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe I split 
up the main research question into five research questions as follows: 
Research question 1: How are capital investment and working capital requirements for ARV 
research and development, and manufacture fmanced? 
Research question 2: As the most prevalent source of external fmance for enterprises, what role 
do commercial banks play in fmancing ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
Research question 3: At firm level, what technological capabilities are required for 
pharmaceutical companies to access fmance and the expertise and 
capabilities at banks required for loan origination? 
Research question 4: What institutional factors drive bank strategy on revenue streams, lending, 
who to lend to and at what price? 
Research question 5: What are the key business and operating environmental factors that 
influence fmancing of ARV manufacture in Zimbabwe? 
9.2 Key Findings by Research Question 
In this section, I present briefly the key fmdings that address each research question and point out 
which empirical chapters the fmdings come from. I start with research question 1 in section 9.2.1 
and follow through with each of the research questions 2,3,4 and 5 in sections 9.2.2; 9.2.3; 9.2.4; 
and 9.2.5 respectively. 
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9.2.1 Research question 1: Chapters 5 and 6 
In this section, I discuss the key [mdings from chapters 5 and 6 that address research question 1. In 
order to be systematic, I start by addressing capital investment and then move on to working capital 
investment. 
The pharmaceutical companies did not seek capital investment finance for ARV manufacturing as 
separate project finance. For the ARVs they are currently manufacturing, they do not need ARV 
specific machinery. Consequently, they purchase capital equipment of universal utility (see chapter 
5). Capital investment was financed by internal funds, cross-shareholder loans and in one instance 
by an international organisation; UNDP. Varichem received usn 2.1 million from UNDP, which 
they used to upgrade their plant culminating in WHO pre-qualification. CAPS on the other hand 
leveraged cross-shareholding with Fredex Financials to receive a loan for re-tooling (see section 
6.2). 
The companies are, however seeking long-term loans collectively in the range of USD 12 million 
to a maximum of usn 22 million (see Table 6.3). These funds are being sought through the 
ZETRAF facility, which currently is only funded at usn 70 million but has been hamstrung 
because the local bank through which the funds were channelled by the Ministry of Finance and 
Afreximbank was placed under curatorship for corporate governance deficiencies as some directors 
are alleged to have allowed excessive insider loans27• The government is trying to recover the 
funds. There was no FDI into the sector. No international pharmaceutical companies operate in 
Zimbabwe, which explains the dearth of FDI. In the current economic environment and the 
indigenisation drive it is highly unlikely that FDI may be a source of capital for technology 
imports. 
27 http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46093:rbz-tasked-to-recover-
us47m_interfm-owes-govt&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, accessed 5 July, 2012 
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For working capital fmance, the pharmaceutical companies accessed working capital fInance from 
banks but depended more on their own internally generated resources to fInance day to day 
operations (see chapter 5 and 6). As in capital investment fInance, the pharmaceutical companies 
do not source working capital fmance separately for ARV manufacturing. The funding is sourced 
for the total portfolio of products they manufacture (see chapters 5 and 6). CAPS pharmaceuticals 
accessed short-term loans of usn 5.9 million at a weighted average interest rate of20%, as at end 
of year 2010 (see table 6.2). Another pharmaceutical company accessed usn 2.3 million out of 
usn 6.7 million short-term lines of credit, at an average interest rate of 14 to 18% per annum (see 
Table 6.5). Another pharmaceutical company only revealed that they currently have a short-term 
line of credit of USD SOOK and did not disclose their outstandings on that short term line of credit. 
The cost of bank funding is very high, on average interest rates range from 16 to 30% per annum. 
The banks charge high interest rates and enjoy very high interest spreads, winning both ways, as 
they pay no deposit interest but charge high lending interest. In addition, banks short date lending 
facilities to collecting management fees more frequently. They use this strategy to increase their 
non-funded revenue streams. Consequently, pharmaceutical companies, wherever possible prefer 
to use internal funds to minimise expensive bank fInance. The expensive bank fInance has caused 
operational problems for CAPS, as the local short-term loans (about usn 5.9 million in 2010) from 
local commercial banks have been called up. The banks have sought court action to auction the 
company's fIxed properties to recover their funds. CAPS argued that expensive bank fmance at a 
weighted average interest rate of20% per annum had choked their operations (see section 6.3). 
Trade credit, a possible source of working capital fmance advanced as in-kind fmance by suppliers 
of goods and services is not available (see section 5.3). The pharmaceutical companies have low 
bargaining power with Indian and Chinese suppliers of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APls) 
and excipients. They pay in advance for the raw materials, locking up capital for as long as four 
months at a time. As the pharmaceutical companies give their buyers credit terms, they fmance 
their buyers (see section 5.4). The pharmaceutical companies fmance their suppliers; a perverse 
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subsidy to big suppliers. By fInancing their buyers, their cashflows are severely constrained 
pushing them to access expensive bank: debt for working capital requirements. 
I now address research question 2 in section 9.4.2. 
9.2.2 Research question 2: Chapters 5 and 6 
In this section, I discuss the key fmdings from chapters 5 and 6 that address research question 2. 
The banks played no role in capital investment, signifying a failure to finance technological 
capability upgrading, and product and process innovation. The situation may change as facilities 
such as ZETRAF (Zimbabwe Economic Trade Revival Facility) a joint venture between the 
Ministry of Finance and Afreximbank channels long-tenn funds for recapitalisation through local 
commercial banks. The other option for capital investment fmancing is regional banks with the 
ability to leverage their reputation on international markets and borrow funds for on-lending to 
local enterprises via local banks or directly (see chapter 6). 
As for working capital finance, banks played an active role; however, pharmaceutical companies 
argue that the interest rates and other charges are exorbitant. In the case of CAPS, the banks called 
up their short tenn loans after CAPS failed to service its debts. CAPS on the other hand argued 
that the exorbitant interest rates of 20% per annum were too onerous and choked their operations. 
Commercial banks in Zimbabwe favour short-tenn fInance and avoid long tenn fInancing (see 
section 2.7 and chapter 6). The banks charge very high interest rates, enjoy high interest spreads 
and lend very little citing adverse selection and moral hazard issues, whereas the politics of lending 
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explains why they prefer transactional banking to traditional lending as they avoid risk, maturity 
and liquidity transformation activities involved in lending (see section 6.5). 
9.2.3 Research question 3: Chapters 5 and 6 
In this section, I discuss key fmdings from chapters 5 and 6 that address research question 3. In 
addressing research question 3, I start with the technological capabilities around accessing fmance 
at pharmaceutical companies then move to the situation in banks. 
Pharmaceutical companies failed to access offshore long-term fmance because of lack of project 
fmance capability (see section 5.5). Other Zimbabwean enterprises and pharmaceutical companies 
in Uganda, Kenya and Malawi raised long-term fmance from PTA Bank. Project fmance capability 
is critical for accessing fmancial resources for technological capability upgrading through 
importation of plant, equipment and machinery. Executives in pharmaceutical companies failed to 
initiate links with financiers and within the economy. Lack of linkage capability in exchanging 
knowledge and information with the fmancial sector resulted in the executives not being aware of 
regional opportunities to access long-term loans for importing technology. 
In chapter 1, I argued that literature on finance tends to focus on fmance aspects of banking and an 
innovation lens to the best of my knowledge had not been used to unravel the technological 
capabilities surrounding loan origination. I proceeded to map Lall's (1992) firm level 
technological capabilities framework developed for the manufacturing and productive sector to the 
financial services industry. In section 6.4 and Table 6.6, I demonstrated that Lall's (1992) firm 
level technological capability framework could be mapped across to Zimbabwean fmancial 
institutions to demonstrate the complexities and technological capabilities surrounding financing 
ARV manufacture. Table 6.6, shows firm level technological capabilities surrounding assessment, 
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risk analysis, approval, disbursement, monitoring, and control of a project fmance loan in a bank 
include project fmance capability, investment capability (pre-investment and project execution), 
process engineering, product engineering, and linkage capability, demonstrating technological 
capabilities required by banks to advance loans. This is one of the complexities that I had argued 
was ignored in contemporary discourses. The discussion in section 6.4 shows that Zimbabwean 
fmancial institutions are facing serious challenges in the level of expertise and experience in these 
technological capabilities surrounding project fmance appraisal, approval, disbursement, 
monitoring, and control, as the institutions lost old timers and merchant banks. 
In the next section, I turn to research question 4 in section 9.4.4. 
9.2.4 Research question 4: Chapter 6 
In this section, I discuss the key fmdings from chapter 6 that address research question 3. I propose 
the politics of lending as an additional explanation, to moral hazard and adverse selection, of why 
Zimbabwean banks and by extrapolation, African banks lend so little, at high interest rates and high 
interest spreads. In section 6.5, I discussed how bank ownership drives strategy for revenue stream 
preference with non-funded income (fees and commissions) taking prominence over risk income 
(lending income) for international banks. They prefer that operational costs be covered by non-
funded income from non-risk based activities. Consequently, this promotes transactional-based 
banking activities over traditional lending. Banks argue that lending activities, considering risk 
weight adjusted capital measures chew capital and should be avoided (see section 6.5.2). This 
model, driven by institutional policy on revenue strategies of commercial banks is implicit credit 
rationing, and encourages managers to prefer less risky business. Thus, politics of lending can 
impact credit allocation to pharmaceutical companies which are locally owned, small to medium 
enterprises that require the heavily weighted lending assets. A micro level institutional policy 
rations credit via capital utilisation strategy and risk-reward metrics; a politics of lending 
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explanation for low lending by African banks. This may be one of the explanations for Allen et 
aI's (2008) fmdings that average credit extended to the private sector in Africa was 15% of GDP 
compared to 28 to 45% for other developing regions, in addition to the classical moral hazard and 
adverse selection theses. 
The second issue on politics of lending relates to borrower company ownership and market 
segmentation. Foreign owned banks are inclined to favourably consider subsidiaries of 
multinational companies, especially subsidiaries of MNCs that the international banks have a 
global relationship with.28 Subsidiaries of MNCs have greater chances of accessing credit because 
of credit assessment tools setup in banks, which allocates better credit rating to subsidiaries of 
MNCs (see section 6.5.1). The credit score or credit grade determines premiums on interest and 
resultantly local companies are likely to pay higher premiums above the base lending rate, and 
management fees compared to subsidiaries of MNCs (see section 6.5.1). As such, credit policy 
setup may be a hurdle to accessing fmancial resources. 
9.2.5 Research question 5: Chapters 5,6 and 7 
In this section, I discuss the key fmdings from chapters 5.6 and 7 that address research question 5. 
Financing of local manufacture occurs in certain policy contexts and national technological 
capability frameworks. At fIrm level, investment, production and linkage capabilities determine 
the success of a company (see chapter 5). Operation of these different levels of capabilities are 
driven by policy regimes, implying when there is policy or practice failure at national technological 
capability level, there has to be a compensatory reaction at a fIrm level technological capability. 
This usually manifests in investment in complementary infrastructure (see section 7.2.1), and 
policy and practice gridlocks. Gridlocks can be caused by policy, practice, and capability failures 
at national level, forcing fIrm level compensation. This inevitably impacts fInanciers' appetite for 
AR V manufacturing risk. 
28 Interviews held in Zimbabwe and practice as a banker working in both corporate and retail banking from 
1999 to 2006. 
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Phannaceutical companies purchased standby generators to ensure consistent supply of electricity 
(complementary capital), and sunk boreholes to ensure consistent water supplies, diverting funds 
from productive activities (see chapter 5). In addition to physical infrastructure failure, the 
incentives and institutional support that Lall (1992) advocates for, are lacking in Zimbabwe making 
the business and operating environment hostile to fmancing ARV manufacture (see chapter 7). 
Financial institutions' credit policies, underwriting standards, capital utilisation strategies, and risk-
reward remuneration policies impact credit allocation to the pharmaceutical industry. Credit 
policies and lending technologies, which prefer short-tenn fmance and encourage revenue streams 
from non-interest incomes as opposed to interest (risk) incomes, is implicit credit rationing. For 
banks, policies at micro level de-emphasised merchant banks and pushed commercial banks to 
dominance. This shrunk a critical development space for capital investment as the fmancial system 
became short-termist, preferring to fmance trade and commerce at the expense of capital 
investment. Using the politics of lending lens I proposed an additional explanation to why banks 
lend little. 
Working together at policy and practice level, infrastructure failure, poor incentives, limited 
product portfolios, skewed import policies, lack of supporting strategies for local production, low 
financial deepening, policy conflict and policy misalignment contribute to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers struggling to access funding (see chapter 7). Financiers view such a business and 
operating environment as not being conducive to business viability and profitability that can 
support long-tenn finance. 
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9.3 Limitations of the Study 
The main limitations of a PhD study are resources and time, which necessitate a streamlined focus 
on the subject area and limited period of study. Additionally, I was not able to access financial 
statements for the privately held companies, which could have painted a richer picture of the 
fInancing story and fInancial health of the companies. I was also not able to access a company that 
used to manufacture ARVs but has since stopped manufacturing them. This company would have 
provided an interesting aspect of the challenges they faced. This however does not take away from 
the main thrust of understanding the source and cost of fInance for ARV manufacture in 
Zimbabwe, as I was able to access executives in the pharmaceutical and banking sectors to build a 
rich story of the financing of ARV manufacture for the company that is currently manufacturing 
ARVs. I also accessed two pharmaceutical companies that are not manufacturing ARVs which 
enriched the study further on challenges to local AR V manufacture. Where fmancing data was not 
availed, the executives provided candid responses to explain the story. 
This research done on Zimbabwe, a former British colony with essentially a British fmancial 
system still evident and just emerging from hyperinflation and an economic meltdown has its own 
peculiarities and the findings' applicability to other African countries could therefore be 
debateable. However, I have taken the view that the Zimbabwean scenario provides an accelerated 
window that precipitates a hight number of things that can go wrong and as such it provides a 
unique opportunity to understand the myriad challenges that African countries face in financing 
technological capability upgrading and innovation in local pharmaceutical manufacture. 
9.4 Implications for Policy 
In as much as this study focused on fmance and innovation; chapters 5, 6 and 7, demonstrate that 
fmance is part of an integrated system, with other issues such as technology, technology transfer, 
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human capital, ease of doing business, economic development, macroeconomic stability and trade 
policies. For example in chapter 5, fmance was described as being part of a number of 
fundamental issues that need to be addressed as fmance by itself is not the panacea. In addition, 
technological capabilities surrounding fmancing of ARV manufacture are likely to permeate other 
economic sectors, hence a systems approach would yield better results. 
In other words technological capabilities surrounding financing of local pharmaceutical 
manufacture do not operate in isolation but should be approached as a component of a system of 
national innovation (Adeoti, 2002; Christensen, 1992; Lundvall, 1998; 2007; Ernst and Lundvall, 
1998). The piecemeal approach of considering issues surrounding local pharmaceutical 
manufacture in silos, separate from health, industry, training institutions, tertiary educational 
institutions, technology, economic development and industrial development will not yield 
significant strides in technological capability upgrading and technological effort. 
I now turn specifically to the policy implications for fmancial systems and building capabilities in 
sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 respectively. 
9.4.1 Financial architecture that supports industrial fmance 
This study has shown that the current Zimbabwean financial architecture is not geared to fmancing 
industrial development, but trade and commerce. Reliance on FDI and foreign loans worked in the 
past, but there is a need to build capabilities to fmance industrial development using local 
resources. I am cognisant of the dichotomy in the types of savings required to fmance importation 
of plant, equipment, and machinery. As I argued, the critical savings that are required for 
importing technology are foreign currency savings. With the systems approach that I advocated 
for, it is then important for the country to earn foreign currency from exports and build adequate 
import cover. The second implication for policy would be to support syndicated lending with 
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offshore banks and promote the institutional arrangement innovation of the Afreximbank-ZETRAF 
facility. At this juncture, realistically, local savings cannot finance industrial growth and 
technological capability upgrading. In the interim, the Afreximbank-ZETRAF model provides a 
possible approach to fmancing industrial development not only in Zimbabwe but also in Africa. 
Domestic savings are important for fmancing local requirements and should be encouraged, and 
they would work well if backed with foreign currency reserves. If foreign currency is readily 
available, the same domestic savings can be used to import plant, equipment, and machinery. 
Pharmaceutical companies could access locallong-tenn loans and use the portion that they require 
to import technology by purchasing foreign currency on the market. In doing so they avoid foreign 
currency risk by locking their liabilities in local currency. However, this is premised on foreign 
currency being freely available on the market. Commercial mortgage fmance should be 
encouraged as it plays a role in building a platform for industrial development. 
From a policy perspective there is a need to encourage financial institutions to start lending long-
term. However as argued earlier in the study, this is driven largely by macroeconomic and political 
stability as well as predictability. 
9.4.2 Support for building capabilities 
From an incentives and capabilities development approach, the role of the state is critical for 
creating an enabling environment. Wade (2009) points at the resurgence of industrial policy, and 
suggests the Industrial Development Bureaus (IDB) model of Taiwan. Cognisant of the different 
contexts and nuances between Taiwan and many African countries, there still are certain aspects 
such as extension using experts in engineering, accounting, marketing and other sectors to 
encourage and stimulate product and process innovation in conjunction with fiscal incentives (tax 
deductions, accelerated depreciation and trade tools) for temporary protection with clear sunset 
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clauses. This may stimulate local capabilities in manufacturing, at the same time it may foster 
competitiveness. 
What is important is that there needs to be a coordinator for building capabilities for technological 
capability upgrading. And Wade's (2009) suggestion of the IDB seems a feasible option. A piece-
meal approach to building capabilities is unlikely to have an impact on technological effort and 
innovation capacity. 
9.5 Implications for Theory 
This study contributes to theory from three fronts. The first contribution of this study is that it is 
the first of its kind in Zimbabwe and to the best of my knowledge in Africa that links finance and 
innovation by considering the technological capabilities surrounding financing of local 
pharmaceutical manufacture. Secondly, it is the first study to gather empirical evidence on the 
politics of lending and thirdly it is the first to map LaII's (1992) firm level technological 
capabilities to the fmancial services sector to unravel the complexities surrounding loan 
origination. 
9.5.1 Project ("mance in Lall's (1992) technological capabilities framework 
I argued in chapter 3 that the defmition of firm level technological capabilities should be expanded 
to include project finance capability. However, project finance capability is linked to investment 
capability. Lall (1992) may have omitted project fmance capability by mentioning without delving 
into details that efficient financial systems were essential for garnering fmancial resources for 
physical investment. However, African fmancial systems are anything but efficient. The 
incorporation of project fmance capability in the finn level technological capabilities can assist in 
unravelling skills necessary to fmance technological capability upgrading. This will enrich the 
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local phannaceutical manufacturing debates by purposively linking project fmance capability with 
the ability to garner financial resources for importing plant, equipment and machinery. 
9.5.2 Financial services sector using LaD's (1992) technological capabilities 
framework 
Another theoretical contribution is the demonstration that the fum level technological capability 
framework can be mapped across to a firm in the fmancial services sector. This may provide a 
conceptual framework to analyse the fmancial services firm using Lall's (1992) fum level 
technological capabilities with some modifications. I applied LaII's firm level technological 
capability to the fmancial service firm specifically the lending business, focusing on loan 
origination. 
9.5.3 The Politics of Lending 
Lastly, the study introduced the politics of lending perspective as an additional lens for explaining 
why African banks lend so little at high interest rates and huge interest spreads. The politics of 
lending lens augments the moral hazard and adverse selection explanations by authors such as 
Allen et ai, (2011), Andrianova (2010; 20 II a; 20 II b) and Nissanke (200 I). The politics of lending 
uses financial intermediation theory to ascertain which activities fmancial intermediaries engage in 
providing a window to understand bank behaviour towards lending. 
9.6 Future Research 
For future research, I observed an interesting phenomenon of institutional or organisational 
arrangement innovation between Afreximbank and Ministry of Finance that has allowed long-term 
fmance to be made available for recapitalisation. This institutional or organisational innovation is 
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similar to health Product Development Partnerships (PDPs) (Chataway et al., 2009,2010) that have 
been used as brokers and facilitators to allocate resources into research and development activities 
for diseases for the poor. It would be interesting to compare and contrast the organisational 
innovation from a social technology perspective, and ascertain whether this could be a way to make 
long term finance become accessible to resource limited African countries in as much as PDPs are 
being promoted to address neglected diseases and cater for the poor (ibid). This study 
demonstrated that sub-Saharan Africa generally does not have local resources to finance 
technological capability upgrading and innovation. The institutional arrangement innovation 
provides a possible vehicle for fmancing sub-Saharan industrial development and needs to be 
investigated further. 
The second avenue for future research that this study opens is the politics of lending lens. It may 
be interesting to investigate the prevalence and depth of this phenomenon in other African 
countries. 
9.7 Conclusion 
In chapter I, I argued that there is an elephant in the room; the fmancing of African local 
pharmaceutical manufacture. I proceeded to argue that financing of local pharmaceutical 
manufacture was a critical component of African local drug production and should be incorporated 
into discourses on economies of scale, technology, technology transfer, and human capital. I 
argued that contemporary discourses on fmancing local manufacture scratch the surface and make 
it an issue of just providing fmance, whereas there are complexities and technological capabilities 
required at pharmaceutical companies to access project finance, especially foreign currency project 
fmance to import technology for technological capability upgrading. Banks as well have 
complexities and technological capabilities surrounding project fmance assessment, approval, 
funds disbursement, monitoring, and control of the advanced loans. I further argued that there is a 
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politics of lending dimension that has not been discussed in contemporary discourses as well as 
how national technological capabilities interact with flrm level technological capabilities to 
influence the business and operating environment. Failure at practice and policy level of national 
and technological capabilities, impacts business and operating environments. This drives 
fmanciers' appetite for risk in terms of lending to local pharmaceutical companies. 
I have demonstrated that fmancing of local pharmaceutical manufacture is a complex issue. This 
study unravelled project and linkage capability challenges faced by pharmaceutical companies in 
accessing fmancial resources for technological capability upgrading. The long-term loans needed 
are foreign currency loans to import capital equipment (the physical embodiment of technology) 
(Dailami and Walton, 1989). Many African countries do not have efflcient fmancial systems and 
the local commercial bank dominated fmancial systems are not geared to fmance foreign currency 
long term loans. Project fmance and linkage capabilities are key technological capabilities required 
to access fmancial resources. 
What is critical at this stage is to realise that debates on African local pharmaceutical manufacture 
need to consider the sources of fmance for working capital and capital investment if technological 
capability and innovation is to be accelerated. Assuming that there are efflcient fmancial systems 
and that investment and project finance capabilities exist in the pharmaceutical and banking 
industry would be erroneous. There is a need for realisation that the pharmaceutical manufacturing 
companies flght for the fmancial resources to upgrade technological capability with other economic 
sectors and they need to build effective linkages that enable them to access the appropriate 
resources for industrial development. For policy makers this study has shown that there are politics 
of lending at play in the banking sector and that there are no local foreign currency savings to 
flnance long term investment. Institutions arrangement innovations such as the ZETRAF fund 
provide a window to fmancing industrial development. 
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11: Appendix 
Interview guide and Consent Form 
o I am conducting a case study of how ARV manufacture was fmanced in Zimbabwe. 
o To do this I am conducting discussions with a number of organisations who are involved 
in the financing, manufacture and procurement of AR VS including your organisation. 
o I am interested to know about: 
a. Banking relationships and credit facilities to pharmaceutical companies. 
b. Financing of working capital requirements, machinery, equipment purchases and factory 
upgrades. 
c. Source of funds and procurement policies of purchasers of locally manufactured AR V s. 
o The interview should take approximately one hour, please ask at any time if you would 
like clarification on any aspect of the interview. 
o Information collected in the interviews could be pooled with information from other 
informants and attributed to a named group of actors e.g. policy makers or used to express 
anonymously the views of informants. 
o I will not attribute anything in the report to you personally. 
o You can go "off the record" and "on the record" at any point during the interview and you 
can terminate the interview at any point. Information given off record will not be recorded 
and will not be reported. 
o You can also withdraw from participating in the research. 
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o The infonnation I receive from these interviews will go towards my PhD thesis. I will also 
try to disseminate the findings further e.g. in a journal. Transcripts of the interview will be 
sent to you after within 30 days after the interview. 
o Any ideas that you have regarding the research would be very helpful. Please mention 
them at any point. 
o Do you have any comments on these uses for the infonnation? How would you like me to 
use the infonnation? 
o You can get in touch with my supervisors ifthere are any issues you may want to discuss. 
Professor J. Chataway G.chataway@open.ac.uk), Dr R. Hanlin (r.e.hanlin@open.ac.uk) or 
Dr R. Simonetti (r.simonetti@open.ac.uk). 
Development Policy & Practice 
Faculty of Maths, Computing and Technology 
The Open University 
Walton Hall 
Milton Keynes 
MK76AA 
Contact telephone: +44 1908 655708. 
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Finance 
1. How many banks/financial institutions do you have a lending relationship with? 
2. Are there any other banks that you use for deposits only? 
3. How did you finance ARV manufacture at: 
a. Project proposal stage 
b. Implementation stage 
c. Import of machinery 
d. Current day to day operations 
4. How much did you spend on machinery imports for ARV manufacture from 2002 
to date? 
5. Did you get any short term loans (up to 1 year loans) from financial institutions 
from 2002 to date: be thy Overdrafts, Bankers Acceptances, Short Term loans, 
Guarantees, or Letters of Credit amongst others? 
a. What were the amounts (even in Zimbabwe dollars)? 
b. What were the interest rates? 
c. What was the management fee charge? 
d. What were the draw-down and establishment fees? 
6. Did you get any medium term loans (2 to 4 years loans) from financial institutions 
from 2002 to date? 
a. What were the amounts (even in Zimbabwe dollars)? 
b. What were the interest rates? 
c. What was the management fee charge? 
d. What were the draw-down and establishment fees? 
7. Did you get any long term loans (5 to 10 years loans) from financial institutions 
from 2002 to date? 
a. What were the amounts (even in Zimbabwe dollars)? 
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b. What were the interest rates? 
c. What was the management fee charge? 
d. What were the draw-down fees and establishment fees? 
8. Did you use your own resources for machinery imports and plant refurbishments? 
a. How much was it? . 
b. What was it used to purchase? 
9. What proportion of your foreign currency needs to did you manage to get in the 
period 2002 to date? 
Research and Development 
1. What are the current R&D activities in Zimbabwe? 
2. Which aspect of R&D costs the most? 
3. How do you manage bio tests for ARVs? 
4. How do you manage drug registrations for ARVs in Zimbabwe? 
5. Are there sufficient legal skills in Zimbabwe to handle drug registrations and 
challenge patents? 
6. What are the effects of TRIPS on local R&D on ARV drugs? 
7. Do you have any joint venture initiatives with companies such as Roche for 
technology transfer in ARV manufacture? 
8. How have you managed to keep abreast of recent developments in ARV 
manufacture technology? 
9. How have you managed the skills flight issue? 
10. What is the future of R&D at Varichem specifically and in Zimbabwe generally? 
309 
Procurement 
1. Who are the main suppliers for ARV raw materials? 
2. What is the spread of the suppliers geographically? 
3. What are the terms of supply? .. Open terms, 30,60, 90 days or advance payment? 
4. Do you get any benefits/incentives for paying in advance or earlier? 
5. Do you have any power when negotiating prices with suppliers? 
6. What are the lead times on the different supplies? 
7. Which raw materials account for the greatest value? 
8. Which raw materials account for the greatest volume? 
Logistics 
9. How do you handle customs clearance? 
10. Do you have an in-house team or do you outsource? 
11. Is the duty structure and VAT systems advantageous to you as an industry? 
12. What are the bank charges for handling import/export documents? 
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Sales and Marketing 
1. What is the estimated market size for ARVs in Zimbabwe and the region? 
2. Who are your customers? 
3. What is the spread of the customers geographically? 
4. Do you have a regionaVintemational thrust? 
5. What are the factors that you consider in the pricing of ARVs? 
6. Do you get a price preference of up to 15% by local purchasers? 
7. It has been reported that Indian pharmaceutical companies generally display more 
interest in the more lucrative North American and European markets. 
a. Which section of Indian pharmaceuticals companies (big, medium or small) 
is in direct competition with local pharmaceutical industry on ARVs and 
other drugs? 
b. Do you have local competitive advantage in local and regional markets for 
ARVs? 
8. How do you manage competition from Indian and Chinese imports? 
9. Does the fact that health insurance seems low affect the volume of sales of drugs in 
Zimbabwe, especially ARVs? 
10. How do you manage the sales/tender process? 
11. How do you manage your distribution costs? 
12. Do you have a Relationship Management model for your sales process? 
13. How successful have you been with WHO, Global Fund and PEPFAR tenders? 
14. What are your sales tenns? 
a. Open account? 
b. Advance payment? 
c. Letter of Credit backed orders? 
d. 30 days? 
e. 60 days? 
f. 90 days? 
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Production 
1. May you please briefly describe the process of manufacturing ARV s. 
2. What are the critical inputs and how do you manage them? 
3. What process/item(s) account for the largest cost of production? 
4. What is the average age of your machinery and how much lifespan is left? 
5. Have you refurbished any machines and increased the lifespan? 
6. What is the historical and current cost of maintenance? 
7. How did you achieve GMP and WHO pre-qualification standards? 
8. What is the cost of compliance? 
9. How are you handing the issue of skills challenges? 
10. What do you need to increase productive capacity? 
11. What do you need to become world-class and compete with international 
pharmaceutical companies? 
12. How are you ensuring technology transfer? 
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